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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effect of wealth inequality on UK economic growth in 
recent decades with a heterogeneous-agent growth model where agents can enhance 
individual productivity growth by allocating time to entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship cost is negatively correlated to individual wealth which originates 
from the fact that the rich are more likely to undertake entrepreneurship than the poor. 
An appropriate wealth concentration to the rich theoretically stimulates their 
entrepreneurship incentives and then aggregate growth. Given UK quarterly data from 
1978 to 2015, our model cannot be rejected to be true using the Indirect Inference 
method. The empirical study finds that our structural model could generate a stable 
relation between inequality and growth and model simulations could fit main 
properties of UK economy. Wealth inequality is found to stimulate economic growth, 
especially in a long term. Policy makers have to face a trade-off when conduct a 
redistribution policy like taxation because inequality reduction will be followed by a 
slow-down of economic growth. Moreover, as redistribution tax rate increases, growth 
reduction has a gradiently increasing trend and thus a moderate tax rate is a priority 
option for policy makers. Our comparison between tax regimes shows that the tax 
transferring income from the rich to the poor is preferred to others. 
Key words: heterogeneous-agent model, entrepreneuring, aggregate growth, wealth 
inequality, redistribution, indirect inference 
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1 
1 Introduction 
Representative-agent model (RAM) with the assumption that economic agents have 
identical behaviour and expectation is the most important and prevailing idea of 
macroeconomic and financial modeling. However, it is frequently found incapable to 
explain some complex economic phenomena and fit some stylised facts. For instance, 
in asset pricing studies, the puzzles why the equity premium is extremely high and 
why the risk-free rate is extremely low, etc. can hardly be explained by RAMs. In 
business cycle studies, the questions why labour volatilities are relatively high and 
why wealth and income distribution across agents are dynamic, etc. can also not be 
answered by RAMs. Bewley (1980) (1983) firstly establishes a heterogeneous-agent 
model (HAM) to consider various individual behaviours by introducing idiosyncratic 
shocks (individual income endowments) and incomplete capital asset market (i.e. 
borrowing constraint where no borrowing is allowed in his model) which determine 
different state conditions across agents when optimal decisions are made and then 
generate heterogeneity. As the development of computational techniques and 
numerical algorithms as well as the popularity of microeconomic data in recent 
decades, HAM has been more widely used. 
Development of HAM and the relevant numerical algorithm experiences three 
important stages. In the early stage, only idiosyncratic shocks (like individual income 
uncertainty and employment uncertainty) are employed for heterogeneity. For 
example, Hansen (l985) and Aiyagari & Gertler (1991), etc. use HAMs to explain the 
asset puzzles by “self-insurance” behaviours that individuals demand much more 
risk-free assets than liquidity assets due to the uncertainty of income. Aiyagari (1994), 
extremely renowned in this area, uses an HAM to explain why individual wealth and 
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consumption are much more volatile than aggregate ones by defining a special 
equilibrium distribution where a constant real interest rate exists such that aggregate 
variables remain unchanged while individual ones could be time-variant. The 
numerical algorithm in first generation models concentrates on solving for 
equilibrium market prices like real interest rate. The second generation represented by 
Diaz-Gimenez and Prescott (1992), and Krusell and Smith (1998) (2006) aims to 
overcome the shortcoming of the first generation that aggregate volatility is lack in 
despite of sufficient individual volatilities by introducing both idiosyncratic shocks 
and aggregate uncertainties. They develop a new method to solve models by 
searching for an equilibrium law of motion for (wealth) distribution around which 
some new numerical algorithms are developed. Distribution is generally described by 
finite order moments for simplification and individual decisions are assumed to be 
made based on distribution moments. However, there might be an 
infinite-dimensional issue if high order moments are consider for individual optimal 
decisions. Hence, moment order is finally diminished to one which result in the so 
called “approximate aggregation” raised by Krusell and Smith that the mean of 
(wealth) distribution and aggregate shock could well determine the aggregate 
behaviour. The first two generations generally solve models by approximating a 
continuum of agents to a finitely large number of agents in practice. As some 
theoretical derivations are based on the assumption of continuous agents, this 
approximation might lead to variant sampling errors. The third generation emphasises 
on solving models with a continuum of individuals and moreover attempts to remove 
the dependence on aggregate law of motions when solve for individual behaviours. 
For instance, Algan et al (2008) and Bohacek and Kejak (2005) develop a projection 
method on Krusell and Smith’s model. Reiter (2009) and Young (2010) adopt a 
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combination of perturbation and projection methods. In most third generation 
algorithms, aggregate law is not essential to solution for individual behaviour, but 
instead they search for equilibrium cross-agents distributions in each period described 
by density functions, resulting in that “approximation aggregation” is not an 
inevitable finding.  
Although the three generation models are helpful to explain some properties of 
business cycles, the long-run effects of wealth and income distributions on economic 
growth which takes increasingly more attention are not concerned.1 Conversely, 
many other scholars establish theoretical models in order to derive an analytical 
relation between inequality across agents and aggregate growth rate, especially the 
inequality effect on growth rather than stimulate important individual behaviours and 
distributional properties as reality, with neither analytical or numerical solutions. Most 
of these growth models are developed from OLG models with different mechanisms 
of inequality effects on growth such as indivisible investment or labour, incomplete 
market barriers, “Median Voter Theorem” and security hazard. Given theoretical 
support of these models, many empirical studies on how inequality affects growth 
which generally adopt regression analysis are developed. Their regression methods 
include cross-country regression for which least squares estimation is frequently used 
and panel data regression where pooled least square, general GMM, difference GMM 
and system GMM are optional. After decades of debate, there is still no consensus on 
whether inequality could stimulate or impede economic growth has no consensus. For 
example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) with cross-country OLS, Deininger and Olinto 
(2000) with panel system GMM and Bagchi and Svejnar (2015) with panel difference 
                                                             
1 The effects of wealth or income distributions on growth are generally explained as stochastic ones 
due to exogenous shocks in all the three generation frameworks. 
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GMM find a negative effect of inequality (income or wealth) on economic growth. 
Contrarily, Perotti (1996) with cross-country OLS, Barro (2000) with panel random 
effects LS, Forbes (2000) with panel difference GMM and Ostry et al. (2014) with 
panel system GMM find a positive inequality effect (some only in developed 
countries). Overall as Halter et al. (2014) pointed out, both estimation method and 
sample employed have considerable influences on the estimated inequality effects. In 
fact lack of sufficient variations of some inequality indicators and complex 
interactions between inequality and growth make regression analysis less efficient. 
This paper aims to establish a heterogeneous-agent growth model to fit 
distributional characteristics of UK economy in recent decades and further study the 
wealth inequality effects on UK economic growth. We introduce heterogeneity into an 
endogenous growth model on the basis of Minford et al (2007)’s model by classifying 
population into two different groups for simplification, say the rich who own higher 
capital holdings and the poor. Individuals can allocate their same time endowment to 
leisure, labour and entrepreneurship incentive (time) where personal entrepreneurship 
incentive drives individual productivity growth and is also costly with per unit time 
cost 𝜋𝑡 . Our development is to relate individual entrepreneurship cost to capital 
distribution so that the rich have more entrepreneurship incentives than the poor. This 
idea comes from the fact that the rich have sufficient wealth to do surplus activity. We 
are not going to deny the success of a few entrepreneurs from impoverished 
backgrounds. However, it is easy to enumerate more successful entrepreneurs born in 
rich families or the middle class, such as John Pierpont Morgan, Rupert Murdoch and 
Warren Edward Buffett, William Henry Gates III and Steven Paul Jobs etc. Levine 
and Rubinstein (2013) investigate who are more likely to become Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs measured by the incorporated self-employed using NLSY79 data in US 
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and find that more entrepreneurs come from well-educated and high-income families. 
Since the macroeconomic behaviour comes from the aggregation of individual ones, 
our prospective effect of wealth inequality is that inequality concentrates wealth to the 
rich with more entrepreneurship incentives which enhances aggregate productivity 
growth and then economic growth. The traditional incomplete market assumption is 
released in the model as individuals have incentives to accumulate assets in order to 
pay entrepreneurship penalty and there is sufficient endogenous heterogeneity. 
We apply the growth model to UK economy with the quarterly data set after 
1978Q1 due to data availability where inequality of wealth and income is measured 
by share of allocations to the rich. The research method can be simply adopted on 
other countries. To ensure the rationality of further analysis, we first examine whether 
benchmark model could artificially a stable tendency of capital inequality and 
economic growth co-movement and also whether policy intervention for 
redistribution like taxation is feasible by starting with two Adhoc identical individual 
groups where posterior heterogeneity solely comes from randomly idiosyncratic 
shocks. Afterwards we assess whether our model fits UK stylised facts and provide 
policy suggestions according to empirical findings. What we are most interested in is 
not whether our model could perfectly fit all the aggregate and individual behaviours 
which in fact is difficult to be realised due to the application of both individual and 
aggregate data, but instead whether the model could fit some important characteristics 
relevant to our topic such as the relation between wealth inequality and growth. 
Therefore, we employ indirect inference (Id-If) early formally used by Le et al (2011) 
to test model and the testing power is found very high. The basic idea of Id-If model 
testing is as follows. Given the null hypothesis that structural model is true, one could 
firstly achieve structural errors according to the difference between actual data and 
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model computed values for variables and then bootstrap structural errors to obtain 
simulated samples.2 As model is assumed true, simulated data should have same 
properties as actual data and those properties are described by an auxiliary model 
which could be impulse response functions, moments of data and so on. We choose a 
VARX as the auxiliary model in practice including key variables we are interested in. 
Parameter estimation is also on the basis of Id-If that parameter values are searched 
for until null hypothesis is not rejectable. 
Our empirical study concludes three important findings. First of all, the structural 
model could generate a stable relation between inequality and growth and model 
simulation could fit main properties of UK actual data. Secondly, wealth inequality is 
found to have a stimulating effect on economic growth, especially in a long term. 
Lastly, although political redistribution intervention like income tax could reduce 
inequality to some extent, the corresponding cost is a slow-down of economic growth 
implying that policy makers have to face a trade-off. Moreover, as tax rate increases, 
growth reduction has a gradiently increasing trend and thus an appropriately low tax 
rate instead of a high rate is prior for policy makers. The comparison between tax 
regimes shows that an income transfer tax (transfer income from the rich to the poor) 
is preferred to other tax regimes.  
This paper has following structure. The current introduction is followed by 
Literature review in next section. Our model setting is illustrated in section 3. Then 
section 4 describes Indirect Inference method including model test and estimation in 
detail. Section 5 introduces employed data. Empirical results are described in section 
6, including detection on tendency, empirical study on actual data and redistribution. 
                                                             
2 In practice, we bootstrap innovations which are residuals of AR regressions on structural errors. See 
details in section 4. 
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The last section concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
We firstly take a review on some HAMs and relevant solution algorithms which are 
aimed at fitting distributional characteristics in real economy and interpreting some 
micro-behaviours which can hardly be explained by traditional RAMs. The first 
generation of HAMs has two key features, idiosyncratic risks which cannot be fully 
insured and incomplete capital market (i.e. borrowing constraints) originating from 
Bewley (1977). He theoretically studies the permanent income hypothesis (this 
hypothesis indicates that the response of consumption to temporary economic 
volatilities e.g. prices and income is smooth, different from Friedman’s long-run 
hypothesis). Consumer is assumed to face a borrowing constraint (no borrowing at all) 
and a random exogenous income. Consumer knows the probability of the stochastic 
environment and thus could change his savings to compensate the consumption. This 
mechanism is called “precautionary saving” nowadays. Then heterogeneity is 
introduced into macroeconomic models by Bewley (1980) (1983) to continuously 
study the permanent income hypothesis by setting multi-sectors and multi-consumers 
with random income endowments. Afterwards, HAM is widely applied in studying 
some important features of business cycles (e.g. volatilities of labour) and the asset 
pricing. 
Hansen (l985) concerns one important labour property in business cycles that 
fluctuations of aggregate working hours are mainly caused by the fluctuations in the 
employment status instead of the individual working hours of the employed workers. 
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Hence, in his second model, consumers supply the indivisible random labour (either 
work full-time or does not work) and probably receives a subsidy “lottery” from firms 
to insure the unemployment. The steady-state allocations, however, are same as those 
in his first homogeneous-agent model because of the unemployment insurance (a 
full-insurance will be chosen in equilibrium). In the field of asset pricing, Aiyagari & 
Gertler (1991) use a numerical method to jointly study two asset puzzles: why the 
equity premium is extremely high and why the risk-free rate is extremely low, based 
on the Bewley model together with transaction costs.3 The crucial step of the 
computational algorithm is to find a constant real interest rate which guarantees a 
steady state.4 Huggett (1993) focuses on the second asset puzzle in a pure exchange 
environment where the individual borrowing constraint is expressed as the “credit 
balance” which is always greater than a given negative lower bound. The price of the 
credit balance plays the similar role as the interest rate in Aiyagari and Gertler 
(1991).5 Both find the puzzles could be explained by “self-insurance” behaviours that 
individuals demand much more risk-free assets than liquidity assets due to the 
uncertainty of income. 
The widespread adoption of heterogeneity in macroeconomic modeling benefits 
from the development in the computational algorithm. Aiyagari (1994) makes an 
honorable contribution to this development. In his Bewley model, each individual has 
budget constraint  𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖,𝑡 where individual asset  𝑎𝑡 ≥
                                                             
3 There are two securities, treasury bills without exchange cost and stocks with exchange cost. 
4 The details of the computational algorithm of a sort are illustrated later in Aiyagari (1994). 
5 The algorithm in Huggett (1993) is similar as the one in Aiyagari & Gertler (1991) and Aiyagari 
(1994). However, different from using a bisection method to update the interest rate in Aiyagari (1994), 
the price of credit balance, q, will be raised if current q leads to an excess demand for credit while will 
be decreased if else.  
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−Φ; 𝑐𝑡 ≥ 0
6 and the individual labor 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑥] follows ln 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌 ln 𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝜎√(1 − 𝜌2) ∙ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0,1).
7 The average labor is always a constant 𝑙.̅ The wage 
rate w is constant equal to the average marginal labor productivity. He focuses on the 
stationary equilibrium characterised by a constant real interest rate r which equals the 
marginal capital productivity. To consider the wealth movement, he defines individual 
total wealth (resource) as 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)?̂?𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟Φ where the individual asset 
demand is  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + Φ . Solve individual’s problem using the rewritten 
constraint  𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 to obtain individual optimal asset demand 
function ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+1 = ℎ(𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑏, 𝑤, 𝑟) while individual wealth evolves following 𝑧𝑖,𝑡+1 =
𝑤𝑙𝑖,𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑟)ℎ(𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑏, 𝑤, 𝑟) − 𝑟Φ. The key step to solve the model is to find the 
optimal interest rate for the stationary equilibrium with the algorithm details below.    
1. It begins to approximate the given rule for individual labour using a 7-state 
Markov chain process in order to ensure the expected labour supply equals a 
constant (normalised to 1). {−3σ, −2σ, −σ, 0, −σ, −2σ, −3σ} is the state space of 
ln 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 . Firstly, divide the real interval into the following seven ranges  𝐼1 =
(−∞, −
5
2
σ) , 𝐼𝑠=2,⋯,6 = (
2𝑠−9
2
σ,
2𝑠−7
2
σ) and 𝐼7 = (
5
2
σ, +∞) corresponding to the 
7 states of  ln 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 above. For each  ln 𝑙𝑡 = ln 𝑙𝑖 ; 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ ,7 , randomly 
draw 𝜖𝑡~𝑁(0,1) many times to calculate ln 𝑙𝑡+1 using its AR(1) process, given 
each pair of {𝜌, 𝜎}. Then use the obtained ln 𝑙𝑡+1 to calculate the Markov chain 
transition probability  𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏{ln 𝑙𝑡+1 ∈ 𝐼𝑗| ln 𝑙𝑡 = ln 𝑙𝑖} . Next use  𝜋𝑖,𝑗 to 
calculate the unconditional probability of ln 𝑙𝑡 = ln 𝑙𝑖, denoted as 𝑃𝑖 and calculated 
the expected value of 𝑙𝑡, denoted as 𝐸(𝑙𝑡) = ∑ 𝑃𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑖
7
𝑖=1 . Then define 𝑙′𝑖 =
𝑙𝑖
𝐸(𝑙𝑡)
 to 
                                                             
6 Φ ≡ min {𝑏,
𝑤𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑟
} , for 𝑟 > 0;   Φ ≡ b, for 𝑟 < 0. b is a positive constant. 
7 where parameters can take on the values 𝜎 ∈ {0.2, 0.4}, 𝜌 ∈ {0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9}. The stochastic rule 
implies that  ln 𝑙𝑡   has the mean 0, variance 𝜎
2 and serial correlation coefficient 𝜌. 
10 
 
normalise the expected labour supply to one. Now, the 7 states of individual 
employment status can be updated as {𝑙′𝑖}, 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ ,7 with the same transition 
probability 𝜋𝑖,𝑗  above. 
2. Use the Markov process above to generate a series of employment status. 
3. Give an initial guess on the interest rate r, denoted as 𝑟0. Use the initial asset, the 
asset demand function ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+1 = ℎ(𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑏, 𝑤, 𝑟) and the series of employment above 
to obtain a series of the asset demand 𝑎?̂? and also a series of the asset 𝑎𝑡. 
4. Calculate the sample mean of 𝑎𝑡, denoted as 𝐸𝑎 
5. Solve the EQ condition 𝐸𝑎 = 𝐾(𝑟) to obtain 𝑟1.
8 
6. Then use the bisection method to set 𝑟2 =
1
2
(𝑟0 + 𝑟1) and repeat the steps above to 
renew 𝐸𝑎. If 𝐸𝑎 > 𝐾(𝑟2), replace 𝑟1 by 𝑟2 to yield 𝑟3 =
1
2
(𝑟0 + 𝑟2). If 𝐸𝑎 < 𝐾(𝑟2), 
replace 𝑟0 by 𝑟2 to obtain 𝑟3 =
1
2
(𝑟1 + 𝑟2). Keep doing so until 𝐸𝑎 close to 𝐾(𝑟). 
Afterwards he uses the accurate simulations given the equilibrium interest rate to 
calculate indicators, like moments and skewness, etc. to quantitatively consider how 
idiosyncratic shocks affect aggregate saving behaviour. The equilibrium he defines 
could explain why individual wealth and consumption are much more volatile than 
aggregate ones. 
Unlike the typical model setting with a continuum of individuals which in 
practice is generally approximated by a finite large number of agents, some works set 
a small number of groups of agents in order to avoid the possible variant sampling 
error (Discuss about this error later). Kydland (1984) classifies the consumers into 5 
different types by their skills also with borrowing constraints to explain the stylised 
                                                             
8 𝐾(𝑟)  describes k as a function of r according to 𝑟 = 𝑓1(𝑘, 1) − 𝛿. 𝑟1 should suffice for the condition 
for finite asset accumulation  r <
1−β
β
= λ where  λ is called “time preference rate”, otherwise 
replace 𝑟1 by λ 
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fact that working hours fluctuate much more than the aggregate labour productivity 
and the real wage rate, which could not be well explained by the representative-agent 
models. Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) strengthen the restrictions on random 
indivisible labors in Hansen (l985) that there are only two groups of agents and only 
one group is productive (employed) at each period. Agents face a random duration of 
being productive. Since the real wage is assumed to be constant, the fluctuations in 
individual productivity could mimic the features in the business cycles.9  
The first generation of HAMs shown above basically involves idiosyncratic risks, 
incomplete market, stochastic processes of uncertain states and equilibrium 
(convergent) market prices. Here we focus on consumer heterogeneity instead of 
producer heterogeneity. For example, Caballero (1990) studies the business cycles by 
introducing heterogeneity in production sector where each firm among a continuum of 
firms has an idiosyncratic productivity shock, but consumers are identical. Although 
most first generation works yield some satisfactory findings that the income is 
generally less dispersedly distributed than the wealth in model simulations and the 
aggregate consumption is relatively smooth while the volatilities of individual 
consumption are significant, both consistent with truth, there are still some 
shortcomings. For instance, the proportion of individuals who touch the borrowing 
constraints is quite small, resulting in a limited effect of fluctuated distribution on the 
aggregate behaviour. Furthermore, the lack of aggregate uncertainty is implausible. 
The use of aggregate uncertainty in addition to idiosyncratic shocks is a symbol 
of the second generation of HAMs. Mankiw (1986) makes an early attempt to 
                                                             
9 Some others, like Mankiw (1986), Telmer (1993) and Den Haan (1996), also use finite groups. 
However, I classify them into the second generation model with heterogeneity because they all 
introduce the aggregate uncertainty. 
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introduce both aggregate and individual shocks into a theoretical model with a 
continuum of individuals and no labour involved. The aggregate economy could have 
two possible states, good and bad, both with the realisation probability 
1
2
. Individuals 
have an exogenous consumption space with values, a certain value 𝜇 when state is 
good and an uncertain value with unconditional expectation 𝜃𝜇  when bad where 0 <
𝜃 < 1. Individual stochastic property mainly originates from the consumption at the 
bad state where consumption could be  𝜇 with probability  𝜌 while it could 
be  (
𝜃−𝜌
1−𝜌
) 𝜇 with probability  1 − 𝜌 . He claims that consumers consider a utility 
maximisation problem by deciding how much of claims to buy. But agents in his 
model are essentially given an exogenous labour income r ∙ 𝑦 where the “payoff” r 
can take on the value (1 + 𝜋) at a good state and −1 at a bad state. And a central 
planner decides how to set y, given shocks. 10  Although he creatively relates 
individual shocks to the aggregate uncertainty, he ignores individuals’ allocation 
trade-offs between consumption and some insurance assets. Telmer (1993) establishes 
two models, a non-tradable model and a tradable one, both with two groups of 
individuals whom are endowed with non-tradable labour income, depending on 
idiosyncratic shocks. Individual tradable bonds are supplemented into the latter model 
like in Huggett (1993). Aggregate income  𝑌𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡𝑌𝑡−1 where the gross growth 
rate  𝜆𝑡 can take on two values  𝜆1 > 1 (good state) and  𝜆2 < 1 (bad state), is 
determined by a Markov process. Individual stochastic process is based on the one in 
Mankiw (1986) that both have an identical and certain income in a good aggregate 
state while have probabilities to be endowed with different incomes in a bad state. 
The difference is that two probabilities related to two individual income values in a 
                                                             
10 I develop this idea and the central planner’s problem is max
𝑦
𝐸{𝑈(𝑐)} , 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑟 ∙ 𝑦 = 𝑐 which leads to 
the solution 𝐸[𝑟 ∗ 𝑈′(𝑐)] = 0 same as equation (4) on Page 4 in Mankiw (1986). 
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bad aggregate state are not identical. Diaz-Gimenez and Prescott (1992) introduce an 
aggregate shock (reflects an exogenous real interest rate) into a Bewley model with a 
large sample of agents. The individual labour  𝑛𝑡 still has dummy values, also 
depending on an aggregate shock 𝑧𝑡.
11 Individual shocks are not simply 𝑛𝑡, but have 
the state space S = {𝑠1, 𝑠2} where the two sub-states 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 represent the human 
capital state space and the productivity state space respectively.12 Individual labour 
income equals the product of  𝑛𝑡 and real wage  𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤(𝑠𝑡, 𝑧𝑡) which equals the 
marginal productivity when employed. The computational procedures, different from 
Aiyagari (1994), are shown below.   
1. Guess the relations between prices (assume both prices of goods and bonds to be 
functions of 𝑧) and 𝑧. 
2. Obtain the individual optimal rules, given prices. 
3. Use individual rules and market clearing to obtain the law of motion  𝑥′ =
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑧′) where 𝑥 describes individual current asset and employment status. 
4. Use the Markov process to update shocks to one-period ahead and repeat steps above. 
Keep doing so to get a time series. 
5. Check if the obtained government spending (residual of market clearing) 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑧) are 
all negative. If they are nonnegative, the initial given relations between prices 
and 𝑧 could reach equilibrium. Otherwise the equilibrium does not exist. 
In some sense, the Markov process in this paper is a degeneration of the one in 
Aiyagari (1994) because the transition probabilities are artificially selected to match 
the US employment data rather than numerically approximated (i.e. the convergence 
is not proved). Furthermore, individual shocks are independent of the aggregate shock 
                                                             
11 Some experiments are implemented in this paper according to the classification of the real interest 
rate regime where 𝑧 = 1 stands for a high rate regime while 𝑧 = 2 represents s a low rate regime    
12 See Page11 in Diaz-Gimenez & Prescott (1992) for details 
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for simplification, diminishing effects of the aggregate shock. 
The second generation model has a wide spread after Krusell and Smith (1998)’s 
work. They introduce heterogeneity with a continuum of agents into a basic RBC 
model where endogenous individual production takes the Cobb-Douglas form with 
both capital and labour as inputs. Individual production also depends on an aggregate 
productivity shock 𝑧 which follows the way in Den Haan (1996) with two states, 
determined by a Markov process. Each agent inputs an indivisible labour ϵ𝑙 as that in 
Hansen (1985) where the idiosyncratic shock ϵ ∈ {0, 1} with realisation probabilities 
such that the total unemployment rate in a bad state and that in a good state are always 
constant, 𝑢𝑔 and 𝑢𝑏 respectively. They solve a decentralised problem where individual 
real wage and real interest rate are marginal productivities respectively in terms of the 
aggregate labour and aggregate capital. They creatively assume that agents predict the 
law of motion for wealth distribution to forecast prices and then make their optimal 
decisions. A simplification of this assumption is that consumers only concern the first 
I moments of the wealth distribution, denoted by 𝑚 = (𝑚1, ⋯ , 𝑚𝐼) which is used to 
approximate an infinite dimensional wealth distribution where  𝑚′ = 𝐻𝐼(𝑚, 𝑧,
𝑧′) and H is an undetermined evolution function. The kernel to find an equilibrium 
solution is to find a stationary H with the numerical algorithm which takes the 
following steps. 
1. Choose a value of I (could start from 1). Guess an initial functional form 
of 𝐻𝐼 with initial values of parameters. 
2. Solve individual optimal rules, given 𝐻𝐼 and an initial wealth distribution. 
3. Stimulate individual data using the individual rules. 
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4. Use the simulated data to calculate the simulated aggregate moments and then use 
least-square to estimate parameters in the function of 𝐻𝐼. 𝑅
2 here is used to 
assess the estimation. 
5. Check whether the estimators are close to the initial guess. If not, change I and 
repeat steps above; if else, stop. 
One of their important findings is “Approximate Aggregation” (APAG) which 
means that the first moment of the distribution (mean of wealth) and the aggregate 
shock could well determine aggregate behaviour. Increasing the moments does not do 
it much better. Moreover, the initial distribution has neglectable effects on the results. 
Nevertheless, like Aiyagari (1994), this benchmark model also generates few agents 
who have low wealth levels, leading to same marginal propensities of consumption 
for many individuals. This is because foe the rich agents, wealth holdings are 
sufficient for full-insurance so that the borrowing constrains play no roles for these 
agents even if they have different individual states (employment status and wealth). 
To overcome this shortcoming, they develop a preference heterogeneity model with 
the assumptions that the unemployed also have income and consumers could have 
different preference discount factors. They find that the poor plays a more important 
role in the consumption aggregation and thus the aggregate consumption behaviour 
differs from the traditional permanent income hypothesis. The wealth aggregation, 
however, is still hardly affected by the poor. The heterogeneous preferences actually 
imply that some individuals must be poor since they are given lower discount factors, 
which seems like a self-fulfilling result. Krusell and Smith (2006) enrich their 
previous model by introducing another asset, bond, in addition to capital, into a 
two-period model and endogenous labours  𝑛𝑖,𝑡 combined with an idiosyncratic 
employment shock 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 following the same Markov process as that in Krusell and 
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Smith (1998). Constraint takes the form  𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎. They use a slightly different algorithm to solve the equilibrium. To find 
a stationary law of motion H for the wealth distribution measurement  𝛤 (e.g. 
log-linear of the 1st moment), they also start with an initial guess on an functional 
form of H. But they do not set initial values for the undetermined parameters in H this 
time. They solve the individual optimal rules then and stimulate the 2nd period 
individual saving and wealth combined with the drawn shocks, given the initial 
distribution  𝛤0 . Now the 2nd period  𝛤1 can be calculated using the simulated 
individual data and the drawn 2nd period aggregate shock. They keep doing the 
iteration this way to obtain a time series of {𝛤𝑠}, 𝑠 = 0, 1, ⋯. Then they directly use 
least-square to estimate the undetermined parameters in H. After that, they replace the 
undetermined parameters by the estimators and repeat the steps above until parameter 
values converge. Note that endogenous 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑛𝑖,𝑡 makes prices (r, w and q) more 
difficult to clear the markets and thus they use a dichotomy method. That is, firstly 
suppose that consumers make decisions based on the given market prices. Then in the 
simulation, market prices are allowed to vary in order to guarantee all markets 
clearing. But this dichotomy is debatable. Consider the aggregate labour which is the 
mean of all the individual labours. Since 𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is achieved from individual optimal 
problem, there is no rule to guarantee a constant mean of all 𝑛𝑖,𝑡. Overall, their 
simulated data could capture most cyclical features except that the poor takes a low 
proportion as in the benchmark model in Krusell and Smith (1998) and simulated 
wealth inequality (Gini-coefficient) is counter-cyclical while the US data shows a 
cyclical inequality. They use R2 to evaluate the accuracy of the H approximation in 
both papers, although several methods are discussed about in Krusell and Smith 
(1998). Den Haan (2010a) and Algan et al (2014) both argue that R2 is problematic to 
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test the accuracy of an approximated aggregate law because same law of motion 
expressed by different ways might result in different values of R2. Consider Krusell 
and Smith’s approximated law of motion 𝐻: ln𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1ln𝑘𝑡 + 𝜐𝑡. Rewrite it by 
minus ln𝑘𝑡 on both sides as ∆ln𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝜌0 + (𝜌1 − 1)ln𝑘𝑡 + 𝜐𝑡. Both equations are 
identical, but R2 in the latter equation estimation is smaller, since the variance 
of ∆ln𝑘𝑡+1 is lower than variance of ln𝑘𝑡+1. Krusell and Smith (1998) (2006)’s work 
is developed by many scholars. For instance, Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) basically 
use Krusell and Smith (1998)’s model, also with a linear aggregate law of motion to 
study the welfare cost of business cycles across agents. A finite group of individuals 
faces two types of idiosyncratic shocks, individual employment status which depends 
on an aggregate productivity shock and individual skill status which is independent of 
the aggregate shock. Moreover, a special transition probability such that the 
probability of being unemployed depends on the skill status (unskilled agents are 
more likely to be unemployed in future) is adopted. They find their model is helpful to 
explain that unskilled individuals have more welfare lost during recessions. Chang 
and Kim (2007) also employ the same model, but with a different algorithm. They 
also assume a linear aggregate law of motion for aggregate capital and assume that 
both wage and interest rate are linear functions of aggregate capital and aggregate 
productivity shock. Then choose 11 grid points for aggregate capital and together with 
individual optimal rules they simulate time series on 200,000 agents. Afterwards, the 
sample of aggregate capital can be obtained from the aggregation of individual capital 
and is used to OLS estimate the proposed aggregate law. 
The utilization of an aggregate law of motion in early second generation models 
is a creative way to make individual and aggregate behaviours independent to some 
extent and thus it could simplify some algorithm when consider both aggregate and 
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individual shocks. It, however, seems like a self-fulfilling procedure to firstly assume 
a law and then to show it cannot be rejectable. It is hard to say whether an aggregate 
law exists, although aggregation is composed of individual variables. Additionally, an 
infinite dimensional issue when use the first i moments of capital distribution as state 
variables to determine individual policy rules is raised by Algan et al (2014). They 
follow Krusell and Smith’s assumption that individuals consider the first I th order 
moments denoted by {𝑚1,𝑡
𝜀 , ⋯ , 𝑚𝐼,𝑡
𝜀 } where 𝜀 = {𝑢, 𝑒} is the employment status to 
make decisions and approximate optimal capital rule to the following Nth order 
polynomial. 
𝑘𝑡+1
𝜀 = 𝜓0
𝜀(𝑆𝑡) + ∑ 𝜓𝑛
𝜀(𝑆𝑡)(𝑘𝑡)
𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=1
where coefficients  𝜓 depend on the aggregate state  𝑆𝑡 = {𝑎𝑡, 𝑚1,𝑡
𝜀 , ⋯ , 𝑚𝐼,𝑡
𝜀 } . For 
convenient notations, individual superscripts are omitted. Decentralised moments 
(i.e. 𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝜀 = ∫(𝑘𝑡)
𝑖) are considered later on instead of decentralised moments for 
simplification. 13  Consider Krusell and Smith’s linear policy rule, i.e.  𝑁 = 1 . 
Aggregating (AL1) with powers from 1 to I directly yields the aggregate state in next 
period  𝑆𝑡+1 = {𝑎𝑡+1, 𝑚1,𝑡+1
𝜀 , ⋯ , 𝑚𝐼,𝑡
𝜀 } where  𝑚𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜀 = [𝜓0
𝜀(𝑆𝑡)]
𝑖 + [𝜓1
𝜀(𝑆𝑡)]
𝑖𝑚𝑖,𝑡
𝜀 +
∑ {𝑖[𝜓0
𝜀(𝑆𝑡)]
𝑗[𝜓1
𝜀(𝑆𝑡)]
𝑖−𝑗𝑚𝑗,𝑡
𝜀 }𝑖−1𝑗=1 . This indicates 𝑆𝑡 is sufficient to obtain 𝑆𝑡+1 when 
individual optimal rules are linear w.r.t. state variables. Now consider a nonlinear 
individual rule, for example 𝑁 = 2. Aggregates (AL1) with the power from 1 to I, 
yielding the followings. 
𝒎𝟏,𝒕+𝟏
𝜺 = 𝝍𝟎
𝜺(𝑺𝒕) + 𝝍𝟏
𝜺(𝑺𝒕)𝒎𝟏,𝒕
𝜺 + 𝝍𝟐
𝜺(𝑺𝒕)𝒎𝟐,𝒕
𝜺  
                                                             
13 To transfer decentralised moments to centralised moments, one just need to change parameter 
values. 
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𝑚2,𝑡+1
𝜀 = (𝜓0
𝜀)2 + 2(𝜓0
𝜀𝜓1
𝜀)𝑚1,𝑡
𝜀 + [(𝜓1
𝜀)2 + 2𝜓0
𝜀𝜓1
𝜀]𝑚2,𝑡
𝜀
+ 2(𝜓1
𝜀𝜓2
𝜀)𝑚3,𝑡
𝜀 + (𝜓2
𝜀)4𝑚4,𝑡
𝜀  
 ⋯ ⋯ 
That is, to obtain 𝑆𝑡+1, one has to firstly increase dimension of the aggregate state 
from 𝑆𝑡 = {𝑎𝑡, 𝑚1,𝑡
𝜀 , ⋯ , 𝑚𝐼,𝑡
𝜀 } to 𝑆𝑡 = {𝑎𝑡, 𝑚1,𝑡
𝜀 , ⋯ , 𝑚2𝐼,𝑡
𝜀 }. However, after that, one has 
to continuously increase the dimension of moments from 2I to 4I. The continuously 
increasing dimensional requirement leads to an infinite dimensional issue and this 
issue exists as long as individual optimal rules are nonlinear about state variables, 
even if individuals are assumed to only consider the first order moment.  
There are still some scholars make an attempt to avoid using an Adhoc aggregate 
law of motion like Den Haan (1996) and Preston and Roca (2007). The former uses a 
basic Bewley model in which N (a finite number) consumers have the constraint 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑞𝑡𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 where 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 is the bond purchased at time t with price 𝑞𝑡 .
14 
Individual income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑖?̅? is determined by the employment status 𝜖 ∈ {𝜃, 1}; 𝜃 <
1 with probability of being employed identical across individuals. 𝜃 could be positive, 
i.e. the unemployed agent still has an income and this assumption is also adopted in 
the second model in Krusell and Smith (1998). The probability of individual 
employment status also depends on the economic state 𝑆𝑡 (good and bad) which 
follows a Markov process. Individual employment probabilities should satisfy the 
condition that the expected total unemployed proportion when state is bad greater than 
that when state is good where the total unemployed proportion is 𝑈𝑁𝑡 ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2}. 
One of his contributions is the use of Parameterised Expectation Algorithm (PE) 
                                                             
14 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 > 𝑎 and 𝑎 < 0, same as that in Huggett (1993). 
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which refers to approximate the rational expectation in the individual optimal rules 
using a certain parameterised function with individual states. To use PE, he firstly 
optimises individual utility 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
1−𝛾
−1
1−𝛾
, given the budget constraint and the borrowing 
constraint, to obtain the following optimal rules, using the KKT condition. 
 (𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑎)[𝑞𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡
−𝛾 − 𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
−𝛾 )] = 0 (Den 1) 
 𝑞𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡
−𝛾 ≥ 𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
−𝛾 ) (Den 2) 
 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 ≥ 𝑎 (Den 3) 
 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 (Den 4) 
Additionally ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖 = 0 guarantees the bond market clearing. Individual future 
consumption depends on current state, including economic state  𝑆𝑡 and wealth 
distribution (described by a function of individual wealth levels 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎𝑖,𝑡). 
Then  𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
−𝛾 ) can be approximated by an undetermined function  𝑓(𝑆𝑡, 𝜔𝑖,𝑡,
𝜔𝑑−𝑖,𝑡; 𝜌) where 𝜔𝑑−𝑖,𝑡 represents a measurement of the wealth distribution.
15 𝜌 is an 
undetermined parameter vector. 16  The key to solve the model is to find the 
equilibrium 𝑞𝑡  and an optimal 𝑓(𝑆𝑡, 𝜔𝑖,𝑡, 𝜔𝑑−𝑖,𝑡; 𝜌). Given a functional form, the 
latter is equivalent to find an optimal 𝜌 with main procedures below.  
                                                             
15 First of all, wealth distribution can be described as a function of all the individual wealth levels. 
Then one can separately approximate this function as a measurement, e.g. moments and shares, etc. 
Haan states that the wealth statistic covering I-1 agents, but it could cover all the agents. That is, 
𝜔𝑑𝐼,𝑡  could replace 𝜔𝑑−𝑖,𝑡 
16  He chooses an exponential form of a polynomial with order n exp[𝑃𝑛(𝑆𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜔−𝑖,𝑡; 𝜌)] to 
replace 𝑓(𝑆𝑡 , 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜔−𝑖,𝑡; 𝜌) in practice. 
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1. Use the Markov processes to generate time series of economic states and 
individual employment status.  
2. Calculate the distribution measurement 𝜔𝑑−𝑖,𝑡 for each individual, given the initial 
individual wealth values.17 
3. Guess an initial value of  𝜌 , say  𝜌0 so that  𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌0) is determined for each 
individual. 
4. Replace 𝛽𝐸𝑡(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
−𝛾 ) by 𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌0) from (Den.1) and (Den.2) to yield: 
 (𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑎)[𝑞𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡
−𝛾 − 𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌0) ] = 0 (Den 5) 
 𝑞𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡
−𝛾 ≥ 𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌0) (Den 6) 
5. Suppose 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 > 𝑎. Given an initial guess on 𝑞𝑡, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 can be solved from (Den 5) 
(i.e. 𝑞𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑡
−𝛾 = 𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌0)). Calculate 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1by (Den 4). If the achieved 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 < 𝑎, 
let 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑎 and use (Den 4) to calculate 𝑐𝑖,𝑡.  
6. Check the bond market equilibrium condition. If   ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁
𝑖 > 0 , replace the 
initial 𝑞𝑡 by 
1
2
𝑞𝑡 and repeat the steps above. If  ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁
𝑖 < 0, replace by 
3
2
𝑞𝑡 and 
repeat the 5 steps. Keep using this bisection method until  ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑁
𝑖 = 0. 
7. Choose any one agent i’s simulated series based on the initial value 𝜌0 with an 
equilibrium 𝑞𝑡 obtained from step 6. Regress 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
−𝛾  on 𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌0) and denote the 
nonlinearly estimated parameter vector as 𝜌0̂. Then update 𝜌 to 𝜌1 by 𝜌1 = 𝜇𝜌0 +
(1 − 𝜇)𝜌0̂; 0 < 𝜇 < 1 and repeat all the steps until a convergent 𝜌 is achieved. 
This algorithm has an advantage in the flexibility of the wealth distribution 
                                                             
17 Actually, one only need to be given initial values of individual bonds,  𝑎𝑖,𝑡  because the other 
component 𝑦𝑖,𝑡  of wealth is known after generating individual employment status (recall 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑖?̅?) 
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measurement as there is no law of motions for a certain measurement so that not only 
moments of wealth distribution, but also deciles, quintiles and even shares could be 
used. Nevertheless, issues also exist. Firstly, the algorithm excessively relies on the 
selected functional form of  𝑓(⋯ ; 𝜌) and the initial value of  𝜌 . Particularly, 
convergence of 𝜌 in step 7 above depends on the artificially chosen 𝜇. Secondly, a 
time-consuming step to find the equilibrium 𝑞𝑡 has to be embodied into the algorithm 
of searching for an optimal 𝜌 just because there is no direct way to solve for 𝑞𝑡 in step 
6 above and the reason for the latter is that an exact value of 𝑞𝑡 is required in step 5 
when compare 𝛼𝑖,𝑡+1 with 𝑎.    
Preston and Roca (2007) make an development by introducing a utility penalty of 
borrowing taking the form of 
𝜙
(𝑘𝑖,𝑡+𝑏)
2 where 𝜙 < 0 and the lower bound of capital 
holding is – 𝑏; 𝑏 > 0 into individual objective functions in order to find certain forms 
of first order conditions (uncertain first order conditions come from the inequality 
restriction, i.e. the borrowing constraint), different from the way using KKT condition 
in Den Haan (1996). That is, the utility decreases as individual borrows more (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is 
closer to −𝑏). They contributively adopt perturbation methods (PBMs) in HAMs for 
model solutions. Prices (r and w) equal marginal productivities of an aggregate 
production with the aggregate technological shock 𝑧𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌𝑧)𝜇𝑧 + 𝜌𝑧𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡
𝑧. 
The individual labour is 𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝑙 where employment shock 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌𝑒)𝜇𝑒 + 𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝜌𝑒𝑧(𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧) + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 .18 Theoretically, Markov processes with a finite number of states 
are not necessary to approximate the stochastic processes above in a PBM, although 
in practice, they are used for simplification. To use a PBM, they firstly solve for the 
first order conditions which give an analytical solution of their model, namely optimal 
                                                             
18 𝜌𝑒, 𝜌𝑧 ∈ (0, 1); 𝜇𝑒, 𝜇𝑧 > 0; 𝜈𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 ~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑒
2), 𝜈𝑡
𝑧~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑧
2) and 𝜇𝑒  and 𝜇𝑧 are mean of 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑧𝑡.  
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rules for control variables (𝑐𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1) depending on predetermined variables 
(𝑘𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑧𝑡) and shocks (𝜈𝑡
𝑧 and 𝜈𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 ).19 To save words, I call both predetermined 
variables and shocks as exogenous variables below. Then they use a second order 
Taylor expansion to approximate the optimal rules around a special equilibrium where 
neither an aggregate shock nor individual shocks exist and thus wealth is equally 
distributed across agents. Note that the unknown coefficients in the approximated 
optimal rules are now the first and second order derivatives with respect to (w.r.t) 
exogenous variables with their equilibrium values. Next, they differentiate the raw 
model equations w.r.t exogenous variables directly and set exogenous variables to 
their equilibrium values in order to get equations with the unknown coefficients in the 
approximated optimal rules. Solve these equations to figure out the unknown 
coefficients. The special equilibrium assumed previously is important to this method. 
Consider the term  ∫ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘)𝑑𝑖
1
0
 where  𝑘𝑡 is the aggregate capital, for 
instance. With idiosyncratic shocks, one could only get (𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘) ∫ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
 and 
the term  ∫ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
 is uncertain, leading to unsolvable approximated optimal 
rules. Given the special assumption above, one have  ∫ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘)𝑑𝑖
1
0
=
(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘)
2 with no uncertainty. Following this way, both individual optimal rules and 
aggregate capital rule finally depend on the sate 
space  {𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 𝑘𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡, Φ𝑡, Ψ𝑡} where  Φ𝑡 = ∫ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖)
2
𝑑𝑖
1
0
 is the variance of 
individual capital and  Ψ𝑡 = ∫ (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑘𝑖)(𝑒𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖)𝑑𝑖
1
0
 is the covariance between 
individual capital holdings and employment shocks. Given that assumption, 
both Φ𝑡 and Ψ𝑡  equal zero in equilibrium. Unlike checking R
2 in Krusell and Smith 
(1998) (2006), they calculate the Euler equation errors to assess the accuracy of their 
                                                             
19 See details of the model equations on Page 11 in Preston and Roca (2007). 
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method. Denote 𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡) as the Markov transition probability of states. Given the 
first order condition  𝑈𝑐(𝑐𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽𝐸𝑡{𝑈𝑐(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1)[𝑟(𝑘𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑡+1, 𝑧𝑡+1) + 1 − 𝛿]} +
2𝜙(𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏)
−3
, they replace consumptions by their optimal rules 𝑐𝑖,𝑡
∗  and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
∗  to 
yield  𝑈𝑐(𝑐𝑖,𝑡
∗ |𝑠𝑡) ≈ 𝛽{𝑈𝑐(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ |𝑠𝑡+1)[𝑟(𝑘𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑡+1, 𝑧𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡+1) + 1 − 𝛿]𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡)} +
2𝜙(𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏)
−3
. Then they solve the inverse marginal utility to obtain  𝑐𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≈
𝑈−1 〈𝛽{𝑈𝑐(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1
∗ |𝑠𝑡+1)[𝑟(𝑘𝑡+1, 𝑙𝑡+1, 𝑧𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡+1) + 1 − 𝛿]𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡) } + 2𝜙(𝑘𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑏)
−3
〉 and define the Euler equation error as 𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 1 −
𝑈−1〈⋯ 〉
𝑐𝑖,𝑡
∗  which also depends on 
the states. Given a series of states, they examine statistics of 𝑒𝑟𝑡, like mean, standard 
deviation and extreme values which all show accurate results. Nevertheless, their 
calibrated model also shows APAG as in Krusell and Smith (1998) and many other 
studies. Additionally, use of the utility penalty is debatable because the penalty makes 
agents almost impossible to touch the borrowing constraint. 
Except some studies classifying individuals into types with common features 
(like skilled and unskilled) in each type, most theoretical models illustrated above are 
implemented in practice by approximating on a continuum of agents in the original 
assumption to a finitely large number of agents. Since some theoretical derivations are 
based on the assumption of continuous agents, this approximation might lead to 
variant sampling errors. Therefore, some algorithms emphasised on solving models 
with a continuum of individuals are raised, which is called the third generation HAMs 
by me. Algan et al (2008) (some ideas originate from Den Haan (1996) (1997)) 
develop a new computational algorithm using a projection method (PJM) to adopt 
Krusell and Smith (1998)’s model with a true continuum of individuals instead of a 
large sample approximation. They also use a finite number of moments, to describe 
the capital distribution and attempt to find a unique law of motion for aggregate states. 
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But different from the essentiality of the aggregate law to solutions for individual 
optimal rules in Krusell and Smith’s model, the aggregate law in their algorithm can 
be completely neglected when solve individual rules. The reason for still using the 
aggregate law is that individuals only consider simple measurement for wealth 
distribution to predict prices rather than consider a complicated time-variant 
cross-agents distribution period by period. I clarify some notations before illustrate 
their new algorithm. They distinguish the jth order moments of capital distribution at 
the beginning and the end of t, denoted by 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑗 ⃖        and 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑗          respectively where the 
moment involves the agents with current employment status  𝜀 ∈ {𝑒, 𝑢} . Assume 
individuals are only concerned with the first N moments, denoted by  𝑀𝑡 ⃖    =
{𝑀𝑡−1
𝑢,𝑐          , 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑗 ⃖       ; 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑁} where 𝑀𝑡−1
𝑢,𝑐           is the proportion of agents who are unemployed 
and simultaneously touch the borrowing constraint boundary (𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 0) out of total 
unemployed agents at the end of period t-1.20 All the other 2N moments consider 
individuals with positive capital because the moments when 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 0 at the beginning 
of each period can be calculated. Define the aggregate state as  𝑆𝑡 =
{𝑎𝑡, 𝑎𝑡−1, 𝑀𝑡 ⃖    } with the aggregate technological shock  𝑎𝑡 .
21 Their algorithm starts 
from describing the aggregate law as a function 𝛤𝜀 (a polynomial in practice) such 
that  𝑀𝑡      = 𝛤
𝜀(𝑆𝑡; 𝜙𝛤𝜀) with parameters  𝜙𝛤𝜀  where  𝑀𝑡      = {𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑐         , 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑗         ; 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑁} . 
The idea to solve for 𝜙𝛤𝜀  and to confirm the polynomial order is to find the best 
responses (whether individual optimal rules corresponding to 𝛤𝜀 also result in the 
same (or close) 𝛤𝜀). Hence, given an initial guess on 𝜙𝛤𝜀 , say 𝜙𝛤𝜀
0 , they use the 
                                                             
20  𝑀𝑡−1
𝑒,𝑐          = 0 since the employed agents will not run out of capital at the end of one period. See details 
on how to derive moments at the end of one period from those at the beginning on P33-35 in Algan et 
al (2008). 
21 Actually there are two alternatives to express 𝑆𝑡 , but the other one is more complicated because of 
the extra components,  𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑐 ⃖       . See details on P10 in Algan et al (2008).    
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following 5 steps (first time to use a PJM) to solve individual rules for 
consumption 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐(𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑡) and capital 𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑘(𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑡). First of all, first 
order conditions are solved using KKT condition as Den Haan (1996) to deal with the 
inequality constraint and a polynomial function with undetermined parameters, 
denoted as 𝜃 is used to approximate the rational expectation terms. Secondly, given an 
initial value on 𝜃, say 𝜃0, they solve individual optimal rules with wage 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤(𝑆𝑡). 
Note that both wage and interest rate 𝑟𝑡 are marginal productivities of the aggregate 
production and thus only rely on aggregate states, but  𝑟𝑡 disappears when 
approximating the rational expectation to a polynomial. Thirdly, assume both capital 
and moments are allocated in some ranges and choose several grid points in each 
range using the Chebyshev polynomial method.22 Calculate 𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 on all 
grids. Fourthly, use the aggregate law  𝑀𝑡      = 𝛤
𝜀(𝑆𝑡; 𝜙𝛤𝜀
0 ) to get  𝑀𝑡       and then 
drive 𝑀𝑡+1 ⃖         to yield 𝑆𝑡+1.
 Next, to get the values of expectation terms, denoted by 
E(X), 23  they primarily calculate X using  𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝑐(𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑆𝑡+1) and  𝑟𝑡 =
𝑟(𝑆𝑡+1), given any possible value of aggregate states. Then calculate the mean of all 
Xs as E(X). Fifthly, use least-squares to estimate polynomial parameters (minimise the 
sum squares of the gap between achieved E(X) and the polynomial with unknown 
parameters) and yield the estimators 𝜃0. Replace 𝜃0 by 𝜃1 =
1
2
(𝜃0 + 𝜃0) and repeat 
previous steps until 𝜃 is convergent. The next stage of the whole algorithm is to derive 
the aggregate law 𝛤𝜀 from the achieved policy rules using a PJM again. The idea is 
that they use optimal rules and cross-agents probability density functions (PDFs) to 
get new time series of moments at the beginning and the end of periods, denoted 
                                                             
22 They choose 50 grid points for capital within a range [0, 99] and 5 grid points for the moments 
within different ranges.  
23 X in this model takes the form of 𝛽(𝑐𝑖,𝑡+1)
−𝛾
(1 + 𝑟𝑡). 
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as  {𝑀𝑡 ⃖    }𝑥 and  {𝑀𝑡
      }
𝑦
 respectively. Then minimise sum of the squares of  {𝑀𝑡      }𝑦 −
𝛤𝜀[{𝑆𝑡}𝑥; 𝜙𝛤𝜀] where {𝑆𝑡}𝑥 includes {𝑀𝑡 ⃖    }𝑥 to yield the estimators 𝜙𝛤?̂? . During the 
procedure of generating moments, the time-independent cross-agents PDFs need to be 
confirmed in advance at the beginning of each period. They firstly approximate PDFs 
with employment status 𝜀 by the following polynomials.24 
𝑃(𝑘, 𝜌𝑡
𝜀) = 𝜌0,𝑡
𝜀 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝜌1,𝑡
𝜀 (𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,1 ⃖       ) + ∑ 𝜌𝑗,𝑡
𝜀 [(𝑘 − 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,1 ⃖       )
𝑗
− 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑗 ⃖       ]
𝑁𝑛
𝑗=2
} ; 𝑁𝑛 > 𝑁 
where the higher-order moments 𝑀𝑡
𝜀,𝑗 ⃖       ; 𝑗 = 𝑁 + 1, ⋯ , 𝑁𝑛 is called “reference moments” 
and used for a more accurate approximation. If reference moments at each period are 
given, optimal parameters 𝜌𝑗,𝑡
𝜀 ; 𝑗 = 2, ⋯ , 𝑁𝑛 can be obtained by solving the 𝑁𝑛 first 
order conditions from the optimal problem  min
𝜌1,𝑡
𝜀 ,⋯,𝜌𝑁𝑛,𝑡
𝜀
∫ 𝑃(𝑘, 𝜌𝑡
𝜀)𝑑𝑘
∞
0
. 
Optimal 𝜌0,𝑡
𝜀  ensures ∫ 𝑃(𝑘, 𝜌𝑡
𝜀)𝑑𝑘
∞
0
= 1. The illustration on the algorithm to generate 
moments, including updating  𝑃(𝑘, 𝜌𝑡
𝜀) and reference moments, and transferring 
moments from the beginning to the end of each period, is skipped here.25  
As I mentioned before, the PJM could work on a true continuum of individuals 
and could diminish the dependence of individual solutions on an Adhoc aggregate law 
if the researcher does not focus on that law, although some algorithm details need to 
be improved. The moments of positive capital holdings are updated following the 
rules below.26 
                                                             
24 k in the PDF is not a special 𝑘𝑖 because this PDF is cross-agents instead of cross-time for one agent 
25 See details on P16-17 in Algan et al (2008). 
26 See details on P35 in Algan et al (2008). 
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𝑀𝑡+1
𝑢,𝑗 ⃖        =
𝑔𝑢𝑢′ (1 − 𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑐         ) 𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑗         + 𝑔𝑒𝑢′𝑀𝑡
𝑒,𝑗         
𝑔𝑢𝑢′ (1 − 𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑐         ) + 𝑔𝑒𝑢′
 
𝑀𝑡+1
𝑒,𝑗 ⃖        =
𝑔𝑢𝑒′ (1 − 𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑐         ) 𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑗         + 𝑔𝑒𝑒′𝑀𝑡
𝑒,𝑗         
𝑔𝑢𝑒′ (1 − 𝑀𝑡
𝑢,𝑐         ) + 𝑔𝑒𝑒′
 
where 𝑔𝜀𝜀′ represents the number of agents who have employment status 𝜀 at t and 
have 𝜀′ at t+1, and it depends on 𝑎 and 𝑎′. The first equation, for example, describes 
that the jth order capital moment of the unemployed agents at the beginning of period 
t+1 equals a weighted sum of the jth order capital moment of the unemployed and that 
of the employed at the end of current period t. This actually is a debatable 
approximation instead of an accurate moment.  
Many algorithms are developed to consider a continuum of individuals and one 
key step is the dynamics of the cross-agents distribution along grid points of capital. 
For example, Bohacek and Kejak (2005) adopt a PJM method on the Krusell and 
Smith (1998)’s model. Their algorithm is similar as Algan et al (2008)’s one but 
simpler since they focus on the cross-agents distribution without the step to find a 
convergent aggregate law. Different from Algan et al (2008), they does not directly 
approximate the rational expectation term in individual first order conditions to a 
function, but firstly use the sample mean of all the possible forms of the term which 
are expected corresponding to all the possible realisation of shocks to replace 
expectation terms. For instance, suppose the stochastic shock  𝑧𝑖,𝑡 has J discrete 
realisations with transition probability from one period to next 𝑄(𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑗,𝑡+1) for any 
individual i. Then individual first order conditions w.r.t consumption can be 
approximated by 
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 𝑈𝑐[𝑐𝑖(𝑘𝑖,𝑡)] = 𝛽 ∑〈𝑈𝑐{𝑐𝑗[𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡)]}[1 + 𝑟(𝐾) − 𝛿]𝑄(𝑧𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑗,𝑡+1)〉
𝐽
𝑗
  
where 𝑐𝑖(𝑘𝑖,𝑡) means that current consumption depends on current capital holdings 
and  𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡) gives next period capital. The realisation of next period 
consumption 𝑐𝑗[𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡)] depends on the transition probability. Afterwards, they 
approximate individual rules for consumption as Chebyshev polynomial functions of 
individual capital. They also approximate one stationary distribution condition 
(similar as Algan et al (2008), but simpler due to time-independent parameters) as a 
Chebyshev polynomial. Then a PJM is used to estimate the parameters. Although they 
consider a continuum of agents, the aggregate shock is neglected.27 Reiter (2009) 
brings in a lump-sum government tax rate on Krusell and Smith (1998)’s model in 
order to introduce more volatilities of individual wealth at period t, denoted 
by 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 which is composed of the gross return on the capital at the end of period t-1, 
denoted by (1 + 𝑟𝑡)𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1, stochastic wage income 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 where 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is a continuous 
random labour productivity with mean 1, and the lump-sum tax subsidy  𝑇𝑡 =
𝜏𝑡𝐾𝑡−1 where 𝜏𝑡 is the tax rate. Individual has the budget constraint 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡. 
He adopts a combination of a PBM and PJM to solve the model (the kernel step is the 
transition of PDF on grid points and thus Algan et al (2014) name his method as the 
grid method). First of all, a PJM is used to solve for individual optimal rules and then 
an approximating cross-agents wealth distribution with idiosyncratic shocks but no 
aggregate uncertainty. In the first stage, unlike Algan et al (2008), he approximately 
describes cross-agents distributions by fractions of agents holding a certain amount of 
capital instead of moments. To obtain the dynamics of cross-agents distributions at 
                                                             
27 I still classify this paper into the 3rd generation because the aggregate shocks are not difficult to be 
introduced using this type of algorithm by renewing the state variables. 
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the beginning of each period, he chooses 1,000 grid points on an interval of 
beginning-period capital and assumes agents are uniformly distributed between grid 
neighbours. Note that although employment status at the end of period t-1 might be 
different from that at the beginning of period t, capital holdings at the end of t-1 is 
always same as those at the beginning of t for each individual. Since individual 
optimal rule for capital at the end of current period t (equivalent to capital at the 
beginning of t+1) depends on the current wealth and current state 𝑆𝑡, denoted as 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑘(𝑥𝑖,𝑡; 𝑆𝑡). The next target is to derive the cumulative distribution function (CDF) 
of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 and it starts from writing wealth as a function of grids by inversing individual 
optimal capital decision, denoted by  𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑘
−1(𝑘𝑖,𝑡; 𝑆𝑡) where  𝑘𝑡  has same grid 
points as 𝑘𝑡−1. Individual budget and positive consumption imply 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 and thus 
the mass of agents whose wealth is less than a certain value (actually a CDF value) 
should at least contain the mass of agents whose capital at the end of t is less than that 
certain value. Suppose 𝜅𝑖 is the i
th grid point of capital interval and 𝑝𝑡
𝑖  is the PDF 
of 𝜅𝑖−1 ≤ 𝑘𝑡−1 ≤ 𝜅𝑖. The CDF of wealth is defined by 𝐹𝑡
𝐽 = ∑ 𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝐽
𝑖=1 +
𝑝𝑡
𝐽+1
𝜅𝐽+1−𝜅𝐽
(𝑥𝐽,𝑡 −
𝜅𝐽). Then the PDF of cross-agents at the beginning of next period 𝑝𝑡+1
𝑖  can be easily 
calculated using the achieved CDF values of wealth distribution and the number of 
agents with a certain employment status. In their second stage, a PBM is used for the 
final solution associated with aggregate shocks. Young (2010) modifies Reiter 
(2009)’s algorithm when transit the PDF of a cross-agents distribution period by 
period on grids. In the first stage, given the grid points (i.e. 𝜅𝑖) of 𝑘𝑡 , he uses 
individual optimal rules to find the values of 𝑘𝑡−1 with same employment status such 
that 𝑘𝑡−1 ≤ 𝜅𝑖  where 𝜅𝑖  and then obtain the PDF 𝑝𝑡
𝑖 . Next, use individual policy 
rules, the achieved 𝑝𝑡
𝑖  and the grid points of 𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 (same grid points as 𝑘𝑡, i.e. also 𝜅𝑖) 
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to calculate  𝑘𝑖,𝑡 . Define some new grid points as  𝜅′𝑖 = 𝑘(𝑘𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜅𝑖) where the 
function 𝑘(∙) is individual optimal rule. He sets a mechanism to decide whether 
allocate the mass of agents hold 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 into the PDF 𝑓𝑡
𝑖  at the end of period t by 
comparing the distance between 𝜅𝑖 and 𝜅′𝑖. The CDF𝐹𝑡
𝐽 can easily be obtained and 
follow same second stage as Reiter (2009) to yield 𝑝𝑡+1
𝑖 . 
Compared with the second generation, some third generation models may not 
inevitably lead to the APAG because one could separately describe dynamics of the 
cross-agents distributions using PDFs for individual behaviour solution. Although 
Algan et al (2008) also find the APAG in practice, it might be a result from a simple 
use of the first order moments as aggregate state variables, not the result of 
incapability. Reiter (2009) find high volatilities of aggregate capital in their model 
with both aggregate productivity shock and tax rate shock, which imply moments may 
plan a more important role in individual policy decision than that in Krusell and 
Smith’s model. Moreover, compared with a large number approximation, the third 
generation models could efficiently remove the sampling-invariant issue. Algan et al 
(2014) compare the simulated fractions of unemployed agents close to the borrowing 
constraint when the economy moves from a recession to a boom with a large sample 
and those with a continuum of individuals. Obviously, the dynamics show significant 
uncertainty, inconsistent with the stylised fact.      
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Figure 1: Uncertainty Comparison between Continuum and Finite Sample 
 
Source: Algan et al (2014) Figure 3, chapter 6 in Schmedders and Judd (2014) 3rd Edition 
There are many other scholars who attempt to establish theoretical frameworks to 
show the long-run effect of inequality on growth, with no interest in whether model 
could generate similar micro-behaviours as reality. Nevertheless, most of them 
investigate how income inequality instead of wealth inequality influences aggregate 
growth. For instance, the earliest study can be traced back to Kuznets (1955) who 
initially raises a Kuznets Curve that aggregate growth is found to be a concave 
function of income inequality. As we are more interested in the wealth inequality 
effects, we only briefly review some relevant studies on wealth distribution or on 
income distribution but with ideas that could be easily applied to wealth inequality. 
These growth models are mostly developed from OLG models with some 
mechanisms of inequality effects on growth such as indivisible investment or labour, 
incomplete market barriers, “Median Voter Theorem” and security hazard, etc.28 
Some scholars use investment or labour indivisibility to show the positive effect 
                                                             
28 Some authors like Ehrhart (2009) and Voitchovsky (2011), etc. have more detailed classifications on 
the mechanisms of inequality effects. Since many studies in fact apply multi-mechanisms classified in 
their papers, we do not follow that way. 
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of inequality on growth. For example, Galor and Tsiddon (1997) consider an economy 
including many production sectors with different technologies but same goods. Each 
individual endowed with a unit of time chooses a producing sector j (can only choose 
one sector due to labour indivisibility) to supply constant proportion of time 
endowment 1 − 𝜃𝑗  as labour and the rest 𝜃𝑗  is the sector requirement for training. 
Individual labour efficiency (ℎ𝑡
𝑖)
𝑗
 in sector j relies on his ability and the ability of his 
parent in this sector (simply say “like father, like son”). They prove that there are an 
upper threshold of ability and lower threshold in each sector. If individual ability is 
higher than the upper threshold, his generation will choose a sector with higher 
technology while his generation will chose a sector with lower technology if his 
ability is less than the lower threshold. Generation stays in same sector if parent’s 
ability is between two thresholds. That is, given initial inequality, individual ability 
will be allocated more optimally to different sectors (high ability labours are allocated 
to sector with high technology) and thus aggregate technology will be enhanced and 
so will aggregate growth. Bhattacharya (1998) assume some individuals as capitalist 
can engage in investment with high return rate but also high risk while individuals 
with more bequests from parents could internally finance investment with lower cost 
which generates income inequality but bequests also make the poor easier to obtain 
external financial credit for investment setting-up (investment indivisibility). Hence 
aggregate capital level is enhanced by inequality and beneficial to economic growth. 
Barro (2000) raises an idea that inequality could stimulate growth to some extent 
because it can make some individuals accumulate sufficient capital to satisfy 
minimum quantity requirement of both production and human capital investment. 
Galor and Moav (2000) establish a model based on Galor and Tsiddon (1997), but 
with new human capital accumulation way which depends on individual physical 
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capital and also parent’s bequest. They consider a situation that marginal saving rate 
of the rich is generally higher than the poor. Hence initially inequality could increase 
aggregate capital stock and further increase aggregate growth. The poor could also 
benefit from this process because wage income is higher following the capital rise. 
This process is also called “Trickle-down” process. However, as economic 
development, marginal return of physical capital is gradually lower than that of 
human capital. Equality might enhance growth since credit restriction limits human 
capital accumulation of the poor.       
Since 1990s, more scholars turn to support that inequality is harmful to economic 
growth. For example, Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997) highlight that 
investment barriers to the poor caused by inequality, given incomplete market is 
harmful to growth. They assume individuals can either only supply labour with no 
capital investment and very low return or invest both capital and labour as 
entrepreneurs with a capital requirement. Entrepreneurship investment, however, has 
a probability to succeed which is determined by labour working efforts. Capital 
market is assumed incomplete and if too many poor agents need to borrow for 
investment, interest rate is higher which will reduce the poor’s incentives to make 
efforts (i.e. moral hazard). The rich as lenders could anticipate the poor’s behaviours 
and set borrowing restrictions which is called “credit-rationing”. Consequently a 
society with more unequal wealth distribution has lower growth due to lack of poor’s 
effort incentives and redistribution could enhance aggregate growth by reducing 
borrowing needs for the poor to invest and further increasing their incentives. Some 
scholars like Dahan and Tsiddon (1998) consider that human capital development will 
also be impeded by inequality, leading to unequal skills and finally worsen aggregate 
growth. One important issue of this kind of models is that lack of effort incentives 
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when agents are poor in fact is based on an implicit assumption that efforts can never 
make the poor become rich which is debatable. Some scholars use indivisibility to 
show a negative inequality effect. For example, Fishman and Simhon (2002) similar 
as Aghion and Bolton (1997) also consider inequality effects on entrepreneurship, but 
assume that individuals can be either entrepreneurs or workers but not both 
simultaneously. Entrepreneurship activity requires both capital and labour which is 
much easier for the rich than the poor due to incomplete capital market. 29 
Individual’s optimal allocation between consumption and bequests (savings) in each 
generation will lead to an extremely unequal economy given initial inequality, i.e. the 
rich will be always rich generation by generation while the poor will be always poor. 
Inequality may not distort aggregate growth in an economy starting with relatively 
equal distributions, but is harmful in an extremely unequal economy because many 
poor individuals do not have sufficient capital for entrepreneurship. 
Many political economists, such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and 
Tabellini (1994), Bénabou (1996), Aghion et al (1999) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2002), attempt to show negative inequality effects on growth by redistribution 
pressure caused by the Median Voter Theorem (MVT).30 For convenience, we use 
Persson and Tabellini (1994)’s model as an example. Given budget constraints in 
youth and in age 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑦𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑘𝑡+1
𝑖  and 𝑑𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑟[(1 − 𝜏)𝑘𝑡+1
𝑖 + 𝐾𝑡+1] where 𝜏 is political 
instrument like tax. Individual in youth solves the optimal problem by allocating 
current consumption 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 and future consumption 𝑑𝑡
𝑖 . Individual in youth has an income 
endowment 𝑦𝑡
𝑖 = (𝑠 + 𝑒𝑖)𝑘𝑡
𝑖  where s is constant skill and 𝑒𝑖 is individual specific 
                                                             
29 There are two types of products, final goods and intermediate goods used for final goods production. 
Entrepreneurs employ labours and capital (his own or borrowing) to produce intermediate goods. 
30 Bénabou (1996) uses MVT in his first model. 
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multiplier with zero mean and non-positive median.31 The solved individual optimal 
rules for 𝑘𝑡+1
𝑖 , 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 and 𝑑𝑡
𝑖  depend on predetermined 𝑘𝑡
𝑖, aggregate 𝐾𝑡+1 and parameters. 
Aggregation on individual production implies that aggregate income growth equals 
aggregate capital accumulation growth which depends on parameters, especially 
political instrument 𝜏. The optimal 𝜏 for individuals solved by first order condition in 
terms of 𝜏 finally is a function of steady-state interest rate r, skill 𝑠 and individual 
exogenous 𝑒𝑖 and the equilibrium 𝜏∗ is the one when 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑒𝑚 where 𝑒𝑚 is the median 
individual specification. Therefore the equilibrium aggregate growth rate could be 
found positively correlated to the median individual specification 𝑒𝑚 which measures 
inequality in this model. That is, aggregate growth is higher if individuals are more 
equal, i.e. 𝑒𝑚 is higher. This kind of models has two issues. First, higher (closer to 
zero) 𝑒𝑖  may not represent higher equality. Suppose population consists of 5 people. 
Consider scenario I where 𝑒𝑖 are {−5, −3, −1, 4, 5} with mean 0 and median −1. In 
scenario II, 𝑒𝑖 are  {−9, −4, 0, 1,12} with mean 0 but median 0. Although 
median 𝑒𝑚 increases to 0 in scenario II, we can hardly say scenario II has higher 
equality. For simplification, suppose average skill 𝑠 = 10. The richest person takes 
only 10% out of total income in scenario I while takes 24% in scenario II. Second, as 
the argument by Zweimüller (2000) and Kucera (2002), inequality has no significant 
effect on taxation policy or transfer regime in many across-country statistics. 
Redistribution pressure by the poor might be uninfluential if the rich has sufficiently 
high political power (Stiglitz, 2012). 
Some others like Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Keefer and Knack (2002) and 
Burdett et al. (2003) consider security reason due to inequality. An extremely unequal 
                                                             
31 Some authors like Bénabou (1996) use nonlinear production and next period individual human 
capital (skill here) depends on current production and exogenous, but they share same essentiality. 
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wealth distribution results in illegal return rate for the very poor much higher than 
their legal return rate which will induce an increase in crime which will discourage 
the incentives of capital accumulation for the rich. Different from many scholars who 
apply OLG models, Benhabib (2003) consider a model where two types of infinitely 
living individuals are classified by their individual productivities. They compare two 
games, cooperative game where a central planer (e.g. a government) optimises social 
utility which is a weighted sum of individual utilities by controlling individual labour 
inputs and consumptions, and a non-cooperative game where individuals solve their 
own optimal problem by controlling own labours and consumptions. Cooperative 
equilibrium is found preferred to non-cooperative equilibrium for central planner. 
Given the implicit assumption that saving ratio across agents is constant (by a special 
preference form) and consumption and leisure are complement, they show that high 
inequality (more capital allocated to agents with higher productivity) results in a 
lower growth rate because agents with higher productivity make less effort. However, 
a completely equal allocation of capital is not optimal since agents with higher 
productivity who are extremely unequally treated will also make less effort (by policy 
rent-seeking in cooperative equilibrium). Hence the optimal situation is a moderate 
inequality which could stimulate agents with higher productivity. Foellmi and 
Zweimüller (2004) also classify infinitely living individuals to two types, the rich and 
the poor with constant population weights but different wealth endowments. Each 
individual is a monopolist to produce a type of. Individuals have willingness to buy 
goods which depend on individual wealth and thus the rich has higher willingness to 
pay higher. Consumption demand relies on both willingness and group size. 32 
                                                             
32 The consumption demand for one good equals the population size if its price is less than the poor’s 
willingness while it equals zero if prices is greater than the rich’s willingness. If the price is between 
two groups’ willingness, goods will be shared by group sizes.  
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Individual productivity progress relies on individual innovation which only costs time 
input and innovation incentive is induced by consumption demand. They compare the 
effects of equality and inequality on the equilibrium growth rate and show that given 
initial unequal wealth allocation, whether inequality or equality is beneficial to growth 
depends on the redistribution method. If income or wealth is transferred from the rich 
to the poor with same population weights, then growth will be reduced by this 
equalisation because lower profits (the rich is unwilling to pay as high as before for 
some goods and the effect on the rich is greater than the wealth effect on the poor) 
drains innovation incentives. However, if the redistribution behaves by increasing the 
population weight of the rich, growth may rise or fall because more individuals now 
could afford goods with mid-priced goods (i.e. “market size effect”) while fewer 
agents could afford goods with extremely high prices (i.e. “price effect”).  
These models are generally used as theoretical support for empirical regression, 
different from the three generation HAMs which are generally used for simulation. 
The estimation methods in relevant empirical studies include cross-country regression 
for which least squares estimation methods are frequently used and panel data 
regression such as pooled least square, general GMM, difference GMM and system 
GMM. Cross-country regression generally regresses average growth rate in the time 
horizon of data set on regressors at the beginning of the time horizon. Difference 
GMM estimation firstly takes difference on original regression equation to get rid of 
the (country specific) fixed effects and use lagged level variables as instruments of 
differenced variables, generally taking the form of  ∆ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1∆ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽2∆Inequality𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆X𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where X𝑖,𝑡 contains all the other regressors. System 
GMM estimates both level and difference equations respectively using lagged 
difference variables and lagged level variables as instruments and the combination of 
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both moments (weight matrix) yields system GMM estimators. The debate on whether 
inequality could stimulate or impede economic growth has no consensus until now.   
One common issue of most existing studies is that income inequality instead of 
wealth or capital inequality is employed as a regressor due to data limitations which 
might lead to misspecified effects on growth because wealth and income distributions 
do not always have same dynamic trend (Rodríguez et al. 2002). Next we briefly 
review some typical empirical studies despite the use of income inequality in some 
papers. 
In the early debates, more empirical studies support the negative inequality effect 
on growth. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) conduct cross-country OLS 
regressions regressing average aggregate growth rate from 1960 to 1985 (also 
consider 1970 to 1985) on GDP, primary schooling index, income inequality 
measured by Gini-coefficient of income, wealth inequality measured by 
Gini-coefficient of land and a dummy variable describing democracy all in 1960. 
They find a significantly negative effect of wealth (also income) inequality on 
aggregate growth. 33  Persson and Tabellini (1994) also use cross-country OLS 
regression (2SLS estimation in “sensitivity analysis”) in two different time horizons 
of data set, 1830-1985 and postwar respectively. Besides same regressors as Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994), they introduce development level as a regressor which is 
measured by the gap between GDP in a certain country and the greatest GDP among 
all the countries. Additionally, they use middle class income share as income 
inequality indicator instead of Gini-coefficients in Alesina and Rodrik (1994). Growth 
is found significantly negatively rely on inequality in all sample countries and in 
                                                             
33 TLSL regression is also considered when wealth inequality measured by land is excluded. 
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democracy countries, but not in non-democracy economies. Perotti (1996) also 
conduct cross-country OLS regressions (WLS is used to test robustness for a certain 
regressor) from 1960 to 1985 by regress average growth rate on regressors in 1960. 
Different from studies above, they measure income inequality by income share of 
middle class (shares of 3rd and 4th quintiles). They also consider investment deflator 
measured by PPPI as a regressor and separately consider human capital of male and 
female by their years of schooling. Lastly, the population share of people aged over 65 
as a proxy of fertility is considered in one regression. They finally find significantly 
positive effects of inequality on growth in whole sample and also in democracy 
economies for all regressions. The effects are still positive but insignificant in 
non-democracy countries.  
Barro (2000) makes an early use of panel data with time horizon 1965-1995 
which is divided into three 10-year episodes. 3SLS with random effects is used in 
pooled regressions with inflation, schooling years and some lagged variables as 
instruments.34 He respectively considers quintile shares and Gini-coefficients of 
expenditure rather than income following Deininger and Squire (1996) as income 
inequality indicators. He finds that income inequality has positive effects on growth in 
developed countries while negative effects in undeveloped economies and 
insignificant effects in the whole sample. Knowles (2001) conduct a study on the 
basis of Barro (2000) by trying different but consistent across countries inequality 
measurements. He argues that some previous studies result in misleading findings 
because inconsistent data on inequality are used. For example, some countries statistic 
Gini-coefficient of income using gross income (essentially before redistribution) but 
some use expenditure (essentially after redistribution). He concludes that income 
                                                             
34 Country specific effects are considered as fixed effects only when evaluate inequality determinants. 
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inequality has a significantly positive effect on growth if it is consistently measured 
by income share of the 3rd quintile, but a negative effect if inconsistently measured by 
Gini-coefficient in the whole sample. A significantly negative effect could be found 
with consistent measurement in high-income economies only if an ex post 
redistribution inequality is used, i.e. expenditure inequality. Forbes (2000) adopts a 
difference GMM in a panel data fixed effects regression using data from 1965 to 1995 
with each 5 year as an episode. His sample does not include undeveloped countries 
like African and sub-Saharan countries. With similar regressors raised by Perotti 
(1996), his estimation results show significantly positive effects of income inequality 
on growth in those middle and high income economies. Bagchi and Svejnar (2015) 
use panel fixed effects regression (including both country effects and time effects) 
using IV (essentially similar with Forbes (2000)’s estimation method) with four 
5-year time intervals from 1987 to 2007. They consider the effect of wealth inequality 
which has three measurements, the share of capital held by billionaires over national 
capital stock, billionaire capital per GDP and billionaire capital over population with 
two instruments available, billionaire capital per GDP over per capita income and 
exchange rate. In addition to usual regressors, they also introduce initial poverty and a 
dummy variable describing whether a billionaire exists as regressors. Negative wealth 
inequality effects are found, although income inequality effect is insignificantly 
positive. Furthermore, poverty has an insignificant effect on growth together with 
income inequality but a significantly positive effect if income inequality is excluded.  
Traditional least square and GMM estimations with lagged level variables as IVs 
generally lead to bias due to unobservable country effects. However, difference GMM 
used by Forbes (2000) also ignores some cross-country variations. Some inequality 
indicators within a country do not have high variants across time, such as human 
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capital and income inequality indicators. Most volatiles of these indicators in a sample 
of countries come from the cross-country variation and thus difference GMM will 
eliminate the cross-country variation (Voitchovsky, 2005 and Castelló-Climen, 2010). 
Compared with difference GMM, system GMM is more efficient. Deininger and 
Olinto (2000) make an early use of system GMM estimation in a panel regression 
using data from 1966 to 1990 with 5-year episodes. Particularly, they consider the 
effects of both income equality and asset inequality measured by Gini-coefficient of 
land on growth. They find asset (land) inequality is significantly harmful to growth in 
both whole sample and rich countries in spite of that income inequality has 
significantly beneficial effects in rich countries. Voitchovsky (2005) uses system 
GMM estimation in the panel data from 1975 to 2000 with same episode interval in 
high and middle income economies. He focuses on effects of different inequality 
measurements, such as Gini-coefficient, share ratio of 90% over 75% (named by “top 
ratio”) and share ratio of 50% over 10% (named by “bottom ratio”). If 
Gini-coefficient is the unique inequality measurement, the effect is insignificant. If 
Gini together with share ratios are used to measure inequality, findings are significant 
where top ratio has positive effects but bottom ratio has negative effects. His finding 
on the poverty effect is contrary to Bagchi and Svejnar (2015)’s finding. 
Castelló-Climen (2010) develops Barro (2000)’s analysis by using system GMM with 
data from 1965 to 2000. His basic finding is as Barro (2000)’s that both income 
inequality and human capital inequality have positive effects on growth in rich 
economies but negative effects in poor countries. Additionally, he compares seven 
different time horizons and also different inequality measurements and finds that the 
sign of inequality effects is more likely to be influenced by sampled time horizons. 
Ostry et al. (2014) estimate the panel data from 1960 to 2010 across maximum 153 
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countries with system GMM to study both the sign of inequality effects on growth and 
the duration of the effects. In particular, they focus on the ex post redistribution 
inequality which is called “net inequality” similar as Knowles (2001). They find net 
inequality has a significantly positive effect on growth while higher net inequality 
also increases the probability of a short duration of growth both OECD and 
non-OECD economies. Halter et al. (2014) investigate both short term (5-year episode) 
and long term (10-year episode) effects of inequality on growth from 1966 to 2005 
with system GMM. In the whole sample, they find inequality has a significantly 
positive effect in short term while a negative effect in long term. Inequality has a 
significantly positive effect in high income economies in both short term and long 
term. They also conclude that the estimated direction of inequality effect is affected 
by both estimation method and sample. More precisely, difference GMM estimation is 
more likely to show a positive effect while system GMM estimation is more likely to 
give a negative effect. 
As shown above, most existing studies emphasise on the linear relationship 
between inequality and growth. However, the relation is possible to be nonlinear 
which is also what we believe and are interested in. Banerjee and Duflo (2003) argue 
that a negative wealth inequality effect on growth in some empirical studies is found 
because only linear relation is considered. Hence, they conduct a panel system GMM 
from 1965 to 1995 by considering inequality (Gini) square as a regressor and find a 
“U-shape” effect that growth is worsened as long as inequality changes no matter the 
direction. Kolev and Niehues (2016) also consider the nonlinear effect of net 
inequality with system GMM in a panel from 1960 to 2010 across 113 countries 
where the key regressor is square of ex post redistribution inequality. Their first 
finding is that linear inequality effect (regardless of the nonlinear relation) is 
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significant at 5% confidence level only if no other regressors except GDP are 
considered no matter which estimation method like OLS, fixed effects pooled least 
square, difference GMM and system GMM, is used in OECD countries (1985-2010). 
Contrarily, nonlinear effect is significant with regressors like human capital and 
investment included in the whole sample (1960-2010). Secondly, nonlinear inequality 
effect is likely to be negative whereas linear effect is likely to be positive especially in 
post-communist OECD countries. They also evaluate the effects of different taxations 
on growth and find most have negative effects, especially the marginal income tax 
rate which support the argument against that redistribution contributes to economic 
growth.     
Neves and Silva (2014) also review some empirical papers on examining 
different theoretical mechanisms of inequality effect which are omitted in this paper. 
As more studies indicate that it is difficult to have a consensus on the inequality effect 
across different countries, this paper prefers to a within-country study instead of a 
cross-country study on this topic. Furthermore, both lack of volatilities of some 
inequality indicators and the complex interactions between inequality and growth 
limit the use of regression analysis. Hence, in this paper we attempt to use a reliable 
model which will firstly be tested by comparing simulation and actual data to analysis 
inequality effects on growth.     
 
3 Model Setting 
This section illustrates our endogenous growth model with a growth mechanism 
originating from Minford et al (2007) that individual entrepreneurship incentives 
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could affect productivity growth and further aggregate growth. In their model, 
entrepreneurship incentives depend on its cost described by an exogenous penalty rate. 
We introduce heterogeneous agents into this growth model and relate the penalty rate 
as well as entrepreneurship incentives to individual wealth holdings. Hence wealth 
distribution could endogenously affect economic growth. This idea comes from the 
fact that rich people who have adequate wealth to support surplus activities generally 
have more incentives to do entrepreneurship or innovation than the poor whose 
priority is survival. We are not going to deny the success of a few entrepreneurs from 
impoverished backgrounds. However, it is easy to enumerate more successful 
entrepreneurs born in rich families or the middle class, such as John Pierpont Morgan, 
Rupert Murdoch and Warren Edward Buffett, William Henry Gates III and Steven 
Paul Jobs etc. Levine and Rubinstein (2013) investigate who are more likely to 
become Schumpeterian entrepreneurs measured by the incorporated self-employed 
using NLSY79 data in US and find that more entrepreneurs come from well-educated 
and high-income families. We regard in spite of this evidence as merely suggestive of 
how an attractive structural model can be specified relating inequality and growth. 
Our aim here is to develop a full and rigorously-based DSGE model and to test it by 
the powerful method of indirect inference to check on how well it matches the 
observed data behaviour of a suitable major economy-here that of the UK.  
3.1 Individual behaviour 
We firstly consider individuals in the economy. Suppose the whole population is 
comprised of a finite number of groups. Agents in each group behave as a 
representative agent. To simplify, assume only two groups (individuals) with constant 
population weights denoted by 𝜇𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 and 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 = 1. Each individual has a 
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centralised optimal problem where individual utility function takes same form across 
agents as well as individual budget constraint. Each individual has same time 
endowment, normalised to unity, which could be allocated to labour input 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 , 
entrepreneurship time (incentive) 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 and leisure. The idiosyncratic shocks in our 
model are individual labour supply preference shocks and individual consumption 
preference shocks instead of individual employment shocks in traditional HAMs. 
Agents are assumed to be fully employed. Individual i’s utility takes CRRA form with 
three arguments, individual consumption 𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 as follows. 
𝑈(𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑁𝑖,𝑡, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡) = Φ
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
1−Ψ1
1 − Ψ1
+ (1 − Φ)
(1 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
1−Ψ2
1 − Ψ2
where 1 − Ψ1 and 1 − Ψ2 are utility elasticity of consumption and leisure. Φ and 1 −
Φ are weights of consumption preference and leisure preference in utility. This 
benchmark model does not consider general tax which will be introduced in the 
redistribution section. Individual entrepreneurship has per unit time cost, denoted 
by 𝜋𝑡  and the total cost of entrepreneurship for individual i is then 𝜋𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡. Both perfect 
labour market and capital market are assumed to be perfect and thus individuals have 
a centralised income equal to individual production  𝑌𝑖,𝑡 which can be used for 
consumption, capital accumulation and bonds purchase. Individual i’s budget 
constraint is now given below. 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟t−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 (2) 
Since we have inequality generation mechanism illustrated later and perfect 
capital market assumption, borrowing constraint is not applied. In fact as Algan et al 
(2014) criticised, individuals could accumulate a relatively high wealth level so that 
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borrowing constraint is rarely touched in practice. Preston and Roca (2007)’s utility 
penalty is also not used because no significant role of penalty is found as discussed in 
the literature section. 
Individual i has a Cobb-Douglas production below which also determines an 
implicit real wage equal to marginal productivity of labour. 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡(𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝛼
(𝑁𝑖,𝑡)
1−𝛼
 (3) 
where individual productivity 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is non-stationary as in many stochastic growth 
models, but we give it an endogenous growth following the process (4) below which 
relies on the entrepreneurship time. 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝐴,𝑡
where 𝜃1 measures the natural productivity growth and the shock 𝜐𝐴,𝑡 is an aggregate 
productivity shock so that both individual productivities are related to aggregate 
productivity which is exogenous and equal to the Solow residual of an implicit 
aggregate Cobb-Douglas production.35 We focus on the interior solution. That is, we 
assume neither 𝜃2 nor 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is zero; otherwise the optimal rules will be equivalent to 
those in an exogenous growth model. We simply adopt identical parameters across 
agents to avoid that inequality is generated by too many exogenous factors different 
across agents. One could release this as a development. 
Individual’s first order conditions on bonds, capital holdings and labour, together 
with first order condition on current and future consumptions, yield intertemporal 
                                                             
35 Since aggregate economy actually is an aggregation of individual behaviours plus some errors, there 
is no necessity to apply an aggregate production function. Instead, we apply an exogenous aggregate 
productivity to reflect the effects of aggregate production on individual ones. 
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Euler equation (5), optimal capital rule (6) and optimal rule for individual labour 
supply (7) respectively. 
 (𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ1
= (1 + 𝑟t)𝛽𝐸𝑡 [(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1)
−Ψ1
] (5) 
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ1
= 𝐸𝑡 {𝛽(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1)
−Ψ1
[𝛼
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛿)]}
(1 − Φ)(1 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ2
= Φ(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ1(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
Given individual production (3) and individual productivity progress (4), the 
differential of 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠 in terms of 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is  
𝑑𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝑑𝑍𝑖,𝑡
=
𝜕𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝜕𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝜕𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝜕𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑠−1
⋯
𝜕𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑍𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝑠−1
⋯
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+2
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜕𝑍𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝜃2 
Therefore first order condition of 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is
36 
(1 − Φ)
(1 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
Ψ2
+ Φ
𝜋𝑡
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
Ψ1
= Φ𝜃2
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡 [∑ 𝛽
𝑠
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠)
Ψ1
∞
𝑠=1
]
Substituting out the first term 
(1−Φ)
(1−𝑁𝑖,𝑡−𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
Ψ2
 in (8) by (7) yields 
(1 − 𝛼)𝑌𝑖,𝑡
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
𝛹1
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
𝛹1
= 𝜃2
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡 [∑ 𝛽
𝑠
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠)
𝛹1
∞
𝑠=1
]
                                                             
36 Since the technological progress (4) 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜃1 + 𝜃2𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝐴,𝑡  is irrelevant to future shocks, the 
expectation could be removed from the term 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
. 
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Equation (9) actually is an accurately optimal decision rule for 𝑍𝑖,𝑡. However, it 
involves an infinite number of expectation terms which makes it impossible to solve 
without approximation. We follow Minford (2007)’s way by approximating 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
 as a 
random walk before steady state and the proof is shown in Appendix 1. Equation (9) 
can be written as 
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜃2
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐸𝑡 [∑ 𝛽
𝑠
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
Ψ1−1
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠)
Ψ1−1
∞
𝑠=1
]
As shown in Appendix 1, Ψ1 is set to unity for simplification and this value will 
also be used in our empirical study. Then Use 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
) =
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
  to simplify (10) as37 
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜋𝑡 =
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝛽𝜃2
(1 − 𝛽)
Equation (11) gives an approximately optimal decision rule for 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 with a finite 
number of terms. According to the perfect labour market assumption, (1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
 is 
the individual implied real wage rate 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 and we define 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 ≡
𝜋𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
 to rewrite (11) as 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
=
𝛽𝜃2
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
(1 − 𝛽)(1 + 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡)
If individual is engaged in entrepreneurship, he will pay 𝜋𝑡  in each unit of time 
and he will also lose unit wage 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 and thus 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 is a scaled variable like a tax rate. 
We call it “entrepreneurship penalty rate” in rest of this paper. Substituting 
                                                             
37 If one estimate Ψ1 different from but close to unity, the approximation
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
≈
1
(𝑔𝑐,𝑖)
𝑠 could be used 
for simplification of (10) where 𝑔𝑐,𝑖  is the steady-state gross growth rate of individual consumption to 
yield (1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+
𝜋𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜃2
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
∑
𝛽𝑠
(𝑔
𝑐,𝑖
Ψ1−1)
𝑠
∞
𝑠=1  
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out 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
 from (12) using (4) gives us the reduced equation of 𝑍𝑖,𝑡. However, it is not 
necessary to do so because 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is essentially an intermediate variable which could be 
substituted out from those equations involved in it. And one advantage of substituting 
out 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is that the difficulty of collecting data on it could be avoided. Similar as 
Minford et al (2007), by relegating 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
 into the error term, (12) can be linearised as 
 ln𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 − ln𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙1,𝑖 − 𝜙2,𝑖𝜋
′
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝐴,𝑡 (13) 
where 𝜙2,𝑖 =
𝛽𝜃2
𝑌𝑖
𝑤𝑖
(1−𝛽)(1+𝜋′𝑖)
2.
38 Note that the error term in (13) is an aggregate error 
instead of an individual one because firstly 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
 is close across agents given the perfect 
labour market assumption and secondly measurement errors when collect data on 
individual productivity could be reduced and the aggregate error is related to 
aggregate productivity which is easy to collect by aggregate Solow residuals. 
3.2 Entrepreneurship penalty rate  
Now consider the form of individual penalty rate 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 ≡
𝜋𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
 which should follow 
the idea that the rich are more likely and capable to do entrepreneurship and policies 
are biased towards the rich to some extent. Hence we assume individual penalty rate 
is negatively correlated with the ratio of group average capital over population 
average capital  
𝐾𝑖
𝐾
 which also describes inequality despite that group capital 
share 𝜇𝑖
𝐾𝑖
𝐾
 is the inequality indicator in this paper. Group capital share is not used 
because it cannot make policy biased towards the rich due to the small population 
                                                             
38 One could also linearise equation (12) directly by taking logarithm on both sides to achieve 
different 𝜙2,𝑖 and drift. However, there are only quantitative effects, but no qualitative effects of all the 
other parameters on 𝜙2,𝑖 
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weight of the rich. We also assume current penalty rate 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 depends on lagged 
instead of current capital ratio 
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
 since policy in reality is pre-set.39 Lastly we 
assume individuals can observe  𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 but cannot observe the exact relationship 
between 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
 and thus 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 is predetermined when individuals make their 
optimal decisions. 
The evolution of 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 is temporarily denoted as follows. 
𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌0
𝜋 + 𝜌1
𝜋 ∙ 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜌2
𝜋 ∙ 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
) + 𝜀𝜋′,𝑡
where 𝜌1
𝜋 ≥ 0; 𝜌0
𝜋, 𝜌2
𝜋 > 0 and 𝜀𝜋′,𝑡 is the aggregate entrpreneuring penaly rate which 
is a time-stationary AR process which describes some common properties of 
individual processes. The empirical finding of Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and Kolev 
and Niehues (2016) indicates that inequality has significant nonlinear effects on 
growth where they consider the effect of inequality square. We hence set 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
) ≡
𝜇𝑖
𝜔𝑌,𝑖
(
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
)
2
 where 
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
= 1 represents a perfect equality while either greater or less than 
1 implies inequality. The coefficient 
𝜇𝑖
𝜔𝑌,𝑖
 firstly aims to avoid the penalty policy too 
much beneficial to the rich as the poor generally has a greater population weight 
relative to their average income share. For example, this relative ratio in our data set 
for the poor is 
0.9
0.7
 while for the rich is 
0.1
0.3
. Second, this setting simplifies aggregation. 
𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
) is finite in spite of its quadratic form and so is 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 because 
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
 has both 
upper bound and lower bound due to the capital aggregation equation. According to 
                                                             
39 Note that capital level at the beginning of period t is denoted by 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 
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the derivation in Appendix 2, 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
) has a minimum at perfect equality where 
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑡
=
𝜇𝑖
𝜔𝑌,𝑖
= 1, penalty rates are identical across agents. It is also shown that the expected 
aggregate growth next period has a reduced form depending on current aggregate 
output, current aggregate capital and both current and lagged inequality. Capital 
inequality on the long-run growth rate is clear that minimised growth rate is reached 
when distribution is always perfectly equal. The temporary effect is more complicated 
due to the opposite directions of current and lagged inequality effects. One important 
reason is that labour input might be temporarily reduced by an increase in 
entrepreneurship incentives because of the total time endowment allocation which 
will have a currently negative effect on output while the rising incentives have a 
stronger positive next period instead of current period. This short-run behaviour is 
insignificant when the existing inequality is relatively high like in reality, but 
significant if capital distribution is close to equality. More details of the relevant 
analysis are provided in the empirical section.   
3.3 Aggregate Economy 
Since the individual variable measures the representative value in each group, the 
aggregate variable in the whole economy is the weighted sum of individual ones. 
 𝑌𝑡  = 𝜇1𝑌1,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑌2,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑌,𝑡 (15) 
 𝐾𝑡 = 𝜇1𝐾1,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝐾2,𝑡 + 𝜖𝐾,𝑡 (16) 
 𝐶𝑡 = 𝜇1𝐶1,𝑡 + 𝜇2𝐶2,𝑡 + 𝜖𝐶,𝑡 (17) 
To simplify, we assume UK is a closed economy; although international trade in 
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UK takes a considerable share of national economy. This is equivalent to say net 
export is captured by market clearing error. We also assume government spending 
entirely funded by individual entrepreneurship charges 𝜋𝑡 ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑍𝑖,𝑡 and they can be 
substituted out from the aggregate market clearing condition below.  
 𝑌𝑡  = 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑚,𝑡 (18) 
where the simple assumption on the perfect bonds market get rids of the aggregate 
bonds from the aggregate market clearing. 
An aggregate production function here is not directly employed to create 
aggregate output, but used to back out aggregate productivity shock which follows an 
I(1) process 
 ∆𝐴𝑡  = 𝜌𝐴0 + 𝜌𝐴∆𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝐴,𝑡 (19) 
where 𝜌𝐴 is close to 1 which will be estimated later. 𝜌𝐴0 captures the deterministic 
trend of non-stationary 𝐴𝑡. 
3.4 Linearised model equations 
There are 2 individual Euler equations, i.e. (5). One is chosen as the path of real 
interest rate and the other determines the path of its individual consumption, yielding 
the linearised equations (20) and (28) below. The consumption path of the rest 
individual, equation (29) below is obtained from consumption aggregation equation 
(17).  𝜀𝑐𝑖,𝑡 measures individual consumption preference error. Output aggregation 
equation firstly can be log-linearised to  ln𝑌𝑡 =
𝜇1𝑌1
𝑌
ln𝑌1,𝑡 +
𝜇2𝑌2
𝑌
ln𝑌2,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑌,𝑡 and 
since 𝑌1 and 𝑌 are steady-state values of output per capita in group one and aggregate 
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output per capita, 
𝜇1𝑌1
𝑌
 is then the steady-state output share of group one, denoted 
as 𝜔𝑌,1. Output share of group two is 𝜔𝑌,2 = 1 − 𝜔𝑌,1. Linearised output aggregation 
and capital aggregation equations are (21) and (22). Linearised market clearing 
condition (23) gives the path of aggregate consumption. Individual capital decision 
rules are linearised to (26) and (27) by substituting out expected consumption using 
Euler equation (5).40 To linearise labour equation (7), we take first order Taylor 
expansion on both sides regardless of constant terms to obtain 
Ψ2(𝑁𝑖ln𝑁𝑖,𝑡+𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
(1−𝑁𝑖−𝑍𝑖)
=
(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − Ψ1ln𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝑁𝑖,𝑡). Using approximation 1 − 𝑁𝑖 − 𝑍𝑖 ≈
1
2
 and  𝑁𝑖 ≈
1
2
 based 
on the actual aggregate data yields  ln𝑁𝑖,𝑡 =
1
(1+Ψ2)
(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − Ψ1ln𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 2Ψ2𝑍𝑖,𝑡) . 
Since 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 plays no more roles than an intermediate variable, substituting it out using 
equation (4) and (13) finally yields (30) and (31) where error  𝜀𝑁𝑖,𝑡 measures 
individual labour supply shock.  
Three more points need to be clarified. Some linearisation is conducted around 
the steady state in despite of non-stationarity because the steady state in our model is 
the one relying one non-stationary predetermined variables or exogenous shocks 
(“conditional steady state”) instead of a constant value which is explained in the 
Indirect-Inference section. Secondly, some constant terms when log-linearise are 
omitted because of our numerical algorithm also illustrated later in Indirect-Inference 
section which has a “Type II Fix” procedure to capture the omitted constant terms. 
Lastly, individual bonds are helpful to derive the real interest rate and Euler equations, 
but are removed from equation list primarily because they take small share over 
individual capital resource allocations which we are not interested in and also because 
                                                             
40 We also use the approximation 𝐸𝑡 (
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
) ≈
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
. If one does not use this approximation, ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡  then 
will be replaced by 𝐸𝑡(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡). 
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their applications will bring difficulties in individual data collection. However, we 
still use individual budget constraints when derive first order conditions and also 
when calculate terminal conditions where individuals have (1 + 𝑟t−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑇 = 𝑏𝑖,𝑇+1. 
List of linearised equations 
 𝑟t = Ψ1(𝐸𝑡ln𝐶2,𝑡+1 − ln𝐶2,𝑡) − ln𝛽 (20) 
 ln𝑌𝑡 = 𝜔𝑌,1ln𝑌1,𝑡 + 𝜔𝑌,2ln𝑌2,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑌,𝑡 (21) 
 ln𝐾𝑡 = 𝜔𝐾,1ln𝐾1,𝑡 + 𝜔𝐾,2ln𝐾2,𝑡 + 𝜀𝐾,𝑡 (22) 
ln𝐶𝑡 =
𝑌
𝐶
ln𝑌𝑡 −
𝐾
𝐶
[ln𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)ln𝐾𝑡−1] + 𝜀𝐶,𝑡
 ln𝑌1,t = 𝛼ln𝐾1,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛼)ln𝑁1,𝑡 + ln𝐴1,𝑡 (24) 
 ln𝑌2,t = 𝛼ln𝐾2,𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛼)ln𝑁2,𝑡 + ln𝐴2,𝑡 (25) 
lnK1,t = ln𝛽 + ln𝑌1,𝑡 −
1
𝛼
𝐾
𝐶
𝑟t 
lnK2,t = ln𝛽 + ln𝑌2,𝑡 −
1
𝛼
𝐾
𝐶
𝑟t 
ln𝐶1,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡ln𝐶1,𝑡+1 −
1
Ψ1
(𝑟t + ln𝛽) + 𝜀𝑐1,𝑡 
ln𝐶2,𝑡 =
1
𝜔𝐶,2
(ln𝐶𝑡 − 𝜔𝐶,1ln𝐶1,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑐2,𝑡 
ln𝑁1,𝑡 =
ln𝑌1,𝑡 − Ψ1ln𝐶1,𝑡 + 2
Ψ2𝜙2,1
𝜃2
𝜋′1,𝑡
(1 + Ψ2)
−
2Ψ2(1 − 𝜃1 + 𝜙1,1)
𝜃2(1 + Ψ2)
+ 𝜀𝑁1,𝑡
ln𝑁2,𝑡 =
ln𝑌2,𝑡 − Ψ1ln𝐶2,𝑡 + 2
Ψ2𝜙2,2
𝜃2
𝜋′2,𝑡
(1 + Ψ2)
−
2Ψ2(1 − 𝜃1 + 𝜙1,2)
𝜃2(1 + Ψ2)
+ 𝜀𝑁2,𝑡
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 ln𝐴1,𝑡+1 = ln𝐴1,𝑡 + 𝜙1,1 − 𝜙2,1𝜋
′
1,𝑡 + 𝜀𝐴,𝑡 (32) 
 ln𝐴2,𝑡+1 = ln𝐴2,𝑡 + 𝜙1,2 − 𝜙2,2𝜋
′
2,𝑡 + 𝜀𝐴,𝑡 (33) 
𝜋′1,𝑡 = 𝜌0
𝜋 + 𝜌1
𝜋 ∙ 𝜋′1,𝑡−1 − 𝜌2
𝜋 ∙ 𝑄 (
𝐾1,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
) + 𝜀𝜋′,𝑡
𝜋′2,𝑡 = 𝜌0
𝜋 + 𝜌1
𝜋 ∙ 𝜋′2,𝑡−1 − 𝜌2
𝜋 ∙ 𝑄 (
𝐾2,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
) + 𝜀𝜋′,𝑡
 
4 Indirect Inference 
In this section, we illustrate the methodology, Indirect Inference, applied to test our 
model and also estimate key parameters, involving 4 subtopics, the basic idea and 
statistic we use, auxiliary model, simulation method and estimation method. 
The concept of Indirect inference (In-If) are firstly raised by Smith (1993) and 
Gourieroux et al (1993) in order to estimate structural parameters which are difficult 
to be directly estimated from a structural model. To briefly summarise their idea, I 
resort to a simple structural model, an MA process 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑡 + 𝛼𝜀𝑡−1 given by 
Davidson and MacKinnon (2004). To estimate structural parameters 𝜇 and 𝛼, one 
could set an auxiliary model which could well specify the structural model, for 
example an AR 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛽𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡 whose parameters are simpler to be estimated.
41 
Id-If has an advantage that the choice of the auxiliary model (or parameters) is quite 
flexible. Id-If is asymptotically efficient as maximum likelihood as long as the 
auxiliary model is correctly described (Keane and Smith 2003). 
                                                             
41 Smith (1993) and Gourieroux et al (1993) do not assume an auxiliary model but auxiliary 
parameters and a criterion function (e.g. a likelihood function) with some restrictions. I use the present 
the brief way to save words due to their complicated notations.  
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Suppose 𝜈𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜈
2). Then auxiliary parameters can be estimated using OLS. The 
properties of  𝜈𝑡 imply  𝐸(𝑦𝑡 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝑦𝑡−1) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣[𝑦𝑡−1(𝑦𝑡 − 𝛾 − 𝛽𝑦𝑡−1)] = 0 . 
Use 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡−1 in the structural model to substitute out 𝑦𝑡  and 𝑦𝑡−1 from the two 
restrictions using those in the structural model yields two “binding functions” below 
which describe the relation between auxiliary parameters and structural parameters. 
𝛾 = (1 − 𝛽)𝜇;  𝛽 =
𝛼
(1 + 𝛼2)
 
Then estimators on structural parameters could be achieved from 𝛾 and ?̂?. More 
generally, however, analytical binding functions are too complicated to compute and 
then simulation method could be used. Define the structural parameter vector and the 
auxiliary parameter vector as  𝜃 and  𝛽 respectively. Following Gourieroux et al 
(1993)’s idea, firstly one can obtain the estimated auxiliary parameters  ?̂? using 
observations. Secondly, one could stimulate S samples using structural model with a 
given 𝜃. Then replace observations by each sample of simulated data in the auxiliary 
model to estimate auxiliary parameters. Denote the achieved estimators based on 
simulated data as  𝛽?̃?(𝜃); 𝑠 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑆 depending on the given  𝜃 . Lastly, the Id-If 
estimator of 𝜃 is the one such that ?̂? and 𝛽(𝜃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑆
∑ 𝛽?̃?(𝜃)  are closest. Their simplest 
but time-consuming way to find optimal  𝜃 is calibration until ?̂? and  𝛽(𝜃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are 
convergent. Alternatively, one could solve the problem  min
𝜃
[?̂? − 𝛽(𝜃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] ′Ω̂ [?̂? −
𝛽(𝜃)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] to yield the optimal estimator 𝜃(Ω) where Ω is a self-chosen positive definite 
matrix Ω and Ω̂ is one converges to  Ω.42 More importantly, given true values of 
structural parameters as 𝜃0, it is proved that √𝑇 [?̂? − 𝛽(𝜃0)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] asymptotically follows a 
normal distribution with zero mean. 
                                                             
42 See the optimal choice of Ω in Gourieroux et al (1993) Appendix 2  
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4.1 Wald Statistic 
The asymptotic property of the early Id-If estimators provides more widespread 
applications of Id-If, like model testing. Le et al (2011) make an early contribution to 
test a DSGE model using Id-If and we also follow their way. A DSGE model (usually 
a linearised one) can be represented as a VARMA or VAR(∞) with structural 
parameter restrictions, although some issues might possibly occur, like linearisation 
errors, multi-solutions and “stochastic singularity” (i.e. too few shocks). Then a 
VAR(∞) could be further represented to a finite order VAR(p) or even a VAR(1) if all 
the endogenous variables are observable or some conditions for state space are 
satisfied (Dave and De Jong 2007; Giacomini 2013; Wickens 2014). Thus we could 
use VAR as the auxiliary model. An unrestricted VAR instead of a restricted one will 
be used for two reasons. Firstly, a restricted VAR requires an analytical solution which 
are difficult to be solved for complicated models. Secondly, as long as structural 
parameters are well identified, unrestricted VAR does not have identification problem. 
Moreover, even if structural parameters are not identified, the effect of using an 
unrestricted VAR also depends on the auxiliary parameters chosen. Consider Canova 
and Sala (2009)’s 3-equations model below composed of IS curve, Phillips curve and 
monetary policy. 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐1 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝛼2(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑒1,𝑡 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑐2 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛼4𝑦𝑡 + 𝑒2,𝑡 
𝑖𝑡  = 𝑐3 + 𝛼5𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑒3,𝑡 
The analytical solution is 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝑃 ∙ 𝑒𝑡 where 𝑌𝑡, 𝐶 and 𝑒𝑡 are column vectors 
respectively comprise endogenous variables, constant terms and shocks. P is a 3 by 3 
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coefficient matrix which does not contain 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 and 𝛼3 . Constant vector 𝐶 in a 
restricted reduced form reflects three restriction equations on structural parameters. 
However, the internal relations disappear when consider an unrestricted reduced form. 
That is, the structural parameters are not well identified in the solution. But the fact is 
that Id-If does not use a reduced form but the original structural model to simulate 
data. Namely, although 𝛼1, 𝛼2 and 𝛼3disappear in the reduced form (suppose as the 
auxiliary model), the constant 𝐶 differs when 𝛼1, 𝛼2 and 𝛼3values change and thus 
if 𝐶 is also considered into the auxiliary parameters, the bias could be neglected. 
Nevertheless, under-identification may occur when a difference form of reduced 
solution (e.g. VECM) is used for non-stationary shocks. In fact, DSGE models are 
quite often over-identified instead of under-identified (Wickens 2012). It should be 
noticed that although an unrestricted VAR is chosen as the auxiliary model, the data 
simulated from the structural model actually follow a restricted VAR. Suppose now 
the auxiliary model is VAR(1). Given null hypothesis of the Id-If model 
testing 𝐻0: 𝜃 = 𝜃0 (i.e. model is true), to generate a testing statistic, we firstly create a 
vector which contains coefficients in the estimated VAR coefficient matrices and 
variances of the VAR residuals. This is the auxiliary parameter vector 𝛽. A sample 
of  {𝛽?̃?(𝜃0); 𝑠 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑆} is obtained after S times simulations (procedure will be 
illustrated later). Given the asymptotical property of ?̂? − 𝛽(𝜃0)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , Wald statistic [?̂? −
𝛽(𝜃0)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ]
′
Σ(𝜃0)
−1 [?̂? − 𝛽(𝜃0)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ] asymptotically follows an 𝜒2 distribution with degree of 
freedom 𝑘 where Σ(𝜃0) is the variance-covariance matrix of {?̂? − 𝛽?̃?(𝜃0)} and 𝑘 is 
the number of elements in 𝛽. Note that a full Σ(𝜃0) reflects the interactive volatilities 
of variables implied by a structural model and thus a Wald test using a full Σ(𝜃0) is a 
joint-distribution test. Meenagh et al (2008) conduct an experiment to compare two 
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Wald statistics, one with a diagonal Σ(𝜃0) and the other with a full Σ(𝜃0), using a 
bivariate VAR(1) as the auxiliary model includes interest rate and inflation. They find 
model hard to be rejected using Wald with a diagonal Σ(𝜃0).
43 Therefore to keep an 
adequate testing power, we also calculate Wald with a full Σ(𝜃0). Then a simple way 
to evaluate the model is to compare the calculated Wald with a certain critical. But 
this way is more affected by the simulated distribution. A more usual way is to check 
the allocation of this Wald, denoted by Wald𝑎 (when ?̂? is obtained using the actual 
data) in the simulated distribution which is composed of S Wald values {Wald𝑠; 𝑠 =
1, ⋯ , 𝑆} where each Wald𝑠 is calculated when ?̂? is obtained using the s
th sample of 
simulated data. One can sort {Wald𝑠;  𝑠 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑆} from lowest to highest and 𝐻0 will 
be rejected in a 95% confidence interval, if  Wald𝑎 > Wald95 where Wald95 is the 
95th percentile value of the sorted {Wald𝑠}. One issue of this way is that Wald𝑎 has 
the possibility to be greater than all {Wald𝑠}. An alternative way is the Mahalanobis 
Distance (MD) which equals  √Wald . As  Wald ~ 𝜒2(𝑘) ,  √2𝜒2 asymptotically 
follows  𝑁(√2𝑘 − 1, 1) . Following Le and Meenagh (2013) that as  √2Wald −
√(2𝑘 − 1) is close to a t distribution, we define a “transformed MD” 𝑧 below and 
compare it with the critical value of t distribution with a large df on a chosen 
confidence interval.44    
𝑧 = 𝑇𝑐 [
√2Wald𝑎 − √(2𝑘 − 1) 
√2Wald𝑐 − √(2𝑘 − 1) 
] 
where 𝑇𝑐𝑞 is the critical value of a one-tail t distribution on the c% confidence interval 
                                                             
43 See (Meenagh et al 2008) Section 2.2.1; Figure 1 
44 In fact, we all use an approximation because the limiting distribution of √2Wald − √(2𝑘 − 1) is a t 
distribution only if for a large degree of freedom, say greater than 30 (Green 2002 Appendix B).  
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and Wald𝑐  is the c
th percentile value of the sorted {Wald𝑠}.  
4.2 Auxiliary Model 
One should note that VAR is not the unique alternative for the auxiliary model but 
a proper one because we are more interested in whether the model could generate 
typical behaviours or interactions of data instead of closest data to the observations. 
Some others like IRFs and moments could also be used. Another discussible point is 
what orders (lags) of VAR and which VAR coefficients we should use. Le et al (2011) 
define two types of Wald statistic based on different use of VAR coefficients, a “Full 
Wald” where a vector composing all the VAR(1) coefficients and variances as the 
auxiliary model is used to calculate the Wald statistic, and a “Direct Wald” where 
some coefficients and variances we are interested in are used for Wald statistic. They 
firstly test three models, the Smets-Wouters model, a New Classical model and a 
hybrid model which is an average of NC and NK using a Full Wald and all the three 
are significantly rejected. Then they test the hybrid model using a Direct Wald. 
Despite that the model is still rejected, the behaviours of inflation, output and interest 
rate perform well and the model could provide some beneficial policy implication. 
That is, although Full Wald test is more powerful, it may reject some models which 
are moderately false. Le et al (2015) summarise the result of Monte Carlo experiments 
on the testing power comparison among different auxiliary VAR(1)s when test the 
S-W model. Model has an 83.5% probability to be rejected if 3variables (thus 9 VAR 
coefficients) are used to calculate Wald while the rejection probability increases to 
96.6% when 5 variables (25 VAR coefficients) are considered. As an appropriate 
number of variables included in a VAR with order 1 could sufficiently have a great 
power, we could start with a Direct Wald with order 1 in an auxiliary VAR or VARX 
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(transferred from a VECM) and probably increase the order of VAR if the test power 
is low. 
As this paper aims to study the dynamics between the capital inequality and 
determinants of the aggregate growth in our model are capital inequality, aggregate 
output and aggregate capital as shown in Appendix 2 lack of rigorousness, the 
auxiliary model should at least contain aggregate output, capital inequality and 
aggregate capital. 45  Furthermore, since the aggregate productivity captures an 
aggregate production function which is lack in the model equations and it could also 
affect the individual productivities, to evaluate whether the relation between aggregate 
growth and aggregate productivity reflected from the actual data and that generated by 
our model are consistent, we introduce this non-stationary exogenous variable in the 
auxiliary model. Due to the non-stationarity, a VECM is preferred to a VAR. Meenagh 
et al (2012) show that the solution of a DSGE model with non-stationary variables can 
be approximated as a VARX (VAR with non-stationary variables X). Suppose the 
structural model is  A(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝐶(𝐿)𝑥𝑡 + 𝐷(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 where  𝑦𝑡 ,  𝑥𝑡 and  𝑒𝑡 are 
respectively a vector of endogenous variables, a vector of non-stationary variables and 
a vector of i.i.d. shocks. Given both 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡  are non-stationary (because 𝑦𝑡 depends 
on 𝑥𝑡 ), there should be cointegrations which requires both are I(1) and then a 
short-run equilibrium (stationary shocks are all zeros) could be written as the form 
of 𝑦𝑡 = Π𝑥𝑡 + 𝑔 (this is also the form of terminal conditions we use). Combined this 
with the I(1) process of 𝑥𝑡, they show that the long-run solution for 𝑥𝑡  comprise a 
deterministic trend and a stochastic trend. Then the solution could be approximated as 
the form of  𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶 + 𝑃𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑄𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 , a VARX depending on the 
                                                             
45 Aggregate growth is the difference in logarithm of aggregate output and thus in the auxiliary VARX, 
series of aggregate output could implicitly describe series of growth. 
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non-stationary 𝑥𝑡−1, deterministic trend 𝜙𝑡 and stochastic 𝜈𝑡. Hence we use VARX(1) 
as the auxiliary model and estimate coefficients by OLS. Then a 12 by 1 coefficient 
vector including 9 VARX coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables and 3 
variances is used to calculate the Wald. 
4.3 Simulation 
A crucial procedure of our test is simulation which could be carried out by 
following steps. 
4.3.1 Back out Residuals 
For convenience, define equation residual as the difference between the LHS 
value and the RHS value of one single equation for a certain variable based on actual 
data. Given structural parameter values, residuals in the equations with no rational 
expectations (RE) are directly backed out by LHS-RHS. For equations with RE, 
firstly following McCallum (1976)’s way to predict expectations using instruments, 
we estimate a VAR of variables with expectations (i.e. choose lagged variables as 
instruments) and set the fitted values one-period ahead as their expectations. Next, 
residuals are also equal to LHS-RHS.  
4.3.2 Obtain Structural Errors and Innovations 
Most equation residuals achieved using actual data are non-stationary due to 
deterministic trends except the exogenous aggregate productivity (Solow residual of 
an implicit aggregate production function) whose non-stationarity comes from both 
unite root and deterministic trend.46  More explicitly, the aggregate productivity 
                                                             
46 It might be argued that most errors should be stationary if the model is a true endogenous growth 
64 
 
follows ARIMA(1,1,0) with a drift while all the others follow ARMA(1,0) with 
deterministic trends. We firstly take difference on aggregate productivity and regress 
on lagged difference and constant to get its OLS residuals which are used for 
structural innovations for 𝐴𝑡 and the estimated constant is set as the Balanced Growth 
Path (BGP) rate. The structural errors for 𝐴𝑡 are the backed out aggregate productivity 
minus the estimated time trend which follows process ∆𝐴𝑡 = 𝛽1
𝐴∆𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡
𝐴. Next for 
other equation residuals, we regress each on a time trend to get the fitted value, 
denoted as  ?̂?𝑡 , which is our time-detrended equation residual. Then 
regress ?̂?𝑡  on ?̂?𝑡−1 to obtain the stochastic process ?̂?𝑡 = 𝛽1
𝑥?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡
𝑥 and the residuals 
are structural innovations for the error ?̂?𝑡. 
4.3.3 Solve the model 
Due to the non-stationary endogenous variables, 𝐴1,𝑡 and 𝐴2,𝑡, the steady state in 
our model is driven by non-stationary variables and thus we use Fortran with some 
numerical iteration algorithms instead of Dynare with stationarisation around a certain 
steady state to solve the model. We follow Le et al (2012)’s numerical solution 
method which originates from the one to solve the Liverpool model, like introduced 
by Minford et al (1984). To my knowledge, the algorithm works as follows. Suppose 
we have observations in N periods and we need to set a number of forecasting periods 
(explain this later), say F. First of all, we solve the model using actual data and 
structural errors (without innovations). Starting with initial values of rational 
expectations (RE) from period 1 to F, we calculate the values of variables in next 
period among which the variables we want to forecast are denoted by 𝑦. Now we use 
                                                                                                                                                                              
model which could capture the growth without exogenous drivers. One should note that structural 
errors depend on structural parameters whose values might be mis-specified and thus we follow the 
described way to let actual data and the current parameter values decide stationarity of errors and 
whether model could generate sufficient growth driving endogenously. 
65 
 
the values of variables in next period as their predictions in current period and thus we 
can have F periods predictions for each RE variable, denoted as {𝑦2, ⋯ , 𝑦𝐹+1}. Next, 
calculate the difference between our prediction value and the given RE value in each 
period and we need all the differences less than a tolerance level. If the gap is greater 
than the tolerance level, then use a certain algorithm to renew the given RE from 
initial values to predictions (like a weighted sum and the present algorithm used is 
“Powell-Hybrid” searching method which has a high convergence speed) until 
predictions are close enough to the newest RE values and then we can say the model 
is solved in the first period.47 Additionally all the differences between the values of 
variables when model solved and the actual data are saved in all the F periods (this 
step is called “Type II Fix”). Afterwards, the algorithm uses RE values one period 
ahead to repeat the steps above to obtain predictions {𝑦3, ⋯ , 𝑦𝐹+2} and solve the 
model in the second period. We need to solve the model in all the N periods which 
require use to collect data in totally N + F periods. In practice, we set F = 50.  
One important thing for numerical methods is the multi-solution. To find a unique 
one, we set a terminal condition which represents model will be in steady state after a 
terminal period T. Although T should be infinity in principle, it has to be a finite 
number in numerical solutions. Both Matthews and Marwaha (1979) and Minford et 
al (1979) find solutions are not sensitive to the choice of T. We set T equal to the 
number of last forecasting period in practice, i.e. N+T. In our model terminal 
condition is the steady state solution for RE variables with stationary errors all zeros. 
Since individual productivities are non-stationary, RE variables will depend on the 
last period individual productivities in steady state and terminal condition can vary, 
                                                             
47 There are several options of algorithms to renew RE, like the Gauss-Seidel algorithm used in an old 
version. 
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given different structural parameter values.  
4.3.4 Bootstrap 
After base run, we bootstrap innovations. Firstly define a time vector to ensure all 
the errors in each period will be randomly chosen together due to the interactive 
volatilities of errors. The bootstrapped samples in general do not follow same 
distributions as the original samples if these innovations are not i.i.d. However, we do 
not release the i.i.d. assumption. What we do is just to consider some occasional 
co-movements occur in certain unobservable environments. When bootstrap, we 
should not ignore those environments and thus randomly draw all innovations in same 
period together. The method could also work if this is released. Then we use a random 
generator to randomly draw elements from the time vector to yield a bootstrapped 
time vector with same dimension, also resulting in a bootstrapped sample of structural 
errors. We bootstrap structural innovations instead of randomly drawing innovations 
form assumed distributions because firstly the interactive volatilities as described in 
the previous note-foot can hardly be realised using single distributions. Secondly, the 
achieved innovations might imply these values have higher realisation probabilities 
(same idea as the likelihood), which cannot be reflected by random draws from given 
distributions. Furthermore, what distributions should be used if use them. It is true 
that bootstrap is based on the large sample theorem where the original sample of 
structural innovations has the same distribution with population structural innovations 
and the sample size in our model is insufficiently large. Le et al (2011) firstly conduct 
Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the accuracy of innovation bootstrap by firstly 
setting a normal distribution for the original structural errors (equivalent to a 
distribution of original innovations), randomly drawing innovations and bootstrapping 
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samples to calculate Wald for each sample.48 It is found that small sample bootstrap 
is also accurate, although bootstrap is likely to “under-reject” and is more accurate in 
large samples. Additionally, they also verify that Id-If Wald based on bootstrapped 
simulations converges to an 𝜒2 distribution as the sample size rises using a Monte 
Carlo experiment.   
4.3.5 Simulate data and Calculate Wald 
The bootstrapped innovations are used to renew structural errors following their 
stochastic processes achieved in 3.2. Then the model is solved following same 
procedures in 3.3 with two differences that innovations now are non-zero and the 
“Type II Fix” residuals are added to equations in each period to diminish 
unobservable uncertainties. The simulated outputs are variable values when model is 
solved. This simulation is called “Full simulation”, different from a simulation for 
IRFs where innovations are non-zero only in the starting period (regardless of the 
lagged periods preparing for base run and simulation). Before calculate Wald, we add 
back BGP to simulated data except some stationary variables, like the real interest rate 
and individual labours. Since we use the estimated coefficient of deterministic trend 
of aggregate productivity as BGP (note that this is a steady state time trend coefficient, 
not the true BGP growth rate and the latter for actually is 
BGP
1−𝛽1
𝐴 ), the BGP growth rates 
of output, capital and consumption (both individual and aggregate) are 
all  
BGP
(1−𝛽1
𝐴)(1−𝛼)
 while the BGP growth rates of individual productivities are 
both 
BGP
1−𝛽1
𝐴 same as aggregate productivity.
49 Then the original simulated data could be 
                                                             
48 See details in Le et al (2011) Section 6.1 
49 Steady-state process of the aggregate productivity is ∆𝐴 = 𝛽0
𝐴 + 𝛽1
𝐴∆𝐴 and thus its BGP growth rate 
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amended by multiplying a gross BGP growth rate in each period. Note that the net 
BGP growth rate generally is quite small for quarterly data, e.g. in our model around 
the range 0.002-0.004 and thus simulated data differ slightly. Moreover, BGP has 
almost no effects on Wald computation. However, we keep this step in order to 
compare simulated data with actual data which implicitly contains a time trend. Lastly, 
Wald and the Transformed MD are calculated after we collect S (1100 in practice) 
bootstrapped simulations. 
4.4 Indirect Inference Estimation 
Given parameter values, previous Id-If Wald test could evaluate whether the 
model is true, but in fact it could not tell us whether a rejection is due to the false of 
functional forms or due to inappropriate parameter values. Fortunately, we could 
firstly assume functional forms are correct and test the model given continuously 
adjusted values of parameters until the model cannot be rejected (we call the different 
models generally if parameter values are different). Our target is to find the parameter 
values such the transformed MD (TMD) or Wald is minimised and this procedure of 
searching for optimal parameters is called Id-If Estimation. 
The Id-If estimation involves a searching algorithm which selects parameter 
values from one group to another. To avoid the trap of local optimum, we use 
Simulated-Annealing method (SA) with procedures given by (Johnson et al., 1990). 
1. We start from initial parameter values 𝜃1 and conduct a full Id-If Wald test with 
all 5 steps described in the previous section to obtain TMD1 (or use Wald, so 
                                                                                                                                                                              
is ∆𝐴 =
𝛽0
𝐴
1−𝛽1
𝐴 =
BGP
1−𝛽1
𝐴 . Steady-state implicit aggregate production is 𝑌 = 𝐴𝐾
𝛼𝑁1−𝛼 where Y and K 
have same BGP growth rate and N has zero growth rate. Hence the BGP growth rate is 
BGP
(1−𝛽1
𝐴)(1−𝛼)
 for 
both Y and K. 
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yield Wald1). 
2. Then we randomly generate a neighbor parameter vector 𝜃2 and follow same 
steps to obtain TMD2 (or Wald2). 
3. If TMD2 < TMD1, 𝜃1 is chosen starting parameters and we repeat the two steps 
above to search for a better one. If TMD2 ≥ TMD1, we do not surely reject to 
move towards  𝜃2 , but calculate an “acceptance probability” (ACP) which 
provides a probability to move. Namely, we always surely move to a better new 
choice, but we still have a certain chance to move towards a worse choice, which 
is our mechanism to escape from a local optimum. The ACP generally takes the 
form of  α(TMD1, TMD2, 𝑇) ∈ [0,1] where T is called "temperature" which 
usually starts from unity and decreases after each estimation iteration. ACP could 
follows Gibbs equation  α = min{exp[(TMD1 − TMD2)𝑇
−1], 1} in practice 
where 𝑇𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑇𝑡; 0 < 𝑞 < 1. We randomly draw a value u from a uniform 
distribution 𝑈(0,1) in each estimation iteration. If the calculated α ≥ 𝑢, we move 
to 𝜃2; if else, we stay at 𝜃1. Note that the process of T implies that it would be 
more difficult to move towards a worse choice as more iterations done. 
4. Repeat steps above until we find an acceptable solution for 𝜃 or reach a maximum 
number of iterations.  
It is an advantage of Id-If that estimation and test are not independent. Id-If 
estimation tells us the optimal parameters such that the “difference” (key 
characteristics) between simulated data and the actual data is minimised while Id-If 
test tells us how good this minimised difference is. Suppose the minimised difference 
can still be strongly rejected. One could believe that the functional forms of the model 
are problematic. 
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5 Model Data 
We collect seasonally adjusted quarterly data in UK from 1978Q1 to 2015Q4 because 
many micro statistics in UK are only available after 1977. Raw data will be used 
without stationarisation primarily because we use VARX as the auxiliary model in 
which non-stationary variables could be directly considered. Besides, residuals 
backed out from model are observable even if non-stationary and thus we can separate 
deterministic trends from residuals to keep regression is used on stationary stochastic 
processes. Furthermore, stationarisation method could do harm to shocks. For 
example, HP filter will affect volatilities of shocks and introduce extra cyclical 
properties. Now consider aggregate and individual data sequentially.  
5.1 Aggregate Data 
To exclude the inflationary effects, we collect the data measured by chain volume 
with base year 2012. Aggregate output and consumption are GDP and household final 
consumption expenditure respectively from UK national statistics. Real interest rate is 
one quarter of the difference between annual nominal interest and annual next-period 
inflation rate where nominal interest rate is measured by 90-day Yields Rate reported 
by Bank of England and inflation rate is CPI annual growth rate of all indexes. The 
aggregate labour is calculated the number of employment in UK aged 16 and over 
(MGRZ) divided by the sum of the total claimant count (BCJD) and the number of 
UK workforce jobs (DYDC) and then divided by two, sourced by Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). 
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Figure 2: Data on four aggregate variables (level unit: thousand GBP) 
 
As the earliest data on capital stock available published by ONS starts from 1997, 
we estimate full observations by perpetual inventory method. Firstly we choose a 
constant annual capital-income (K-Y) ratio, 4.715 in practice which is the average of 
4.16 in 1980 and 5.27 in 2010 reported by Piketty and Zucman (2014). The choice of 
a constant K-Y ratio aims to estimate an average capital-investment (K-I) ratio later 
for further iterations and does not mean that the actual volatilities of this ratio are 
ignored. Next, we collect data on aggregate investment by summing up “changes in 
inventories including alignment adjustment” (CAFU) and “total gross fixed capital 
formation” (NPQT), sourced by ONS. An average quarterly K-I ratio equals K-Y ratio 
divided by average investment and then multiplied by average income and 4 
respectively. Suppose the equilibrium net growth rate of capital 
∆K
K
 is equal to that of 
income which can be easily calculated. Then a constant capital depreciation rate δ can 
be backed out from the equilibrium investment equation I = ∆K + δK and the average 
K-I ratio. Lastly, we set the first period quarterly capital equal to the initial quarterly 
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income multiplied by K-Y ratio and 4 respectively and use the investment 
equation  K𝑡+1 = I𝑡 + (1 − δ)K𝑡 to iterate sequential capital stocks. The annually 
averages of capital stocks generated by us (Model capital) are compared with the 
annual capital published by ONS from 1997 to 2015. Their ratio is almost constant as 
shown below which implies that the almost constant gap after logarithm have no 
effect on model simulation. 
Figure 3: Compare generated capital with ONS capital 
 
𝜋𝑡
′  measures the entrepreneurship cost in which a decrease could stimulate 
entrepreneurship incentives, reflected by time on entrepreneurship 𝑧𝑡, could improve 
productivity regardless of shocks. Following Minford (2016)’s idea that costs of 
incentives could be represented by two factors, the Labour Market Regulation (LMR) 
and tax rate. LMR describes the degree of supervision in the labour market, protection 
to labour welfare and employment costs. For example, Fraser Institute reports the 
LMR indicator comprising 6 items among which we only use the third item 
“Centralized Collective Bargaining” (CCB) and the fifth item “Mandated cost of 
worker dismissal” (MCD) because others are most related to wages already implicitly 
included in agent income.50 CCB describes the whole procedure for both employers 
                                                             
50 The 6 items are “hiring regulations and minimum wage”, “hiring and firing regulations”, CCB, 
“hours regulations”, MCD and “conscription”. See more details in measurement of “Economic freedom” 
73 
 
and employees to make a collective agreement on working contracts (Gernigon et al 
2000) and it is measured by a value from 0 (hardest to agreements) to 10 (easiest), so 
is MCD. Some preparations are needed before we use them. First of all, data on both 
CCB and MCD are not available in all time periods. Moreover they are annual data 
instead of quarterly data and lack of volatilities for model simulation. Therefore we 
begin with supplementing the omitted annual observations using 3-points quadratic 
estimating interpolation. Then to generate quarterly series with sufficient volatilities, 
we follow Minford (2016) to use a Denton method. We firstly choose an instrument 
with relatively high frequency, e.g. “trade union membership” (TUM) rate in practice. 
We calculate the TUM rate by dividing TUM which is the number of employees who 
are trade union members), collected from “UK National Statistics”, by total number of 
employees. Next, use same quadratic interpolation method to achieve quarterly data 
of the TUM rate.51 Since both CCB and MCD describe how lax the regulation is, we 
then define the final instrument by IV = inverted (1 − TUM). Afterwards, we can 
yield quarterly data of CCB and MCD using Denton method.52 Lastly, these quarterly 
data are inverted (in order to describe costs instead of benefits) and scaled to [0, 1] 
(scale them to keep consistent with tax rate) using 1 −
𝑥
maximum
. We take the average 
of these transformed CCB and MCD as transformed LMR (TLMR). For the other 
incentive determinant, different from Minford (2016) we choose corporation tax rate 
(CTR) rather than marginal income tax because entrepreneurship is more sensitive to 
the former. We also expand annual CTR to quarterly using quadratic interpolation and 
calculate quarterly 𝜋𝑡
′  by the average between TLMR and CTR. The relevant data are 
                                                                                                                                                                              
from Fraser Institute on Website: 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/approach  
51 Source of TUM is https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/trade-union-statistics-2016  
52 To obtain quarterly data of x denoted by y, run “y =denton(IV,x,4,1)” in MatLab where x is annual 
data and IV is quarterly data   
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shown below where 𝜋𝑡
′  gradually decreases during the chosen time horizon. 
Figure 4: Generated Data on 𝜋𝑡
′  
 
5.2 Individual Data 
Theoretically, we should collect the data on one income group with fixed 
members. In practice, however, there are no statistics tracking same agents for 
decades. Hence, we make an assumption that although agents might move across 
income groups in different time periods, the average behaviour of one group is hardly 
to be affected. That is, we assume that the represent agent in one group is always “him” 
and this assumption is feasible if a large number of agents are included in one group 
so that we do not use too many groups but only two groups which are classified by the 
income deciles, top 10% and bottom 90% in UK. 
Data on income distributions and wealth distributions could be found from 
“World Wealth & Income Database” (WID) website and UK ONS statistics like 
“average incomes, taxes and benefits by decile groups of all households” (ITB), 
“identified personal wealth” (IPW) and “distribution among the adult population of 
marketable wealth” (AMW).53 For the 10%-90% segmentation on income and wealth, 
we use WID data. As data on consumption distribution is not available, we use “taxes 
                                                             
53 See more details on these sources in Appendix 3 
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on final goods and services” density included in the ITB statistics as an appropriate 
proxy because all the tax rates (like VAT, duty on tobacco and Vehicle excise duty, etc.) 
within this category are directly relevant to consumption and are identical across 
agents unlike income tax rates which are different across agents according to base 
income values. ITB provides amounts of tax payment by income deciles, given a 
population sample and we calculate fractions of tax payment across groups using 
group payment over total payment. Since consumption tax rates are same across 
agents, individual consumption equals the total amount multiplied by his consumption 
tax payment fraction. See Figure 5 below where although both groups have 
significantly increasing trend as aggregate data, the rich (group one) have lower 
volatilities, particularly during 2008 financial crisis. This difference across agents is 
unobservable when representative-agent models and solely aggregate data are applied. 
To estimate individual labours, we firstly estimate individual labour ratio using the 
implicit wage which is equal to marginal productivity of labour. Then individual 
labour ratio can be approximated as individual income ratio over individual wage 
ratio where the latter could be calculated from the item “wages and salaries” within 
ITB. We find individual labour ratio is quite close to the group population ratio so that 
one could also simply assume both inner-group representative agents have same 
labour. All the individual data above are transformed with group population weights, 
denoted by 𝜇𝑖 (e.g. 𝜇1 = 0.1; 𝜇2 = 0.1), to data of inner-group representative agents. 
To my knowledge, data on individual entrepreneurship time is unavailable to collect 
and that is why we substitute out 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 from model equations. Individual 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′  can be 
estimated from aggregate  𝜋𝑡
′  and individual wage distribution. Recall the 
definition  𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′ =
𝜋𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
 and  𝜋𝑡
′ =
𝜋𝑡
𝑤𝑡
 where  𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the real wage of inner-group 
representative agent i and 𝑤𝑡 is aggregate wage. We estimate 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′  as follows. 
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𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′ =
𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝜋𝑡
′ =
𝜇𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑡
𝜇𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝜋𝑡
′ =
𝜇𝑖
𝜔𝑤,i
𝜋𝑡
′  
where 𝜔𝑤,i =
𝜇𝑖∗𝑤𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑡
 is the wage share of group i which can be calculated from ITB 
statistics. Lastly, individual productivities are individual Solow residuals.  
Now we have gathered all the data we need and some annual data are transformed 
to quarterly by quadratic interpolation again. For convenient application in model 
simulation, we scale values of most variable except interest rate, labor,  𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′  and 
productivities by firstly dividing each value by a same constant (e.g. sample average 
of aggregate output) and then taking logarithm. For labours, we dividing each value 
by sample average of aggregate labour and then taking logarithm. Last of all, 
productivities are multiplied by the sample average of aggregate labour with 
power (1 − α), divided by average of aggregate output also with power (1 − α) and 
then taken logarithm.  
Figure 5: Data on individual output, capital and consumption  
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Figure 6: Estimates of individual labour and entrepreneurship penalty rate 
 
Gini-coefficient is more often used for inequality measurement in reality which is 
calculated according to the Lorenz curve (cumulative shares distribution) and used to 
describe the ratio of unequally allocated resources (e.g. income) over all so that 0 
represents completely equality and 1 represents completely inequality. However, 
Gini-coefficient has a shortcoming that it cannot tell where the inequality comes from. 
Piketty (2014) compares different inequality measurements and suggests using shares 
table, e.g. shares of each quintile, decile or percentile. We follow Piketty (2014)’s way 
to measure inequality by shares, although we have only two groups. Our model could 
work on more than two groups actually. As shown in the model-setting section, our 
inequality indicator is the top 10% decile average capital over aggregate capital. To 
keep consistent form with the prevailing expression, we can transform it to Top 10% 
shares over total. One clarification should be cleared that we simply approximate 
wealth distribution to capital distribution, different from Aiyagari and some others 
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who distinguish these two, primarily because capital and income show close tendency 
and income generally has small values relative to capital so that whether income is cut 
off from capital does not have significant effects. 10%-90% segmentation individual 
data and some inequality indicators are shown in Figure 7 where income inequality 
has a remarkable rise, especially in 1980s while capital inequality experiences a sharp 
decline at the beginning of 1990s and turns to rise afterwards. Consumption inequality 
does not perform a clear tendency in last decades. 
Figure 7: Inequality Indicators 
 
Before we close the data illustration, one more point should be noted that we need 
to increase sample size because the simulation algorithm requires original N periods 
plus the number of forecasting periods F, e.g. 50 in practice. Therefore, we extend 
non-stationary data by their trend while extend stationary data using the last period 
observation. 
 
6 Empirical Results 
6.1 Detection on tendency 
This section aims to examine whether the model simulated relation between 
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inequality and aggregate growth has a stable tendency. To check whether inequality 
and growth could be generated simultaneously, we assume that two groups are 
innitally identical with equal population weights, half-half and identical resource 
allocations. Inequality will be generated solely by innovations. As we expect the 
tendency is not occasional (parameter-independent) if it exists, parameter values are 
calibrated and freely set. Identical groups imply that data on each one is same as the 
aggregate representative-agent and thus we calibrate most parameters based on UK 
aggregate data from 1978Q1. Details of calibration are same as those shown in the 
empirical section where estimation basedon actual heterogeneous-agent data is also 
adopted and are omitted here. 
Table 1: Freely set values of key parameters 
Marginal effect of entrepreneurship time on individual productivity growth θ2 0.500 
(Negative) Marginal effect of capital term Q on individual oppurtunity cost of 
entrepreneurship 
𝜌2
𝜋 0.005 
(Negative) Marginal effect of entrepreneurship penalty rate on individual 
productivity growth for group 𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 
𝜙2,𝑖 0.850 
 
To ensure the time period is sufficiently long to observe tendency, data are 
extended to 250 periods from 1978Q1 by same way illustrated in the data section.  
6.1.1 Benchmark tendency 
First of all, to generate artificial inequalities, we randomly draw individual 
innovations from chosen normal distributions where any one group can be selected to 
be the rich by shocks rather than bootstrap innovations backed out from model 
equations because individual innovations now are same across identical agents. For 
convenience, we set the distribution mean of innovations slightly different across 
groups to make one group, say group one in practice, always be chosen as the rich; 
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otherwise inequality indicator is difficult to compute by programming.54  
One typical simulated sample is shown in Figure 8 where capital inequality is 
calculated by capital per capita in group one (now selected as the rich) over the 
aggregate capital per capita which implies that this indicator equal to unity represents 
a perfect capital equality while a value either greater than or less than unity stands for 
unequal capital distribution.  
In consideration of the non-negligible effects of actual data on simulated growth 
(for example, suppose the actual data experiences a recession at a certain period. The 
economy is hard to be pushed to boom at that period even if simulated data affected 
by model behaviours and shocks could vary differently from actual data), when think 
about aggregate growth, one can either directly compute quarterly growth rate of 
simulated output or observe the deviation of simulated data from the actual data. The 
latter measurement which is convenient for intuitive comparison with inequality due 
to relatively lower volatilities is used in Figure 8. First of all, capital inequality and 
aggregate growth are simultaneously generated in despite of some fluctuations due to 
random shocks (both are almost always greater than one) which fit most empirical 
studies that there might be a relation between inequality and growth. Second, 
aggregate growth has almost same tendency with inequality and inequality is likely to 
lead the volatilities of growth. These two findings support our point of view to some 
extent that capital inequality might stimulate growth, especially in long term. The 
short-run fluctuation also fits our theoretical prediction that labour input might be 
partly transferred to entrepreneurship time which has a temporary negative shock to 
                                                             
54 One could solely randomly draw individual shocks as they are sufficient for inequality generation. 
Specifically, individual labour supply shocks of group one are drawn using a slightly higher mean than 
those of group two in practice in order to always choose group one as the rich because our inequality 
indicator is capital per capita of the rich over aggregate per capita. Of course, there is nothing different 
if group two is selected to be the rich. This setting is only for programming convenience. 
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growth. Specifically, the increasing wealth concentration is unlikely to die out without 
policy intervention which implies that redistribution policy is necessary if policy 
makers concern social equality and stability. 
Figure 8: Tendency of the relation between aggregate growth and capital inequality 
 
To exclude the occasionality, we also conduct a Monte Carlo experiment by 
simulating 1,000 samples to examine the average relation where the aggregate growth 
rate is accurately quarterly growth rate of simulated aggregate output instead of 
deviation from actual data. For convenience, we calculate the average correlation 
coefficient between two indicators across 1,000 samples in practice and yield the 
coefficient value as 0.2726, implying a positive correlation. This qualitative finding is 
consistent with the reality where quarterly aggregate growth rate in UK is positive 
correlated with the inequality indicator measured by capital share of top 10% from 
1978Q1 to 2015Q4 and the correlation coefficient is 0.2291. Therefore, we can 
believe the stimulating effect of capital inequality on growth explained by our model. 
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6.1.2 Redistribution tendency with tax 
Equality concerning both social welfare and stability is always an important 
consideration of policy makers. Although wealth inequality in UK experiences a 
remarkable decline over two centuries, it has a significant rising tendency in recent 
decades and the tendency was not interrupted during the 2008 financial crisis. For 
example, wealth share held by top 10% in UK was 51.98% in 2006 before crisis and 
rose to 54.01% in 2009. It is noteworthy that this indicator was only 45.99% in 1990. 
Coincidentally income inequality is also exhibiting an increasing tendency. Hence, 
there is necessity to consider the redistribution problem.  
This section aims to examine the redistribution tendency by introducing an 
income taxation regime. Constant proportional tax rate will be considered for 
simplification but with various utilisations of tax revenue. For instance, tax revenue 
could be used as government spending funding, identical per capita subsidy across 
groups or even income transfer from the rich to the poor. Note that identical per capita 
subsidy is unlikely to be offset by tax payment in HAMs, quite different from that in 
representative-agent models which is the lump-sum tax. The three ways of taxation 
have different issues. Taxation with no subsidy (funding government spending) is 
simplest. However it might lead to a self-fulfilling result that inequality will be 
reduced and meanwhile economic growth will undoubtedly fall due to the decrease in 
aggregate capital used. The other two need approximation; otherwise subsidy or tax 
transfer will have no effect on individual capital accumulation and consumption 
because of the lack of individual budget constraints themselves as model equations. 
To understand this issue, consider the poor who benefit from subsidy or income 
transfer. If individual budget constraints are used as a model equation, subsidy or 
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transfer has a positive income effect on the poor like that the poor have more 
endowment to consume or accumulate capital. Nevertheless, individual budget 
constraints themselves are kicked out from model equations to omit individual bonds 
so that subsidy or transfer has no effect when the poor make the optimal decision 
because the first order derivative w.r.t. the predetermined subsidy or transfer is zero 
and is used nowhere else. We can use the following approximation to avoid this trap. 
Suppose an income tax transfer is adopted where a constant income tax rate 𝜏𝑦1 is 
enforced on the rich (group one for example). Then the tax revenue per capita across 
whole population is 𝜏𝑦1𝜇1𝑦1,𝑡 which is transferred from the rich to the poor with 
population weight  𝜇2 and thus aggregate output is unchanged, i.e.  𝜏𝑦1𝜇1𝑦1,𝑡 =
𝜏𝑦2𝜇2𝑦2,𝑡 where 𝜏𝑦2 =
𝜇1𝑌1,𝑡
𝜇2𝑌2,𝑡
𝜏𝑦1 is actually a subsidy rate for the poor. It can be 
approximated as 𝜏𝑦2 =
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1. Then individual income after taxation transfer of the 
rich is (1 − 𝜏𝑦1)𝑌1,𝑡 and the income transfer to the poor is (1 +
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1) 𝑌2,𝑡. The 
imperfection of this way is using approximation  
𝜔1
𝜔2
≈
𝜔1,𝑡
𝜔2,𝑡
, but similar 
approximation 𝜔𝑖 ≈ 𝜔𝑖,𝑡 is also used when linearise aggregation equations. 
In this section, the simplest tax regime is used where both groups are enforced a 
same constant income tax rate, say 𝜏𝑦 = 0.3, with no subsidy because to groups are 
initially identical and different due to shocks which make differences insignificant so 
that an income transfer may invert the rich to the poor. Our main target here is to 
examine a stable tendency given a policy intervention, like tax no matter what type 
used and some various tax regimes will be compared in the “Redistribution and policy 
measurement” section later. 
The individual budget constraint now is 
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(1 − 𝜏𝑦)𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟t−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
The nonlinear optimal rule for capital accumulation (6) now is 
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ1
= 𝐸𝑡 {𝛽(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1)
−Ψ1
[(1 − 𝜏𝑦)𝛼
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐾𝑖,𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛿)]}
The nonlinear optimal rule for labour supply (7) now is 
(1 − Φ)(1 − 𝑁𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ2
= Φ(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
−Ψ1
(1 − 𝜏𝑦)(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑁𝑖,𝑡
The nonlinear optimal rule for individual productivity growth (12) now is 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡
=
𝛽(1 − 𝜏𝑦)𝜃2
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖,𝑡
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝜏𝑦 + 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡)
 
All the other equations are same as those in the benchmark model. The linearised 
equations of (37), (38) and (39) take same forms as (26)-(27), (30)-(31) and (32)-(33) 
respectively except new constant terms containing tax rate which can be captured by 
“Type II Fix” of our algorithm. Coefficient  𝜙2,𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 now becomes  𝜙2,𝑖 =
𝛽(1−𝜏𝑦)𝜃2
𝑌𝑖
𝑤𝑖
(1−𝛽)(1−𝜏𝑦+𝜋′𝑖)
2 ; 𝑖 = 1,2 which differs from that in the benchmark model and thus all 
the parameter values are set same as those in previous benchmark tendency section 
except 𝜙2,𝑖 = 0.648. Following same simulation procedures, we draw same random 
shocks across models by setting same “time seed” in order to efficiently compare 
simulated behaviours with and without tax. 
Figure 9 shows one simulated sample using same random shocks as the sample in 
previous section where growth and inequality have almost same tendency, but lower 
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levels. The differences in growth rates and also capital inequality (the value simulated 
by benchmark model minus the value simulated by the model with 𝜏𝑦 = 0.3) are 
shown in Figure 10. Obviously, income tax reduces inequality and aggregate growth 
simultaneously, but the change in inequality is much more remarkable. Moreover, the 
gap due to tax is gradually enlarged. Similar findings are found after repeating this 
experiment many times and the significant tendency makes it feasible to carry on 
further analysis on actual distribution.  
Figure 9: Tendency of the relation between growth and capital inequality with tax 
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Figure 10: Experimental comparison between the tax model and benchmark model 
 
6.2 Empirical study on actual data 
The primary purpose of the empirical research is to examine whether present 
model could minic main characteristics and tendency of economic growth and 
distributions of capital and income in recent decades in UK. Then the final aim is to 
search for appropriate policy intervention instriuments and provide practical 
suggestions by analysing dynamic effects of changes in exogenous factors on growth 
and inequality. This chapter mainly consists of following sections, illustration on 
calibration and estimation, Impulse response and variance decomposation analyses, 
and redistribution.  
6.2.1 Calibration 
The capital share in production 𝛼 is set to 0.3 according to the average of annual 
labour share in UK from 1978 to 2015 reported by FRED economic data. Utility 
discount factor 𝛽 is set to 0.97 to match UK average quarterly risk-free rate 0.031. As 
Oulton and Srinivasan (2003) report the aggregate annual depreciation rate of capital 
stock in UK is 6% measured by ONS method in 2000 and has no trend to increase, we 
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set the quarterly 𝛿 = 0.015.55 Steady-state aggregate output/consumption ratio and 
capital/consumption ratio are calculated from the average ratio from 1978 to 2015. 
The steady-state quarterly growth rate of output, capital and consumption are all 
0.0057. The shares of group one’s holdings over total amount in three aggregation 
equations are calibrated to 𝜔𝑦,1 = 0.3, 𝜔𝑘,1 = 0.3 and 𝜔𝑐,1 = 0.3 respectively using 
average shares during the empirical periods while shares of group two are equal to 
one minus shares of group one. The steady-state individual labours are approximated 
to 0.5 as used to linearise equations of individual labours. The weight of consumption 
preference in utility Φ is set to 0.5. We do not estimate this parameter because any 
change in the constant terms will be corrected by the “Type II Fix” procedure in our 
algorithm and Φ only occurs as a constant term in the linearised labour equation so 
that the change on this parameter does not affect the simulated behaviours 
significantly (but could be estimated). In fact, there is an under-identified problem as I 
mentioned in Id-If section when parameters only come up in the constant terms after 
linearisation. Minford (2016) estimates states the estimated value on it is 0.5276, 
close to our setting here. Similarly some other parameters only involved in the 
constant terms after linearisation, like drifts in the linearised individual productivity 
equations 𝜙1,𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 and the drift in productivity as a function of entrepreneurship 
time θ1, are all set to the steady-state productivity growth rate 0.004. The elasticity of 
consumption in utility Ψ1 is set to unity following the value used in the proof in 
Appendix 1. Labour elasticity Ψ2 is also set to unity for simplification and one could 
estimate this parameter. The constant term in individual entrepreneurship penalty 
                                                             
55 ONS indicates that the life of capital like plant and machinery is from 25 to 30 years, longer than 
that in US and thus the relevant depreciation rate is lower than that in US.  
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equations 𝜌0
𝜋 is set to the sample average of the aggregate penalty rate.56 
Table 2: Calibrated parameter values  
Share of capital in Cobb-Douglas production 𝛼 0.3 
Utility discount rate 𝛽 0.97 
Capital depreciation rate 𝛿 0.015 
Share of conumption preference in CRRA utility Φ 0.5 
Elasticity of consumption in CRRA utility Ψ1 1 
Elasticity of labourr in CRRA utility Ψ2 1 
Steady-state net growth rate of productivity θ1 0.004 
drift in linearised productivity equation for group 1 𝜙1,1 0.004 
drift in linearised productivity equation for group 2 𝜙1,2 0.004 
drift in individual entrepreneurship penalty equations 𝜌0
𝜋 0.369 
Steady-state output share by top 10% income decile 𝜔𝑦,1 0.3 
Steady-state capital share by top 10% income decile 𝜔𝑘,1 0.5 
Steady-state consumption share by top 10% income decile 𝜔𝑐,1 0.3 
Steady-state aggregate output/consumption ratio Y/C 1.693 
Steady-state aggregate capital/consumption ratio K/C 18.43 
 
6.2.2 Estimation 
We emphasise estimation on parameters 𝜌2
𝜋 and 𝜙2,𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 where the first one 
tells us how capital distribution affects policy attitude on entrepreneurship penalty rate 
and the second tells us how this intermediate factor drives productivity growth and 
even the aggregate growth. To estimate 𝜙2,𝑖 =
𝛽𝜃2
𝑌𝑖
𝑤𝑖
(1−𝛽)(1+𝜋′𝑖)
2, we firstly estimate 𝜃2. 
Since the ratio 
𝑌𝑖
𝑤𝑖
 could be calibrated using individual observations, the determinant 
of 𝜙2,𝑖 needs to estimate is 𝜋
′
𝑖. Although 𝜋
′
𝑖  is the steady-state of individual penalty 
rate, the way to collect data on it as shown in the data section leads to possible errors 
so that we still need estimation. That is, we indirectly estimate 𝜙2,𝑖 by the parameter 
restriction. Id-If estimators are shown in Table 3. 
                                                             
56 The simulated annealing method to search global optimum is time-cost with too many parameters to 
estimate and thus we focus on key parameter estimation. 
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Table 3: Id-If estimators 
Marginal effect of entrepreneurship time on individual productivity growth θ2 0.7016 
(Negative) Marginal effect of capital term Q on individual oppurtunity cost of 
entrepreneurship 
𝜌2
𝜋 0.001 
(Negative) Marginal effect of entrepreneurship penalty rate on individual 
productivity growth for group 1 
𝜙2,1 0.7822 
(Negative) Marginal effect of entrepreneurship penalty rate on individual 
productivity growth for group 2 
𝜙2,2 0.5534 
The small estimated value of 𝜌2
𝜋, 0.001, does not mean that entrepreneurship 
penalty rate is insensitive to capital distribution and it is because penalty rate has a 
lower magnitude order than capital. The estimated 𝜙2,1 greater than 𝜙2,2 implies that 
individual productivity is more sensitive to changes in penalty rate for the rich than 
that for the poor. 
As illustrated in the Id-If section, our auxiliary model VARX takes the form of 
[
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
𝐼𝑄𝑡
] = 𝛽1 [
𝑌𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
𝐼𝑄𝑡−1
] + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
where 𝛽1 is a 3 by 3 coefficient matrix and 𝛽2 is a 3 by 2 coefficient matrix. The 
exogenous non-stationary variable vector 𝑋𝑡 = [
𝐴1,𝑡−1
𝐴2,𝑡−1
] and the error vector is 𝜀𝑡. Our 
auxiliary parameter vector used to compute the Wald statistic is 𝛽 which contains the 
9 elements in 𝛽1 and also the 3 variances of the VARX regression residuals Ω?̂?. Given 
the actual data, the estimated 𝛽1 and Ω?̂? are shown below. The VAR coefficient 0.1605 
reflects a positive effect of capital inequality on the aggregate growth. 
𝛽1 = [
0.8447    0.0164 0.1605
0.0084    0.9995 −0.0055
0.0595 −0.0285 1.0174
] ; Ω?̂? = [
5.00𝑒−5
1.02𝑒−6
1.26𝑒−5
] 
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Details of our Id-If Wald test on the null hypothesis that structural parameters are 
equal to our estimators above are shown by Table 4 and Figure 11. Obviously, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected under a 5% confidence interval (The actual Wald is 
greater than 94.35% of all the 1,008 simulated Wald statistics).57 
Table 4: Id-If Wald test result 
Wald Statistic Transformed MD Wald Percentile 
27.0396 1.5219 94.3452 % 
 
Figure 11: Distribution of simulated Wald statistics  
 
6.2.3 Structural Errors and Innovations 
Given estimators, AR coefficients of the structural errors are summarised below. 
Table 5: AR coefficients of structural errors 
𝑑𝜖𝑌,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝑌,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝐾,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝐾,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝐶,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝐶,𝑡−1
 
𝑑∆𝜖𝐴,𝑡
𝑑∆𝜖𝐴,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝐶1,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝐶1,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝐶2,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝐶2,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝑁1,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝑁1,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝑁2,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝑁2,𝑡−1
 
𝑑𝜖𝜋′,𝑡
𝑑𝜖𝜋′,𝑡−1
 
0.9651 0.9453 0.8312 0.0026 0.8892 0.8773 0.9390 0.9388 0.9705 
                                                             
57 Simulations are run 1,200 times among which some simulations do not meet format setting and thus 
no output.   
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It is introduced in the Id-If section that aggregate productivity is assumed to have 
an I(1) process. Given estimated parameters, aggregate productivity now is tested by 
ADF test and Phillips-Perron test and the process is found to apparently follow an I(1) 
shown below. 
Table 6: Unit root test on aggregate productivity 
Unit Root Test Level Trend 1st Difference 
ADF test Statistic  -0.0527 (95.10%) -1.8443 (67.67%) -11.3836 (0.00%) 
Phillips-Perron Test Statistic -0.0388 (95.24%) -2.1592 (50.74%) -11.3697 (0.00%) 
(Note: values in the parentheses are p-values) 
The structural errors and structural innovations used for bootstrapping are shown 
in Figure 12 and 13 where some errors are separated from a deterministic trend 
following the way introduced in the Id-If section. 
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Figure 12: Structural Errors 
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Figure 13: Structural Innovations 
 
6.2.4 Id-If Power Test 
Le et al (2012) and Le et al (2015) conduct Monte Carlo power test on three 
testing method Id-If, Likelihood ratio test and “unrestricted Wald” test on different 
models. Id-If is found more powerful than some other classical testing methods. To 
evaluate the power of Id-If on our model, we can provide a powerful Monte Carlo 
statistical test both against parameter mis-estimation and more importantly against 
model mis-specification, including models with different causal sequencing and 
capable apparently of providing ‘observationally equivalent’ data. We firstly generate 
500 samples from the true model and the actual data. Then given each simulated 
sample from the true model as the observation, we test the false model by Id-If and 
calculate the rejection rate out of the 500 Monte Carlo experiments. Table 7 shows the 
result of our power test against the false models with mis-estimation where both 
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structural parameters and the AR coefficients of the errors are steadily falsified by a 
percentage degree +/- x each time. The probability of rejecting the false models is 
getting higher associated with an increase in the falsity of parameters and the power is 
considerably high given a significant falseness. 
Table 7: Power test against numerical falsity of parameters 
Parameter Falseness True 1% 5% 7% 10% 
Rejection Rate with 95% Confidence 5% 13.4% 67.2% 82.6% 100% 
We then test the power of Id-If against a mis-specified model in which the basic 
mechanism of wealth inequality on entrepreneurship is turned off. Namely, the 
equations of penalty rate (34)-(35) are replaced by a simple AR(1) process. Wealth 
inequality in this false model is generated by randomness. We keep parameters same 
as the full-estimated values in the benchmark model. As the rich are still more 
sensitive to a reduction in the penalty rate (𝜙2,1 > 𝜙2,2), this mis-specified model can 
also generate both growth and rising wealth inequality but they will not be correlated. 
We still consider 500 samples and the rejection rate of this mis-specified model with 
95% confidence is as high as 99.4%. In fact, out Monte Carlo test has a limitation that 
we have to test the true model against any mis-specified model which could generate 
similar observed data. However, in practice, we selected a certain mis-specified model 
which is much more likely to generate both growth and rising capital inequality 
simultaneously than many other mis-specified models. And hence we can conclude 
that Id-If provides huge power against the mis-specified models which attempt to 
mimic the results from the true model. 
6.2.5 Impulse Response 
In this section, we analyse sequential effects of temporary shocks on the 
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aggregate economy, individual variables and also inequality indicators within 
forecasting period. The analysis is focused on some typical results and more impulse 
response (IR) figures could be found in Appendix 4. Some stationary aggregate 
shocks have same effects as in basic RBC models. For example, a positive aggregate 
production shock stimulates aggregate output, aggregate capital and consumption, 
which lead to a decrease in real interest rate. A lower interest rate induces more 
individual consumptions and more capital holdings (fewer bonds). Individual labours 
begin with a decrease because marginal utility of leisure is greater than marginal 
production of labour. Individual outputs do not catch up the sudden increase in 
aggregate output immediately, but gradually rise after a sudden fall due to the increase 
in individual capital input and individual labour recovery. Overall, capital distribution 
does not change corresponding to stationary aggregate shocks and neither do 
individual productivity growth rates. Therefore the sequential effects finally die out. It 
should be clarified that some IRs do not behave hump shapes mainly because of the 
individual capital equation where capital is too sensitive to the real interest rate 
determined by the coefficient of 𝑟t on the RHS. If one insists on performing the 
hump-shaped (Impulse responses) IRs, the “Capital Adjustment Cost (AJ)” 
originating from Hayashi (1982) can be used in individual’s budget constraint taking 
the following form. 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + [𝑘𝑖,𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝐽𝑖,𝑡] + 𝜋𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝐴𝐽𝑖,𝑡 is a convex in terms of capital and could take the form 
𝜙
2
(
𝐼𝑡
𝑘𝑡−1
)2𝑘𝑡−1 used 
by Hayashi (1982) or the form  
𝜙
2
(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡−1)
2 used by Meenagh et al (2005), 
Davidson et al (2010) and Minford (2016). The linearised capital equation generally 
takes the form below. For example, the estimated marginal effect of interest rate on 
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capital ξ4 by Minford (2016) is 0.2365.    
lnk𝑖,𝑡 = ξ1lnk𝑖,𝑡−1 + ξ2𝐸𝑡lnk𝑖,𝑡+1 + ξ3ln𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − ξ4𝑟𝑡 
In this model, we ignore the analysis on sequential effects of an aggregate 
productivity shock because the logarithm of individual productivity has a unit root 
process and thus one-period aggregate productivity shock will dominate all the other 
one-period shocks. Our focus is on individual shocks and the entrepreneurship penalty 
shock since they are vital to the dynamics of inequality. The following two figures 
show the IRs to one-period individual shock on consumption preference and labour 
supply preference respectively for group 1 (the rich). A sudden rise in consumption 
preference of the rich firstly reduces their individual capital holdings. Meanwhile, 
their individual labour also has a sudden fall because more entrepreneurship time is 
required to enhance future productivity in order to support their higher consumption 
demand in the future; although this is harmful to current individual output. Hence 
their individual output has an initial decline but gradually recovers afterwards. The 
rise in individual consumption of the rich also raises the aggregate consumption up, 
leading to a lower real interest rate which in turn stimulates individual consumption of 
the poor but with a smaller increase than the rich. Corresponding to the decrease in 
interest rate, the poor input more capital in input (transfer from bonds) and reduce 
labour input slightly to increase entrepreneurship time while the rich reduce capital 
input to satisfy the consumption requirement. Although the poor’s output also has a 
decline due to the decrease in labour input at the beginning, it recovers soon. As 
expected, finally both income inequality and capital inequality (share of holdings by 
the rich) decline. Similarly as shown in Figure 15, a sudden rise in the labour supply 
preference of the rich finally results in more unequal distributions of both capital and 
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income. 
Figure 14: IRs to a +5% one-period individual consumption shock on the rich 
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Figure 15: IRs to a +5% one-period individual labour supply shock on the rich 
 
The effects of entrepreneurship penalty rate shock are of our most interest 
because the previous individual shocks are generally non-controllable for policy 
makers. Conversely, 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′ , like a tax rate in some sense, could be intervened by 
government. As Figure 16 shows, when 𝜋𝑖,𝑡
′  due to an identical negative shock to both 
groups, first of all, both individuals have incentives to spend more time on 
entrepreneurship and this extra time is more likely to be squeezed from leisure instead 
of labour because both marginal productivity of labour and capital will rise after an 
increase in individual productivity due to the rising entrepreneurship time and more 
labour and capital will be input into production. This is shown by the figure that both 
individual labours and capital holdings go up and so do individual outputs. During 
this process, consumption starts with a decline (consume less and input more) and 
interest rate starts with an increase. One important finding is that although both 
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groups have an increase in individual income as well as capital, distributions of 
income and capital gradually become more unequal. The reason is that in despite of 
the same lower 𝜋′𝑖, the individual productivity of the rich has a higher growth rate to 
make the gap wider probably because firstly the rich have higher capital holdings per 
capita initially and secondly individual productivity is more sensitive to changes in 
penalty rate for the rich (𝜙2,1 > 𝜙2,2). This tells a policy implication that social 
inequality could be aggravated if governors attempt to reduce entrepreneurship 
penalty rate like the corporation tax rate to stimulate economic growth. 
Figure 16: IRs to a -3% one-period entrepreneurship penalty shock on both groups 
 
6.2.6 Variance Decompositions 
In order to analyse how various shocks could influent economic volatilities and 
further examine the feasibility of policy interventions (for example, if the change in 
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economic behaviour by a certain intervention is neglectable, this intervention 
instrument is infeasible), we implement variance decomposition analysis by two 
different ways.   
The first is a usual way (like IRs) to consider the dynamics of volatilities caused 
by a certain temporary shock across a period of time. Given 1,000 initial one-period 
innovations to a certain structural error (randomly draw the innovations from a normal 
distribution with mean zero and variance 0.05 in practice58), we yield 1,000 simulated 
samples and calculate the variance of each endogenous variable across the samples in 
each period. We repeat this experiment on each structural error and calculate the 
proportion of variance on a certain endogenous variable in one period caused by each 
shock out of the total variance (sum of all variances for a certain variable in one 
period). Given simulations, we can yield 16 (number of endogenous variables) groups 
of variance decompositions among which some typical analyses are shown in 
Appendix 5. For example, an aggregate capital shock initially plays an important role 
in the volatilities of real interest rate, aggregate capital and aggregate consumption, 
but the effect diminishes quite soon after several periods. Conversely, both the 
entrepreneurship penalty rate shock and the aggregate productivity shock have an 
increasing influence on volatilities of all the aggregate variables. For individual 
variables, their volatilities are all dominated by the entrepreneurship penalty rate 
shock as time goes by. Our focus now is on the time-variant volatility effects on 
aggregate output growth and inequalities since this analysis could provide a 
reasonable reference on the redistribution policy which we will discuss about in next 
section.  
                                                             
58 The distribution variance is selected to be small in case of the divergent iteration due to large 
magnitude shock. 
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Figure 17 shows the variance decomposition for aggregate growth within 25 
forecasting periods where 4 shocks (respectively on entrepreneurship penalty rate, 
aggregate productivity, aggregate capital and aggregate output) capture almost all 
fluctuations of aggregate growth and thus proportions of the other 5 shocks are 
omitted. Figure 18 below shows 5 most important shocks respectively on 
entrepreneurship penalty rate (almost the blank area), aggregate capital, individual 
labours and individual consumptions to determine volatilities of capital inequality. 
These findings suggest that to affect growth and inequality together, policy 
interventions should be levied on aggregate capital or entrepreneurship penalty rate 
because shocks on them are both determinants on volatilities of growth and inequality. 
Moreover, as stated before, adjustment on entrepreneurship penalty rate results in a 
trade-off between growth and inequality and this implies that governors could 
consider a way to control aggregate wealth for appropriate interventions. 
Figure 17: Proportions of key determinant shocks on volatilities of aggregate growth 
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Figure 18: Proportions of key determinant shocks on volatilities of capital inequality 
 
We also analyse volatilities of each endogenous variable corresponding to 
different shocks across time horizon following Minford (2016)’s way to reduce the 
errors caused by non-stationary shocks or shocks with high auto-correlation process. 
We firstly bootstrap innovations on one structural error individually to obtain 1,000 
simulated samples. Then calculate the variance of each endogenous variable along the 
time horizon and average variances over the 1,000 samples for each variable. Repeat 
this experiment on each structural error and calculate the proportions corresponding to 
different errors for each variable.59 Different from the usual way of decomposition 
which tells us whether variables are sensitive to a certain shock and whether the 
sensitivity could remain along periods, this way of decomposition tells us whether the 
change in a variable caused by a certain shock is stable across time. For example, 
proportions summarised in Table 8 below indicate that volatility of aggregate growth 
across time caused by aggregate capital shock only accounts for 0.6%, implying that 
relatively frequent adjustments on aggregate capital as well as on aggregate output, 
consumption, individual labours and individual consumptions (intervention) are 
                                                             
59 This decomposition gives us static proportions instead of time series of proportions. 
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possible because the effects on fluctuations of growth path are moderate. Contrarily, 
no shock has stable effects on the path of capital inequality and thus we have no 
preferences between different interventions suggested by the previous usual 
decomposition analysis. Overall, capital intervention is considerable to stabilise 
capital inequality and moderately affect the growth path meanwhile.     
Table 8: Unusual way (static proportions) to decompose variances of key variables  
Variable 𝜀𝑌 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐶 𝜀𝐴 𝜀𝐶1 𝜀𝐶2 𝜀𝑁1 𝜀𝑁2 𝜀𝑃′ 
R 0.17% 0.29% 0.22% 17.3% 0.26% 0.15% 13.6% 14.7% 53.4% 
Y 9.94% 10.14% 10.6% 14.2% 10.1% 10.3% 8.37% 7.14% 19.2% 
K 4.65% 4.99% 5.76% 18.7% 4.90% 5.26% 8.75% 4.58% 42.4% 
C 9.85% 9.97% 10.3% 11.6% 9.96% 10.1% 8.66% 6.95% 22.7% 
Y1 10.1% 10.3% 10.6% 12.4% 10.1% 10.4% 8.47% 9.46% 18.3% 
Y2 9.71% 9.91% 10.5% 15.4% 9.88% 10.1% 8.67% 6.14% 19.7% 
K1 5.41% 5.75% 6.50% 17.1% 5.62% 6.02% 8.85% 4.03% 40.7% 
K2 3.75% 4.08% 4.81% 20.6% 4.04% 4.32% 9.20% 6.79% 42.4% 
C1 9.88% 10.0% 10.3% 11.6% 10.0% 10.1% 8.71% 7.02% 22.4% 
C2 9.85% 9.96% 10.3% 11.6% 9.95% 10.1% 8.65% 6.94% 22.7% 
N1 3.40% 3.40% 3.40% 6.08% 3.47% 3.40% 19.9% 7.17% 49.8% 
N2 2.95% 2.96% 2.99% 6.51% 2.96% 2.97% 4.71% 9.58% 64.4% 
Growth 0.57% 0.57% 0.58% 2.03% 0.57% 0.57% 1.29% 1.66% 92.2% 
InEq.K 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 11.44 11.3% 11.6% 
InEq.Y 8.93% 8.91% 8.85% 8.85% 8.66% 8.85% 10.4% 17.7% 18.9% 
InEq.C 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 11.6% 11.3% 11.0% 11.0% 10.9% 
 
6.2.7 Comparisons between Actual and Simulated Data 
We pick up one typical simulated sample to compare with actual data on 4 
indicators, aggregate growth rate, capital inequality, income inequality and 
consumption inequality as shown in Figure 19. Here we focus on the UK economy 
before 2008 financial crisis. The present model could approximately generate the 
economic boom in 1980s, a gradual fall in 1990s and a moderate rise afterwards, but 
the simulated fluctuations are more drastic that the actual. Piketty (2014) summarise 
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that inequality in developed countries across 21th century exhibit three properties, 
wealth inequality higher than income inequality, a significant increase in income 
inequality and a sharp reduction in wealth inequality before the last decades of 21th 
century.  
Our model simulations could meet all the three properties and approximately 
perform similar tendencies of capital inequality and income inequality. Especially, the 
consumption inequality is outstandingly performed. For instance, the actual capital 
inequality from 1979Q2 to 2007Q4 has mean 51.22% and standard deviation (s.d) 
2.43% while actual income inequality during that time has mean 29.55% and s.d 
2.28%. Given the chosen simulation, capital inequality has mean 50.97% and s.d 2.63% 
while income inequality has mean 29.37% and s.d 2.69%. However, model 
behaviours cannot mimic all the cycles, like that simulated income inequality is 
obviously higher at the beginning of 1990s and much lower at the end of 1980s and at 
the second half of 1990s while simulated capital inequality has close performance. 
Overall, volatilities of simulated inequality indicators are found to be somehow higher 
by observing many simulations. Secondly, model generated growth rate is more 
fluctuated than the actual growth like that the s.d of growth rate in the selected sample 
is 1.08% while s.d of actual growth during that time is only 0.69%. This drastic 
fluctuation is probably caused by the bootstrapped innovations of the penalty rate. 
Recall the dominant effects of the penalty rate shocks on the variances across time of 
the aggregate growth analysed in the variance decomposition section. However, this 
fluctuation has a consistent trend with that of the actual growth rate and also has little 
effect on our Indirect Inference as aggregate growth is only one element out of the 
total 12 elements in our auxiliary model. But model simulation could basically mimic 
the cycles of aggregate growth such as the peak in the middle of 1980s and the bottom 
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at the beginning of 1990s.   
Figure 19: Comparisons between Actual data with one simulation 
 
We can probably explain the sharp rise in income equality before 1990s based on 
the model growth mechanism as a reduction in entrepreneurship penalty rate. Recall 
the data corporation tax rate (CCB) shown in data section where a significant decline 
in CCB results in a fall in entrepreneurship penalty rate and then leads to an increase 
in individual productivity growth and income equality rises because given an 
aggregate reduction in entrepreneurship penalty rate, the rich benefit more and could 
gain higher growth. However, we can hardly explain why capital inequality has a 
decline during that time. This question will be reconsidered in next section.  
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With regard to the relation between capital inequality and growth, same as the 
benchmark tendency experiment, our model simulations based on actual heterogeneity 
also show an approximately stimulating effect of capital inequality on aggregate 
growth in UK from 1980s to 2000s (average of correlation coefficients between these 
two items is 0.2319 across 1,000 simulations). 
6.3 Redistribution and Policy Measurement 
6.3.1 Income transfer from the rich to the poor 
In this section, we assess political interventions to redistribute capital or income 
allocations across agents. We have concluded in the tendency section that income tax 
interventions firstly do not affect the stability of behaviour tendency and secondly 
inequality might be improved to some extent while aggregate growth might be 
reduced. For the instruments of interventions, our empirical study on the benchmark 
model provides sufficient reason for the use of individual income tax. In previous 
section, it is shown that intervention on capital is a direct way to stabilise inequality 
and it could moderately affect. Conversely, other shocks may result in either too sever 
changes like the entrepreneurship penalty rate shock or too negligible influences like 
the output aggregation shock. Hence individual income tax regime which is also a 
usual instrument in practice is introduced to adjust both individual capital and 
aggregate one. 
In the tendency section, three options for individual constant income tax regime 
are suggested, tax with no subsidy, tax with same per capita subsidy and an income 
transfer tax. The first one is employed in that section because subsidy or income 
transfer might switch the rich and the poor, given initially identical groups. However, 
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this section studies actual 10%-90% income groups. As the rich is difficult to switch 
to the poor due to interventions, the latter two could be considered. We start with the 
income transfer tax. We follow the approximation introduced in that section in order 
to avoid the self-fulfilling trap where the rich (group one) is charged a constant 
income tax rate 𝜏𝑦1 and the transfer to the poor per capita relative to the poor’s 
income can be approximated by rate 𝜏𝑦2 =
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1. The linearised individual capital 
equations for the rich and the poor (26) and (27) have extra constant terms ln(1 −
𝜏𝑦1) and  ln (1 +
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1) respectively on RHS. The linearised individual labour 
equations for the rich and the poor (30) and (31) now have extra constant terms (1 +
Ψ2)
−1ln (1 − 𝜏𝑦1) and (1 + Ψ2)
−1 ln (1 +
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1) respectively. The marginal effect 
of penalty rate on individual productivity growth for the rich and the poor 
becomes  𝜙2,1 =
𝛽(1−𝜏𝑦1)𝜃2
𝑌1
𝑤1
(1−𝛽)(1−𝜏𝑦1+𝜋′1)
2 and  𝜙2,2 =
𝛽(1+
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1)𝜃2
𝑌2
𝑤2
(1−𝛽)(1+
𝜔1
𝜔2
𝜏𝑦1+𝜋′2)
2 respectively. The 
new constant terms could also be computed by “Type II Fix” step of our algorithm. 
Theoretically, various tax rates represent different models and model parameters 
should have been re-estimated. However, that is against our intentions because we are 
interested in the effects of tax rates on present model simulation (i.e. same model with 
same parameter values). Hence, we keep all the parameters same as the benchmark 
model except  𝜙2,𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 which are calculated by same estimators of other 
parameters like 𝜃2 but with tax rate used. 
Table 9: Values of marginal penalty effect on productivities given various 𝝉𝒚𝟏 
Marginal penalty effect 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.0 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.1 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.2 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.3 
𝜙2,1 0.7822 0.8144 0.8470 0.8790 
𝜙2,2 0.5534 0.5713 0.5884 0.6036 
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  Practically, we apply Id-If Wald test on the three models with various tax transfer 
rates using same auxiliary model where we bootstrap structural innovations for 
simulation rather than randomly draw from certain distributions in the tendency 
section. Test results are shown in Table 10. Although strictly speaking three models 
are rejected on 95% confidence interval, the rejection percentile is not extremely high 
for models with tax rate equal to 0.1 and 0.2 respectively. On the other hand, if one 
model were not rejected, that would be problematic because that means the 
benchmark model might not be well identified or the auxiliary model may be 
inappropriately chosen so that more than one model pass the test. In fact, rejection of 
these models does not affect our analysis since we are interested in the ceteris paribus 
effects on changes in tax rates on economic behaviours. Conversely, renewed 
estimation may interfere redistribution analysis because one can hardly conclude 
whether should attribute behaviour change to tax change or to parameter change. 
Rejection on the model with positive tax rate given current parameter values does not 
mean that the structural model cannot be the one with tax. One could estimate all the 
key parameters and probably could find a structural model with positive tax rate 
because non-zero tax in fact is closer to reality.  
Table 10: Id-If Wald test with various tax rates 
Tax Rate 𝜏𝑦1 Wald Statistic Transformed MD Wald Percentile 
0.1 28.669 1.664 95.165% 
0.2 28.858 1.691 95.478% 
0.3 31.547 1.862 96.744% 
 
Now we use actual 10%-90% data, starting with the tax rate 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.1. Structural 
innovations are bootstrapped to simulate samples and innovations in same periods are 
chosen for both models with and without tax transfer in order to exclude effects 
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caused by random shocks in different time periods. One group of simulations is 
shown by Figure 20 below. Both capital inequality and income inequality (the 
indicator is top 10% share over all) are reduced due to tax transfer and capital 
inequality changes more. Additionally, both aggregate output and growth rate have 
gradual declines in despite of fluctuations of growth rate. This seems consistent with 
the fact that the rich contribute more to entrepreneurship so that capital transfer to the 
poor lower their entrepreneurship incentives, resulting in lower aggregate growth. Our 
empirical finding on the role of tax in capital redistribution is also raised by Piketty 
(2014), although different types of tax are considered. He states that the primary 
reason for a high degree of wealth inequality is rate of return on capital greater 
economic growth rate during a long period. The third property of inequality 
introduced in previous section that wealth inequality experiences a reduction during 
the first half of the twentieth century now can be explained as a result of changes in 
tax policies such that return rates became lower. 
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Figure 20: Redistribution comparison when 𝝉𝒚𝟏 = 𝟎. 𝟏  
 
What we want to know further is to what extent aggregate growth declines and 
two what extent social inequality could be improved. To answer these, we consider 
different tax rates, say  𝜏𝑦1 = 0.2 and  𝜏𝑦1 = 0.3 for example. Comparisons are 
summarised by Figure 21 and Figure 22. It is obvious that inequalities are improved 
better while both aggregate growth and aggregate output level fall further as tax rate 
increases. To make it clear, we select several time nodes with forecasting periods to 
compare deviations due to three tax rates in Table 11. Intuitively all the changes due 
to tax including reduction in growth and improvement in inequality exhibit a gradient 
growth as tax rate uniformly rises.  
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Figure 21: Redistribution comparison when 𝝉𝒚𝟏 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
 
Figure 22: Redistribution comparison when 𝝉𝒚𝟏 = 𝟎. 𝟑 
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Table 11: Redistribution comparison using various tax rates 
Deviations (no tax-tax) 
Period 
Tax Rate   
25 50 75 100 
Aggregate Output 
0.1 0.03894% 0.12794% 0.30069% 0.74750% 
0.2 0.08383% 0.30811% 0.72281% 1.81187% 
0.3 0.13623% 0.55564% 1.31303% 3.32699% 
Aggregate Growth 
0.1 0.01235% 0.00119% 0.01905% 0.00882% 
0.2 0.02745% 0.00463% 0.04264% 0.02300% 
0.3 0.04597% 0.01120% 0.07280% 0.04622% 
Income Inequality 
0.1 0.03067% 0.22773% 0.25473% 0.70309% 
0.2 0.06651% 0.49778% 0.58279% 1.59609% 
0.3 0.10878% 0.82428% 1.01554% 2.75525% 
Capital Inequality 
0.1 0.03694% 0.24720% 0.30729% 0.84858% 
0.2 0.07984% 0.53942% 0.70329% 1.93011% 
0.3 0.13014% 0.89165% 1.22645% 3.34284% 
 
Since it has been shown that capital inequality might has a stimulating effect on 
growth, we could loosely regress the deviation of growth rate in a tax model 
simulation away from a benchmark model simulation on the deviation of capital 
inequality away from benchmark simulation and constant marginal effects are found 
not rejectable.60 We then simulate 1,000 samples for each model with same series of 
“time seed” and compute the average marginal effects of capital inequality deviations 
as 3.04% (s. d = 0.00175), 3.27% (s. d = 0.00171) and 3.50% (s. d = 0.00166) 
when tax rate equals 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 respectively. For example, the estimated 3.04% 
when tax transfer rate is 0.1 tells that as each 1% share of capital held by the rich is 
reduced compared with the benchmark model, the economy will lose 0.0304% growth 
rate compared with the benchmark model. 61  Apparently the marginal cost of 
improvement on inequality is increasingly higher as tax rate rises. Moreover, 
                                                             
60 Same “time seed” is used for both simulation and this marginal effect has nothing about the simple 
correlation coefficient between growth rate and inequality.  
61 One unit change in the inequality deviation results in 3.04% change in growth deviation and thus 1% 
change in inequality deviation results in 0.0304% change in growth deviation. 
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fluctuations of economic growth rates also become fiercer when tax rate increases 
(average s.d of growth rates are 0.000123, 0.000292 and 0.000527 at tax rate 0.1, 0.2 
and 0.3 respectively). 
The policy implication behind these findings is that policy makers need to be 
cautious if they attempt to improve inequality status by tax transfer. Although higher 
tax rate levied on the rich could rapidly narrow the wealth gap, the resulted risks of 
economic recession and economic instability are quite high. As tax rate increases, the 
cost of reducing inequality, reduction in growth, has a gradiently increasing trend 
rather than a uniformly increasing trend. This nonlinear tax effect is also found by 
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2012) who indicate that the negative tax effect on growth 
becomes more significant with an increase in tax rate. Hence the attempt to 
immediately equalise allocations across individuals by a considerably high tax rate is 
inappropriate. Although a lower long-run tax rate still has negative effects on 
economic growth, an appropriate tax transfer rate could gain a gradual and moderate 
wealth gap narrowing with a relatively low cost of growth. This trade-off between 
economic growth and social inequality needs deeper considerations and studies in the 
future.  
6.3.2 Robustness of redistribution  
In this section, we discuss about redistribution effects of various tax regimes. As 
suggested in the tendency section, one could also levy proportional tax rate on both 
groups either with subsidy or not. Now consider the regime where a constant income 
tax rate, say 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.1 for example, is still solely enforced on the rich but with no 
transfer to the poor. Model equations as well as coefficients 𝜙2,𝑖; 𝑖 = 1,2 now change 
to the ones such that the rich have same 𝜙2,1 in the previous section while the poor 
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have same 𝜙2,2 in the tendency section. For convenient comparison, same “time seed” 
used for the selected simulations by Figures 20-22 in previous section is chosen for 
current bootstrapping. Figure 23 also indicates that the cost of reducing inequality is 
still loss of growth. Additionally, this tax instrument is less efficient than the income 
transfer tax in previous section because inequality is reduced to less extent while 
growth falls more. Quantitatively, the average marginal effect of capital inequality 
deviation on growth rate deviation across 1,000 samples is 3.77% (s. d = 0.00312) 
much higher than 3.04% with same tax rate but with income transfer to the poor. This 
finding makes sense because no transfer implies total loss of aggregate capital 
accumulation used for future production in this model and therefore one can consider 
the higher marginal loss as the sum of both cost of inequality reduction and aggregate 
capital loss. 
Figure 23: Compare income tax on the rich but no transfer with benchmark model 
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Now we consider the tax regime where both the rich and the poor are charged a 
constant income tax rate, say 𝜏𝑦1 = 0.1 but with no individual subsidy (tax revenue 
all funds government spending). Model equations now take completely same forms as 
those in tendency section. Figure 24 shows results as what we expect that inequality is 
reduced to further less extent while loss of growth is much higher and also quite 
fluctuated.62 This is also one of the reasons why we do not start with this tax regime 
in previous section. Tax without any subsidy is also harmful to the economy by 
reducing aggregate capital accumulation. 
Figure 24: Compare income tax on both but no transfer with benchmark model 
 
A constant proportional income tax with any other subsidy scheme can be 
considered as a combination of the tax with no subsidy and the transfer tax. Hence the 
                                                             
62 Marginal effect of inequality deviation of growth deviation is not used here for illustration because 
the regression is lack of good fitness, although the estimated marginal effect is 7.50% much higher as 
expected. 
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empirical experiment on this tax is skipped here and undoubtedly it will have a less 
efficient redistribution effect than the transfer tax. To conclude, income tax rate 
regime regardless of the utilisation of tax revenue generally has a redistribution effect 
that inequality could be reduced with a certain loss of aggregate growth. However, 
those tax regimes with tax revenue returned to individuals have less harm to economic 
growth and those regimes with tax revenue more transferred to the poor are more 
efficient to reduce inequality. These findings are all consistent with our standpoint that 
there is a trade-off between inequality and growth.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper establishes a theoretical framework to consider the effect of wealth (capital) 
inequality on economic growth by introducing an endogenous mechanism of 
entrepreneurship incentive stimulating individual productivity growth and an effect of 
capital distribution on entrepreneurship penalty. First of all, our model could generate 
a stable tendency of the relation between capital inequality and economic growth and 
this tendency is almost independent of parameter values and population shares of 
individual groups, which make it also applicable to different countries and different 
population group-segmentations. When consider the 10%-90% income segmentation, 
model well fits main characteristics of actual data in UK from 1978Q1 to 2007Q4, 
such as wealth inequality higher than income inequality, a significant increase in 
income inequality and a sharp reduction in wealth inequality at the beginning of 
1990s. By analyzing the influence of external shocks on deviations and volatilities of 
endogenous variables, we find that some shocks have fairly large impact on both 
aggregate growth and inequality such as the shock on entrepreneurship penalty rate 
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while some shocks have almost no effect on one aspect or on both, like aggregate 
consumption shock and output aggregation shock. And some shocks could moderately 
affect both, like capital aggregation shock. This finding implies that if policy makers 
attempt to control inequality or stimulate economic growth by adjusting 
entrepreneurship penalty rate like the corporation tax rate, economy may have 
considerable fluctuations. Conversely, if the intervention is conducted on capital 
(aggregate or individual) like income tax rate, there might be acceptable and moderate 
effect on both inequality and growth. More importantly, we find capital inequality is 
most likely to stimulate economic growth and thus policy makers have to face a 
trade-off between equalisation of wealth allocation and economic stabilisation. 
Although our model only considers the mechanism of how inequality affects growth, 
we can hardly deny that growth might also have a positive effect on inequality 
because growth and inequality always exhibit a positive relation in our benchmark 
model, tendency experiment and redistribution experiment with no exception. Lastly, 
according to the comparisons on tax or not, and different income tax regimes, we find 
the tax regime which transfers income from the rich to the poor is more efficient to 
balance inequality and growth. Moreover, as tax rate rises, the cost of reducing 
inequality, reduction in growth, has a gradiently increasing trend instead of a 
uniformly increasing trend and this suggests that an appropriately low tax rate instead 
of a high rate is prior for policy makers. 
Present study also has some limitations and shortcomings. In terms of model 
setting, we assume that only a few agents within one group may switch group in each 
period and this ignores cross-group behaviors and their sequential effects; although 
this assumption is reasonable for an infinite number of agents in each group. 
Individual bonds are eliminated in linearised model equations due to the 
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unavailability of individual credit data which finally results in an inevitable 
approximation when consider tax subsidy or income transfer. Some parameters are set 
same across individuals for simplification such as the marginal effect of 
entrepreneurship incentives on individual productivity growth rate 𝜃2 which in reality 
for the rich is generally higher than the poor, implying that some empirical results 
might be more significant in reality. In the aspect of data, this paper simplifies wealth 
into capital, probably resulting in measurement errors in despite of small differences 
because wealth also contains income and individual credit in each period. Regarding 
model fitness, although model could fit behaviours of most variables and especially 
their interactions, the fitness of interest rate behaviour is not good enough and this 
also causes behaviours of individual capital not to be well fitted (despite of the good 
fitness of the relative relation between individual capitals). Additionally, both model 
simulated inequality and growth are somehow more volatile than actual ones. In the 
future on the basis of sufficient micro-data, current study could be developed by 
employing individual credit equations in the list of model equations in order to make 
different behaviours of real interest rate and by distinguishing individual capital and 
wealth, etc. furthermore, we plan to apply time-variant resource shares in linearised 
equations to consider cross-group behaviours. In terms of redistribution, more 
instruments besides income tax such as asset return tax can be considered. Last, the 
mechanism of the growth effect on inequality can be modeled in the future. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Prove 
𝑪𝒊,𝒕
𝒀𝒊,𝒕
 could also be approximated to a random walk 
Define 𝑌𝑖,?̃? = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡𝑍𝑖,𝑡  and rewrite individual budget constraint 
as 
 (1 + 𝑟t−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑖,?̃? (AP1. 1) 
The condition of no Ponzi that present value of all the future increment of bonds should 
be equal to (1 + 𝑟t−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡  implies 
(1 + 𝑟t−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖,?̃? + 𝐸𝑡 ∑
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+?̃?
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠−1)
𝑗
𝑠=1
∞
𝑗=1
Euler equation (5) can be approximated by 
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡)
Ψ1 =
1
𝛽
𝐸𝑡 [
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1)
Ψ1
(1 + 𝑟t)
] ≈
1
𝛽𝑗
𝐸𝑡 [
(𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑗)
Ψ1
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠−1)
𝑗
𝑠=1
]
For simplification, we set Ψ1 = 1 which will also be employed in the empirical study. 
Then (AP1.3) can be simplified to 
1
𝛽𝑗
𝐸𝑡 [
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑗
∏ (1+𝑟𝑡+𝑠−1)
𝑗
𝑠=1
] = 𝐶𝑖,𝑡. In fact, we could also use this 
simplified form of (Ap1.3) as long as Ψ1 is close to unity which is true in many empirical 
papers. 
Now (AP1.2) can be written as 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛽) [(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖,?̃? + 𝐸𝑡 ∑
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+?̃?
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠−1)
𝑗
𝑠=1
∞
𝑗=1
] 
where (AP1.4) means that current consumption should equal the sum of current bond gross 
return and present value of permanent income in all the future, denoted by 𝑌𝑖,𝑡⏞ = 𝑌𝑖,?̃? +
𝐸𝑡 ∑
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+?̃?
∏ (1+𝑟𝑡+𝑠−1)
𝑗
𝑠=1
∞
𝑗=1 , discounted by the rate (1 − 𝛽). 
The steady-state condition of bonds is (1 + 𝑟𝑇−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑇 = 𝑏𝑖,𝑇+1 and 𝑏𝑖,𝑡  generally follows 
an AR process before steady state, denoted by  𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 which is 
non-stationary due to the coefficient (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1).
63 This can be transformed to 
𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
=
(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)
𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
 which implies that 
𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
 before steady state approximately follow a unit root 
because the random growth rate  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
 is generally close to  𝑟𝑡−1 . Hence, (AP1.4)   
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
=
                                                             
63 For example, if consider an open economy, (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝑏𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 generally equal the net export 
which is a random in terms of output.  
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(1 − 𝛽) [(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)
𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
+
𝑌𝑖,𝑡⏞
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
] implies that  
𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
 could also be approximated to a random walk. 
   
Appendix 2: Derive the relation between the aggregate growth and inequality 
Given the linearised aggregate output equation, aggregate growth is   
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡+1 ≡ ∆ln𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝜔𝑌,1∆ln𝑌1,𝑡+1 + 𝜔𝑌,2∆ln𝑌2,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑌,𝑡+1 − 𝜀𝑌,𝑡 
Individual output growth is yielded using (24) and (25) 
ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼∆ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼)∆ln𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1 + ∆ln𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1 
Substituting out ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡, ∆ln𝑁𝑖,𝑡+1 and ∆ln𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1using (26)-(27), (30)-(31) and (32)-(33) 
yields 
∆ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜑𝑟t − ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1)
+
(1 − 𝛼)
(1 + Ψ2)
[∆ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 − Ψ1∆ln𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1 + 2
Ψ2𝜙2,𝑖
𝜃2
∆𝜋′𝑖,𝑡+1]
− 𝜙2,𝑖𝜋
′
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Taking 𝐸𝑡  on the equation above yields 
(
𝛼 + Ψ2
1 + Ψ2
) 𝐸𝑡∆ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜑𝑟t − ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1) −
(1 − 𝛼)
(1 + Ψ2)
Ψ1𝐸𝑡∆ln𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1
+
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2𝜙2,𝑖
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
𝐸𝑡𝜋
′
𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝜙2,𝑖 [
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Substituting out ∆𝐸𝑡ln𝐶𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝜋
′
𝑖,𝑡+1 and 𝜋
′
𝑖,𝑡  using (14) and (28) yields 
(
𝛼 + Ψ2
1 + Ψ2
) 𝐸𝑡∆ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1) − (𝛼𝜑 +
1 − 𝛼
1 + Ψ2
) 𝑟t
+
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2𝜙2,𝑖
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
[𝜌1
𝜋 ∙ 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌2
𝜋 ∙ 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
)]
− 𝜙2,𝑖 [
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] [𝜌1
𝜋 ∙ 𝜋′1,𝑡−1 − 𝜌2
𝜋 ∙ 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
)]
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑖,𝑡 
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To get rid of the past 𝜋′𝑖,𝑡−𝑠, 𝑠 ≥ 2, set 𝜌1
𝜋 = 0 to obtain 64 
(
𝛼 + Ψ2
1 + Ψ2
) 𝐸𝑡∆ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝛼(ln𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − ln𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1) − (𝛼𝜑 +
1 − 𝛼
1 + Ψ2
) 𝑟t
+ 𝜌2
𝜋𝜙2,𝑖 {[
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
) −
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
)}
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀′𝑖,𝑡 
Aggregating the equations above across individuals with assumption that 𝜙2,𝑖 is same 
dnoted by 𝜙2,2 across groups for simplification yields 
(
𝛼 + Ψ2
1 + Ψ2
) 𝐸𝑡(𝑔𝑡+1)
= α(ln𝑌𝑡 − ln𝐾𝑡−1) − (𝛼𝜑 +
1 − 𝛼
1 + Ψ2
) 𝑟t
+ 𝜙2,2𝜌2
𝜋 {[
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] ∑ 𝜔𝑌,𝑖𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−2
𝐾𝑡−2
) −
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
∑ 𝜔𝑌,𝑖𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
)}
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀′′𝑡
We set 𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
) =
𝜇𝑖
𝜔𝑌,𝑖
(
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
)
2
 where 𝑞𝑡 =
𝐾1,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
 also measures capital inequality and 
define the aggregate term 𝑄𝑡 ≡ ∑ 𝜔𝑌,𝑖𝑄 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
). Then 
𝑄𝑡 = ∑ 𝜔𝑌,𝑖
𝜇𝑖
𝜔𝑌,𝑖
(
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
)
2
= ∑ 𝜇𝑖 (
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
)
2
= 𝜇1(𝑞𝑡)
2 + 𝜇2 [
1
𝜇2
(1 − 𝜇1𝑞𝑡)]
2
 
𝑑𝑄𝑡
𝑑𝑞𝑡
= 2𝜇1𝑞𝑡 − 2
𝜇1
𝜇2
(1 − 𝜇1𝑞𝑡) = 2𝜇1 [𝑞𝑡 (1 +
𝜇1
𝜇2
) −
1
𝜇2
] =
2𝜇1
𝜇2
(𝑞𝑡 − 1) 
Note 
𝑑𝑄𝑡
𝑑𝑞𝑡
> 0 if 𝑞𝑡 > 1 while 
𝑑𝑄𝑡
𝑑𝑞𝑡
< 0 if 𝑞𝑡 < 1 and 𝑞𝑡 =
𝐾1,𝑡−1
𝐾𝑡−1
< 1 means group 2 has 
higher average capital, still inequality. It concludes that 𝑄𝑡  has minimum at perfect equality 
(𝑞𝑡 = 1). Equation (AP2.1) now can be rewritten as 
(
𝛼 + Ψ2
1 + Ψ2
) 𝐸𝑡(𝑔𝑡+1)
= 𝜙2,2𝜌2
𝜋 {[
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] 𝑄𝑡−1 −
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
𝑄𝑡} + ⋯
The aggregate growth above is still complicated due to both current and lagged 
inequality terms. However, if we consider a mid-term or a long-term growth by summing up 
temporary growth rates within a long time period, we yield the following 65 
                                                             
64 This assumption will not change the direction of inequality effect on growth but make this effect 
magnified. 
65 For the long-run growth rate, we use an approximation that ∏ (1 + 𝑔𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 ≈ 1 + ∑ 𝑔𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  
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(
𝛼 + Ψ2
1 + Ψ2
) 𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔
≈ 𝜙2,2𝜌2
𝜋 {[
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] ∑ 𝑄𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡=0
−
2(1 − 𝛼)Ψ2
(1 + Ψ2)𝜃2
∑ 𝑄𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0
} + ⋯ 
Since the other growth determinant real interest rate endogenously depends on lagged 
output and capital, both short-run and long-run growth rate in (AP2.2) and (AP2.3) could be 
approximated as a reduced form of lagged output, capital and inequality which is the usual 
form of existing empirical regression studies. Note that 𝑄𝑡 > 0 and ∑ 𝑄𝑡−1
𝑇
𝑡=0 ≈ ∑ 𝑄𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0  for 
long term. Since [
2(1−𝛼)Ψ2
(1+Ψ2)𝜃2
+ 1] >
2(1−𝛼)Ψ2
(1+Ψ2)𝜃2
, this long-run growth rate is minimised when 
capital distribution is always perfectly equality. Importantly, the stimulating effect in very 
short term is not as clear as that in long term because when inequality stimulates 
entrepreneurship incentives, labour input in production will have a decline which implies a 
negative but temporary effect on growth.  
 
Appendix 3: Data source of ITB, IPW and AMW 
ITB does not include data on wealth distribution. IPW only covers annual data from 2001 
to 2015. And AMW collects annual data from 1976 to 2005. If the 50%-50% segmentation is 
considered, one has to combine IPW and AMW to estimate because WID only provides top 1% 
and top 10% shares. Furthermore, the wealth share of bottom 50% agents is quite small, 
inconvenient for model use. 
Source of ITB: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/inco
meandwealth/datasets/averageincomestaxesandbenefitsbydecilegroupsofallhouseholds 
Source of IPW: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/table-138-identified-personal-wealth-analysis-by-de
cile 
Source of AMW: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120406010108/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/per
sonal_wealth/archive.htm 
 
Appendix 4: Impulse Responses in the benchmark model not used in the body 
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Figure 25: IRFs to a +5% one-period aggregate output shock 
 
Figure 26: IRs to a +5% one-period aggregate capital shock 
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Figure 27: IRs to a +5% one-period aggregate consumption (market clearing) shock  
 
Appendix 5: Variance decomposition using the IRs way 
Table 12: Usual way (IRs way) to decompose variances of interest rate 
Periods 𝜀𝑌 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐶 𝜀𝐴 𝜀𝐶1 𝜀𝐶2 𝜀𝑁1 𝜀𝑁2 𝜀𝑃′ 
1 1.38% 31.34% 0.48% 46.34% 1.17% 0.24% 6.64% 4.30% 8.13% 
2 2.97% 63.11% 0.86% 23.98% 0.45% 0.45% 4.19% 1.20% 2.78% 
3 3.51% 72.30% 0.87% 6.88% 0.07% 0.48% 1.71% 0.04% 14.14% 
4 3.73% 74.50% 0.81% 1.10% 0.00% 0.47% 0.68% 0.15% 18.56% 
5 3.97% 76.65% 0.76% 0.01% 0.02% 0.46% 0.26% 0.66% 17.22% 
6 4.24% 79.31% 0.73% 0.84% 0.05% 0.45% 0.08% 1.27% 13.03% 
7 4.52% 81.74% 0.69% 2.57% 0.10% 0.45% 0.01% 1.89% 8.03% 
8 4.75% 83.19% 0.66% 4.73% 0.13% 0.44% 0.00% 2.46% 3.63% 
9 4.90% 83.01% 0.62% 7.01% 0.17% 0.42% 0.02% 2.93% 0.92% 
10 4.94% 81.00% 0.57% 9.14% 0.19% 0.40% 0.05% 3.27% 0.44% 
11 4.87% 77.33% 0.52% 10.94% 0.20% 0.37% 0.09% 3.47% 2.21% 
12 4.72% 72.46% 0.47% 12.34% 0.21% 0.34% 0.13% 3.54% 5.81% 
13 4.51% 66.96% 0.41% 13.33% 0.20% 0.31% 0.16% 3.52% 10.62% 
14 4.26% 61.30% 0.36% 13.97% 0.20% 0.27% 0.18% 3.42% 16.04% 
15 4.01% 55.86% 0.32% 14.33% 0.19% 0.25% 0.20% 3.28% 21.57% 
16 3.77% 50.82% 0.28% 14.50% 0.18% 0.22% 0.21% 3.13% 26.88% 
17 3.55% 46.31% 0.25% 14.55% 0.17% 0.20% 0.23% 2.97% 31.78% 
18 3.35% 42.34% 0.23% 14.54% 0.16% 0.18% 0.23% 2.81% 36.16% 
19 3.17% 38.91% 0.20% 14.49% 0.15% 0.16% 0.24% 2.67% 40.01% 
20 3.03% 35.94% 0.19% 14.44% 0.15% 0.15% 0.24% 2.54% 43.33% 
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Table 13: Usual way (IRs way) to decompose variances of aggregate output 
Periods 𝜀𝑌 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐶 𝜀𝐴 𝜀𝐶1 𝜀𝐶2 𝜀𝑁1 𝜀𝑁2 𝜀𝑃′ 
1 15.21% 1.56% 0.02% 60.00% 0.73% 0.01% 3.19% 11.96% 7.33% 
2 14.90% 0.10% 0.00% 63.63% 0.44% 0.00% 1.93% 14.05% 4.95% 
3 10.77% 0.54% 0.02% 49.40% 0.25% 0.01% 1.06% 10.87% 27.09% 
4 7.32% 1.38% 0.04% 35.82% 0.16% 0.02% 0.66% 7.42% 47.18% 
5 5.15% 2.03% 0.04% 26.70% 0.12% 0.02% 0.46% 5.12% 60.36% 
6 3.81% 2.47% 0.05% 20.86% 0.09% 0.03% 0.34% 3.69% 68.66% 
7 2.96% 2.74% 0.05% 17.01% 0.08% 0.03% 0.28% 2.79% 74.08% 
8 2.39% 2.93% 0.04% 14.39% 0.07% 0.03% 0.23% 2.19% 77.74% 
9 2.00% 3.05% 0.04% 12.53% 0.06% 0.03% 0.20% 1.78% 80.32% 
10 1.72% 3.13% 0.04% 11.18% 0.05% 0.03% 0.18% 1.49% 82.20% 
11 1.51% 3.18% 0.04% 10.16% 0.05% 0.03% 0.16% 1.27% 83.60% 
12 1.35% 3.22% 0.04% 9.40% 0.04% 0.02% 0.15% 1.11% 84.67% 
13 1.23% 3.25% 0.03% 8.81% 0.04% 0.02% 0.14% 0.99% 85.49% 
14 1.14% 3.28% 0.03% 8.36% 0.04% 0.02% 0.13% 0.89% 86.11% 
15 1.07% 3.30% 0.03% 8.01% 0.04% 0.02% 0.13% 0.82% 86.59% 
16 1.01% 3.33% 0.03% 7.75% 0.04% 0.02% 0.12% 0.76% 86.95% 
17 0.97% 3.36% 0.03% 7.56% 0.04% 0.02% 0.12% 0.71% 87.21% 
18 0.93% 3.39% 0.03% 7.43% 0.04% 0.02% 0.12% 0.67% 87.38% 
19 0.91% 3.43% 0.03% 7.35% 0.03% 0.02% 0.12% 0.64% 87.48% 
20 0.89% 3.47% 0.03% 7.31% 0.03% 0.02% 0.12% 0.61% 87.51% 
Table 14: Usual way (IRs way) to decompose variances of aggregate capital 
Periods 𝜀𝑌 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐶 𝜀𝐴 𝜀𝐶1 𝜀𝐶2 𝜀𝑁1 𝜀𝑁2 𝜀𝑃′ 
1 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 1.01% 89.62% 0.35% 6.53% 0.24% 0.17% 0.39% 1.12% 0.57% 
3 1.79% 81.87% 0.54% 11.75% 0.36% 0.28% 0.57% 2.12% 0.72% 
4 2.21% 75.13% 0.58% 14.73% 0.38% 0.31% 0.61% 2.72% 3.33% 
5 2.39% 68.04% 0.56% 16.19% 0.36% 0.31% 0.59% 2.98% 8.58% 
6 2.42% 60.74% 0.50% 16.62% 0.33% 0.29% 0.56% 3.02% 15.53% 
7 2.36% 53.70% 0.44% 16.41% 0.29% 0.26% 0.51% 2.91% 23.12% 
8 2.25% 47.27% 0.37% 15.85% 0.26% 0.23% 0.47% 2.74% 30.56% 
9 2.12% 41.62% 0.32% 15.13% 0.23% 0.21% 0.43% 2.53% 37.41% 
10 2.00% 36.78% 0.27% 14.38% 0.20% 0.18% 0.39% 2.33% 43.47% 
11 1.88% 32.69% 0.23% 13.66% 0.18% 0.16% 0.36% 2.15% 48.71% 
12 1.77% 29.24% 0.20% 13.00% 0.16% 0.14% 0.33% 1.98% 53.18% 
13 1.67% 26.35% 0.18% 12.41% 0.15% 0.13% 0.31% 1.83% 56.98% 
14 1.59% 23.93% 0.15% 11.90% 0.13% 0.11% 0.29% 1.70% 60.19% 
15 1.52% 21.89% 0.14% 11.47% 0.12% 0.10% 0.28% 1.59% 62.90% 
16 1.46% 20.17% 0.12% 11.12% 0.11% 0.09% 0.26% 1.49% 65.17% 
17 1.41% 18.72% 0.11% 10.82% 0.10% 0.09% 0.25% 1.41% 67.08% 
18 1.37% 17.49% 0.10% 10.60% 0.10% 0.08% 0.25% 1.34% 68.68% 
19 1.34% 16.46% 0.10% 10.42% 0.09% 0.07% 0.24% 1.28% 70.00% 
20 1.32% 15.58% 0.09% 10.31% 0.09% 0.07% 0.24% 1.23% 71.09% 
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Table 15: Usual way (IRs way) to decompose variances of aggregate consumption 
Periods 𝜀𝑌 𝜀𝐾 𝜀𝐶 𝜀𝐴 𝜀𝐶1 𝜀𝐶2 𝜀𝑁1 𝜀𝑁2 𝜀𝑃′ 
1 0.55% 19.14% 0.19% 26.00% 9.00% 26.08% 2.63% 1.70% 14.72% 
2 0.89% 27.82% 0.26% 9.75% 4.39% 13.02% 1.25% 0.36% 42.27% 
3 1.10% 32.48% 0.27% 2.69% 2.02% 6.28% 0.53% 0.01% 54.62% 
4 1.36% 38.52% 0.30% 0.39% 1.05% 3.42% 0.25% 0.06% 54.66% 
5 1.74% 47.01% 0.33% 0.08% 0.58% 2.02% 0.11% 0.29% 47.83% 
6 2.23% 58.00% 0.38% 1.06% 0.32% 1.23% 0.04% 0.67% 36.07% 
7 2.76% 69.32% 0.43% 3.14% 0.16% 0.72% 0.01% 1.16% 22.31% 
8 3.17% 76.59% 0.44% 5.90% 0.06% 0.37% 0.00% 1.64% 11.83% 
9 3.21% 74.95% 0.41% 8.29% 0.01% 0.15% 0.01% 1.92% 11.04% 
10 2.90% 65.29% 0.34% 9.47% 0.00% 0.05% 0.03% 1.92% 20.01% 
11 2.43% 52.78% 0.26% 9.49% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 1.73% 33.26% 
12 1.97% 41.41% 0.19% 8.89% 0.01% 0.00% 0.05% 1.48% 46.00% 
13 1.60% 32.44% 0.15% 8.09% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 1.25% 56.41% 
14 1.31% 25.72% 0.11% 7.31% 0.02% 0.01% 0.06% 1.05% 64.41% 
15 1.09% 20.75% 0.09% 6.62% 0.02% 0.01% 0.06% 0.90% 70.46% 
16 0.93% 17.05% 0.07% 6.04% 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 0.77% 75.05% 
17 0.80% 14.26% 0.06% 5.55% 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 0.67% 78.56% 
18 0.71% 12.13% 0.05% 5.15% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.59% 81.29% 
19 0.63% 10.47% 0.04% 4.82% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.53% 83.43% 
20 0.57% 9.16% 0.04% 4.54% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 0.48% 85.14% 
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